Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
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Appellant Kojuan Miles was convicted of the sexual assault and compelled prostitution of a fifteen-year-old complainant. The jury assessed punishment at seven and twenty-three years’ incarceration respectively. The trial court cumulated the sentences. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed judgment in the sexual-assault case, but modified the judgment in the compelling-prostitution case to delete the cumulation order and affirmed that judgment as modified. On direct appeal, appellant argued the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively and contended that the cumulation statute did not authorize stacking a sentence for compelling prostitution onto a sentence for sexual assault of a child when both offenses arose from the same criminal episode and are prosecuted in a single criminal action. Finding no error in the appellate court’s revision of the trial court’s sentence, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. View "Miles v. Texas" on Justia Law

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In 2008, appellant David Lea was sentenced to two years’ confinement for his conviction on child pornography charges. On counts two and three, he was sentenced to ten years, which was probated for ten years. Four years later Lea pled guilty to a single count of improper photography, for which he received a two-year sentence. That same day, the State moved to revoke Lea’s community supervision on counts two and three for which he had previously been on probation. Two years later, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the offense of “improper photography” was facially unconstitutional because it was overbroad and infringed upon protected First Amendment speech. Lea appealed the revocation of his probation on that ground, that the statute the State used as basis for its revocation argument was now unconstitutional. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and granted relief. View "Ex parte David Lea" on Justia Law

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Appellant Jeremy Thomas, was tried for the murder of Vernon Keith Moses. While the jurors were deliberating guilt, they requested that the court read to them a portion of a witness’s testimony which the trial court allowed. The jury resumed deliberations and ultimately found Appellant guilty. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison. On direct appeal, Appellant claimed that the trial court erred by reading too little testimony to the jury. The First Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court erred under Article 36.28 by failing to read additional testimony that would have been responsive to the jury’s request, but it also held that the error was harmless and therefore affirmed Appellant’s conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the trial court’s error was harmless and affirmed the judgment of the First Court of Appeals. View "Thomas v. Texas" on Justia Law

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Antonio Sepeda applied for the writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his due process rights were denied when a letter denying him parole did not comply with Texas Government Code section 508.1411. After ordering briefing on the issues raised, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the writ of habeas corpus was the proper remedy by which to compel the Board of Pardons and Paroles (the “Board”) to provide a parole-denial letter in compliance with section 508.1411 and that the section did not create a liberty interest protected by due process. After considering the statutes, the pleadings of the parties, and the most recent notice of denial of parole sent to applicant by the Board, the Court denied relief. View "Sepeda v. Texas" on Justia Law

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In 2013, Appellee Victor Manuel Schunior, Jr. was indicted on four counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, all of which arose out of a single incident. According to the indictment, the counts occurred on or around February 19, 2011. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss and a pre-trial application for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the State was barred from prosecution because the statute of limitations for aggravated assault had run. Finding that the correct statute of limitations for the aggravated assault charged was two years, the trial court granted Appellee’s request for habeas relief and dismissed the indictment with prejudice. The State appealed, arguing that Article 12.01(7) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure applied a three-year limitation period for aggravated assault. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the indictment. After review of the appellate court's judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that aggravated assault was governed by Article 12.03(d), not Article 12.01(7), and that the lesser-included offense with the greater limitation period did not control. View "Schunior v. Texas" on Justia Law

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In February 2014, a jury convicted Juan Balderas of capital murder committed in December 2005, for which he received the death sentence. Appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals was automatic; Balderas raised nine issues to support overturning his sentence. Taking each in turn and finding no merit to any of those arguments, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and Balderas' death sentence. View "Balderas v. Texas" on Justia Law

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Applicant Garcia White was sentenced to death. In a subsequent habeas application, applicant claimed that, if certain newly discovered scientific evidence had been available at trial, it would likely have changed the jury’s answers to the special issues. Applicant claimed that this new evidence entitled him to relief under Article 11.073. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that it did not, because evidence that would have changed only punishment did not satisfy Article 11.073’s requirement that the new evidence show that applicant “would not have been convicted.” Consequently, the Court dismissed the application. View "Ex parte Garcia Glen White" on Justia Law

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In 2004, Appellant Anthony Metts pled guilty to two charges of sexual assault of a child and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for each offense. Before Appellant entered his plea, he and a prosecutor representing the State appeared at a status hearing to waive Appellant’s right to a jury trial. The prosecutor later became a district court judge and, nine years later, she adjudicated Appellant guilty and sentenced him to ten years of confinement for each offense. On appeal, Appellant argued for the first time that the trial court’s judgments were void because the judge was constitutionally and statutorily disqualified from presiding over cases in which she had previously acted as counsel for the State. The court of appeals rejected Appellant’s assertions and affirmed the trial court’s judgments. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted Appellant’s petition for discretionary review to consider his contention that the court of appeals erred by holding that the trial judge’s prior involvement in the cases as a prosecutor did not render her constitutionally and statutorily disqualified from adjudicating Appellant’s guilt. Agreeing that the trial judge should have been disqualified, the Court vacated the judgments of the court of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Metts v. Texas" on Justia Law

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Appellant Aaron Moore was charged with Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child. Although he was 16 years old at the time of the offense, charges were not filed until after his 18 birthday. Because Appellant was over 18 years of age when charges were filed, the State filed a petition for discretionary transfer from juvenile court to criminal district court, which was granted. The criminal district court deferred adjudication and placed Appellant on 5 years’ community supervision. Appellant appealed, claiming that the juvenile court improperly transferred the case because the State failed to show that, for reasons beyond the control of the State, it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before his 18th birthday as required under Family Code Section 54.02(j)(4)(A). The court of appeals vacated the trial court’s judgment, holding that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to transfer the case. The State filed a petition for discretionary review to the Court of Criminal Appeals, which was granted to determine whether the court of appeals’s construction of “the state” in Family Code Section 54.02(j)(4)(A) required dismissal of a case with prejudice without consideration of the factors for oppressive delay in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed. View "Moore v. Texas" on Justia Law

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Appellants Kenneth and Shelley Walker were charged with and convicted of causing injury to a child when they were alleged to have immersed their granddaughter's feet in scalding hot water, causing her to suffer second-degree burns to her feet and ankles. The Walkers were sentenced to 25 years each. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. In consolidated appeals, appellants contended that the court of appeals erred in holding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain their convictions. Specifically, appellants argued the jury’s conclusion that they intentionally immersed the child's feet in the hot water was based on the drawing of multiple unreasonable inferences and was thus too speculative to give rise to any criminal liability in this case. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded after review of the trial court record that the evidence in this case could rationally be said to establish nothing more than a mere suspicion of wrongdoing by appellants, the evidence was insufficient to prove that either appellant engaged in the conduct at issue in this case–namely intentionally immersing the child in hot water. Therefore, the Court held that no reasonable trier of fact could have found all the elements of the offense of injury to a child beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, the Court held that, given that the evidence failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of any criminal conduct by either appellant, the convictions could not be reformed to any lesser-included offense. The Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and rendered judgments of acquittal. View "Walker v. Texas" on Justia Law