Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Appellant Alvin Henry Jr. of evading arrest with a motor vehicle. At the punishment stage of trial, the jury found that Henry was previously convicted of two felony offenses, resulting in an enhanced sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment. Henry appealed, arguing that the State, during punishment, “failed to prove that he was the same person who had committed the extraneous offenses introduced during punishment, including the two prior felony offenses used to increase his range of punishment.” The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. And finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals. View "Henry v. Texas" on Justia Law

In July 2013, a jury convicted appellant Albert Love, Jr. of capital murder for the 2011 murders of Keenan Hubert and Tyus Sneed during the same criminal transaction. He received the death penalty. Appellant raised eleven points of error on automatic appeal. After reviewing those alleged errors, the Court of Criminal Appeals found appellant’s sixth point of error, regarding the warrantless seizure of his text messages, to have merit. Consequently, the Court reversed the trial court’s judgment and sentence of death, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Love v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Appellant Alvin Peter Henry Jr. of evading arrest with a motor vehicle. At the punishment stage of trial, the jury found that Henry was previously convicted of two felony offenses, resulting in an enhanced sentence of sixty years’ imprisonment. Henry appealed, arguing that the State, during punishment, “failed to prove that he was the same person who had committed the extraneous offenses introduced during punishment, including the two prior felony offenses used to increase his range of punishment.” The court of appeals found that the State had presented sufficient evidence to link Henry to the prior convictions used to enhance his punishment and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. Henry challenged the sufficiency ruling to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding the evidence sufficient to support Henry's conviction, the Court affirmed the enhancement allegations. View "Henry v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Damon Asberry was charged with a murder that occurred in 2003, indicted in 2007, and convicted by a jury in 2008. In preparation for trial, some items of evidence had been subjected to DNA testing. Appellant argued on appeal to the court of appeals that the trial court had erred by failing to appoint an expert for an independent examination of the DNA evidence. The Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and life sentence in 2009. In his petition for discretionary appeal, appellant argued that the court of appeals had improperly required that he file an affidavit from an expert in order for the trial court to approve funds for an independent DNA examination. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals, saying that while “its opinion mentioned the lack of affidavits, expert or otherwise, it did not hold that an affidavit from an expert was required,” only that appellant must provide “some evidence in support of the motion” for appointment of an expert. In 2013, appellant filed a motion, pursuant to Chapter 64, for retesting of DNA evidence. The trial court ruled that, based on the entire record, the new testing would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Before ruling on the motion, the trial court had reviewed the entire record, including the testimony from the original trial, but because the earlier testimony was not formally entered into evidence, the court of appeals declined to consider it, citing to its own precedent and holding that “testimony from a previous trial cannot be considered by the trial judge at a subsequent trial unless it is admitted into evidence at the subsequent proceeding.” The Court of Criminal Appeals held that all of the evidence that was before the trial court before it made its ruling should have been made available to, and considered by, the reviewing court. The Court therefore remanded this case to the court of appeals for reconsideration. View "Asberry v. Texas" on Justia Law

Shirley Copeland was charged with possession of a dangerous drug after police searched the vehicle she was in and found prescription pain medication in a plastic bag. She filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search of the car was illegal. The trial court granted the motion and sua sponte issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State appealed the trial court's suppression order three times, initially focusing on whether the police had the consent of the driver and Copeland to search the vehicle. The Court of Criminal Appeals, on second remand, instructed the court of appeals to determine if there was an alternative theory of law upon which to uphold the ruling of the trial court. Specifically, the Court noted that, in her motion to suppress, Copeland argued that the length of her detention was unreasonable but that the State did not challenge that argument on appeal. On remand, the court of appeals held that the State procedurally defaulted the length-of-detention issue, reasoning that because the State argued at trial that the length of Copeland’s detention was reasonable, the issue was a theory applicable to the case, and as a result, the State was obliged to make that argument on appeal or forfeit it through inaction. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals exercised its discretionary review power to determine: (1) whether the court of appeals erred when it held that the State procedurally defaulted the length-of-detention issue; and (2) whether the court of appeals properly performed the analysis instructed by the Court. Because the Court agreed with the court of appeals that the State procedurally defaulted the length-of-detention issue on appeal, it affirmed the court of appeals. View "Texas v. Copeland" on Justia Law

Appellant Kojuan Miles was convicted of the sexual assault and compelled prostitution of a fifteen-year-old complainant. The jury assessed punishment at seven and twenty-three years’ incarceration respectively. The trial court cumulated the sentences. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed judgment in the sexual-assault case, but modified the judgment in the compelling-prostitution case to delete the cumulation order and affirmed that judgment as modified. On direct appeal, appellant argued the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his sentences consecutively and contended that the cumulation statute did not authorize stacking a sentence for compelling prostitution onto a sentence for sexual assault of a child when both offenses arose from the same criminal episode and are prosecuted in a single criminal action. Finding no error in the appellate court’s revision of the trial court’s sentence, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. View "Miles v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2008, appellant David Lea was sentenced to two years’ confinement for his conviction on child pornography charges. On counts two and three, he was sentenced to ten years, which was probated for ten years. Four years later Lea pled guilty to a single count of improper photography, for which he received a two-year sentence. That same day, the State moved to revoke Lea’s community supervision on counts two and three for which he had previously been on probation. Two years later, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the offense of “improper photography” was facially unconstitutional because it was overbroad and infringed upon protected First Amendment speech. Lea appealed the revocation of his probation on that ground, that the statute the State used as basis for its revocation argument was now unconstitutional. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and granted relief. View "Ex parte David Lea" on Justia Law

Appellant Jeremy Thomas, was tried for the murder of Vernon Keith Moses. While the jurors were deliberating guilt, they requested that the court read to them a portion of a witness’s testimony which the trial court allowed. The jury resumed deliberations and ultimately found Appellant guilty. Appellant was sentenced to life in prison. On direct appeal, Appellant claimed that the trial court erred by reading too little testimony to the jury. The First Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court erred under Article 36.28 by failing to read additional testimony that would have been responsive to the jury’s request, but it also held that the error was harmless and therefore affirmed Appellant’s conviction. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed that the trial court’s error was harmless and affirmed the judgment of the First Court of Appeals. View "Thomas v. Texas" on Justia Law

Antonio Sepeda applied for the writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his due process rights were denied when a letter denying him parole did not comply with Texas Government Code section 508.1411. After ordering briefing on the issues raised, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the writ of habeas corpus was the proper remedy by which to compel the Board of Pardons and Paroles (the “Board”) to provide a parole-denial letter in compliance with section 508.1411 and that the section did not create a liberty interest protected by due process. After considering the statutes, the pleadings of the parties, and the most recent notice of denial of parole sent to applicant by the Board, the Court denied relief. View "Sepeda v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2013, Appellee Victor Manuel Schunior, Jr. was indicted on four counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, all of which arose out of a single incident. According to the indictment, the counts occurred on or around February 19, 2011. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss and a pre-trial application for habeas corpus relief, arguing that the State was barred from prosecution because the statute of limitations for aggravated assault had run. Finding that the correct statute of limitations for the aggravated assault charged was two years, the trial court granted Appellee’s request for habeas relief and dismissed the indictment with prejudice. The State appealed, arguing that Article 12.01(7) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure applied a three-year limitation period for aggravated assault. The court of appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing the indictment. After review of the appellate court's judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that aggravated assault was governed by Article 12.03(d), not Article 12.01(7), and that the lesser-included offense with the greater limitation period did not control. View "Schunior v. Texas" on Justia Law