Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Shirley Copeland was charged with possession of a dangerous drug after police searched the vehicle she was in and found prescription pain medication in a plastic bag. She filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the search of the car was illegal. The trial court granted the motion and sua sponte issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. The State’s initial appeals focused on whether the police had the consent of the driver and Copeland to search the vehicle. In the first appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that Copeland could not deny consent for police to search the vehicle when the driver and registered owner of the vehicle did consent to the search. In the next appeal, the Court held that the State did not procedurally default its argument at trial or on appeal that the driver freely and voluntarily gave his consent to search his vehicle. The case was remanded with instructions that the court of appeals determine if there was an alternative theory of law upon which to uphold the ruling of the trial court. Specifically, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that, in her motion to suppress, Copeland argued that the length of her detention was unreasonable but that the State did not challenge that argument on appeal. On remand, the court of appeals held that the State procedurally defaulted the length-of-detention issue. The State appealed, and the Court of Criminal Appeals exercised its discretionary review power to determine: (1) whether the court of appeals erred when it held that the State procedurally defaulted the length-of-detention issue; and (2) whether the court of appeals properly performed the analysis as instructed. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the court of appeals that the State procedurally defaulted the length-of-detention issue on appeal, and affirmed. View "Texas v. Copeland" on Justia Law

Holding that a traffic stop was illegal, the trial court granted a motion to suppress. One of the State’s arguments on appeal was that, if the police officer was mistaken about whether appellee Jose Cortez had committed a traffic offense, the traffic stop was nevertheless legal as a reasonable mistake of law under "Heien v. North Carolina," (135 S.Ct 530 (2014)). Citing precedential cases that predated "Heien," the court of appeals concluded that even a reasonable mistake about the law would not justify a stop. However, the court of appeals did not discuss Heien. After review of this case, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the court of appeals failed to address every issue necessary to the disposition of this case case. Consequently, the Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration under Heien. View "Texas v. Cortez" on Justia Law

Appellant Sir Melvin Wright, Jr. was indicted for failing to register as a sex offender. On direct appeal from the revocation of “regular” community supervision, appellant contended that his sentence was illegal. He argued that the court of appeals erred in applying the habeas harm analysis from "Ex parte Parrott," (396 S.W.3d 531 (2013)) to his case on direct appeal. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals rejected appellant’s complaint because his illegal-sentence claim on was a collateral attack on the judgment from the original plea proceeding. Consequently, the court of appeals' judgment was affirmed. View "Wright v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Civil Rights Division of the Harris County District Attorney’s Office received a complaint alleging that appellee Jimmy Drummond, a sergeant in the Harris County Constable’s Office, engaged in official oppression when he used excessive force while arresting five individuals. Seven days after the complaint was received, and one day before the expiration of the statute of limitations, a probable-cause affidavit was presented to a magistrate who agreed with the State and authorized the issuance of a capias. That same day, an assistant district attorney charged Drummond with official oppression. About three months after the State filed the document in question, a grand jury returned an indictment based on the same allegations, but the indictment did not include tolling language. Drummond filed a motion to quash based on the lack of that language, but before the judge ruled on the motion, a grand jury returned a second indictment that included tolling language. Drummond argued that both indictments should have been quashed, and the trial court agreed. The issue for the Court of Criminal Appeals' review was whether the State successfully tolled the statute of limitations. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the State had not tolled the statute of limitations too, holding that, because the State was required to present an information or indictment to prosecute the Class A misdemeanor offense of official oppression, the statute of limitations was not tolled when it presented only a complaint. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the document constituted a complaint and information, and the filing was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals, set aside the trial court’s order granting the motion to quash, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Drummond v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Dewan Morgan was convicted of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to sixteen years’ imprisonment. Concluding that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury finding that Appellant entered a habitation “without the effective consent of the owner,” the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction because Appellant was a "cotenant" of the apartment he broke into. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with that holding because, under the facts of this case, it ran contrary to the Texas Penal Code’s definition of "owner" as a person with "a greater right to possession of the property than the actor." Appellant’s girlfriend, as the complainant, was the "owner" of the apartment because she held a greater right to possession than Appellant. And, at the time of the commission of the offense, Appellant did not have her effective consent to enter. View "Morgan v. Texas" on Justia Law

The court of appeals held that, because there was a factual dispute whether the vehicle appellant Ruben Totten was riding in and pulled over was the same vehicle involved in a traffic violation, the trial judge erred in refusing an Article 38.23 jury-charge instruction. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded, after review of this matter, that the dispute was not dispositive of whether evidence was obtained in violation of the law under Article 38.23(a). The Court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remanded for the court to address Totten’s alternative argument. View "Totten v. Texas" on Justia Law

Dallas Carl Tate was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to two years’ confinement. The court of appeals reversed his conviction, holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he intentionally or knowingly possessed the controlled substance in question. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals found sufficient evidence to support Tate's conviction, and reversed the court of appeals' judgment and affirmed the trial court. View "Tate v. Texas" on Justia Law

Eric Stevenson was convicted by jury of three counts of violating a sexually violent predator civil-commitment order. On appeal, Stevenson argued: that the trial court lacked jurisdiction; the judge erred in denying his motion to quash, motion for directed verdict, and requests to admit certain evidence; and that double jeopardy barred his multiple convictions. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals agrees with the court of appeals’ conclusions, except for its resolution of Stevenson’s double-jeopardy claim. The Court held that the multiple punishments imposed violated Stevenson’s double-jeopardy rights, and the judgments stemming from the indictment’s first and third counts were vacated. View "Stevenson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Albert G. Hill III and his wife Erin were indicted in 2011 for making false and misleading written statements to Omni American Bank when procuring a $500,000 home-equity loan in 2009. Within six months, the State dismissed the indictments against Erin Hill. Shortly thereafter, Albert moved to quash and dismiss his indictments. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Hill’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. The State appealed, but the Court of Appeals sustained the State’s first two points of error and reversed the dismissals, holding that the trial court judge “erred in conducting a hearing on Hill’s motion to dismiss.” Hill appealed, and after review, the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed the Court of Appeals and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by conducting a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Hill’s motion to dismiss. The Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to address the State's remaining issues raised to challenge the trial court's dismissal of the indictments against Mr. Hill. View "Texas v. Hill" on Justia Law

Applicant Clifton Harvin was placed on deferred adjudication for aggravated sexual assault. He tried unsuccessfully to have his community supervision terminated early, and he was later adjudicated guilty. Prior to applicant’s plea, the complainant had recanted her allegations in a tape recording made by applicant, and she has recanted again in an affidavit and testimony in habeas proceedings. Applicant raised a variety of claims: that he was actually innocent; that both his plea and adjudication attorneys were ineffective; that the prosecutor and law enforcement engaged in misconduct; and that his trial judge was biased. After hearing evidence, the trial court found, among other things, that the complainant’s recantation was not credible. Concluding that none of applicant’s claims had merit, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. View "Ex parte Harvin" on Justia Law