Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Dallas Carl Tate was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to two years’ confinement. The court of appeals reversed his conviction, holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he intentionally or knowingly possessed the controlled substance in question. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals found sufficient evidence to support Tate's conviction, and reversed the court of appeals' judgment and affirmed the trial court. View "Tate v. Texas" on Justia Law

Eric Stevenson was convicted by jury of three counts of violating a sexually violent predator civil-commitment order. On appeal, Stevenson argued: that the trial court lacked jurisdiction; the judge erred in denying his motion to quash, motion for directed verdict, and requests to admit certain evidence; and that double jeopardy barred his multiple convictions. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals agrees with the court of appeals’ conclusions, except for its resolution of Stevenson’s double-jeopardy claim. The Court held that the multiple punishments imposed violated Stevenson’s double-jeopardy rights, and the judgments stemming from the indictment’s first and third counts were vacated. View "Stevenson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Albert G. Hill III and his wife Erin were indicted in 2011 for making false and misleading written statements to Omni American Bank when procuring a $500,000 home-equity loan in 2009. Within six months, the State dismissed the indictments against Erin Hill. Shortly thereafter, Albert moved to quash and dismiss his indictments. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and granted Hill’s motion to dismiss with prejudice. The State appealed, but the Court of Appeals sustained the State’s first two points of error and reversed the dismissals, holding that the trial court judge “erred in conducting a hearing on Hill’s motion to dismiss.” Hill appealed, and after review, the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed the Court of Appeals and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by conducting a pretrial evidentiary hearing on Hill’s motion to dismiss. The Court reversed and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to address the State's remaining issues raised to challenge the trial court's dismissal of the indictments against Mr. Hill. View "Texas v. Hill" on Justia Law

Applicant Clifton Harvin was placed on deferred adjudication for aggravated sexual assault. He tried unsuccessfully to have his community supervision terminated early, and he was later adjudicated guilty. Prior to applicant’s plea, the complainant had recanted her allegations in a tape recording made by applicant, and she has recanted again in an affidavit and testimony in habeas proceedings. Applicant raised a variety of claims: that he was actually innocent; that both his plea and adjudication attorneys were ineffective; that the prosecutor and law enforcement engaged in misconduct; and that his trial judge was biased. After hearing evidence, the trial court found, among other things, that the complainant’s recantation was not credible. Concluding that none of applicant’s claims had merit, the Court of Criminal Appeals denied relief. View "Ex parte Harvin" on Justia Law

Appellant Chris Furr was charged with possession of a controlled substance after police found heroin on him while patting him down for weapons. He moved to suppress, arguing that he was illegally stopped and frisked. The trial court denied the motion. Furr pled guilty, and was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, probated for three years. He appealed the denial of the motion to suppress, again arguing that he was illegally stopped and frisked. The court of appeals affirmed, and finding no error with that judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed too. View "Furr v. Texas" on Justia Law

Pursuant to agreement, appellant James Williams pled guilty to two felony offenses. In addition to the written terms of the plea agreement, the parties orally agreed to a statement made by defense counsel. This statement, occurring at the plea hearing after defense counsel acknowledged the written terms of the agreement “in each case,” was: “And the State . . . is going to refuse prosecution of any other case in which the State has notice . . . unfiled cases.” Appellant argued that this oral part of the plea agreement was unambiguous and bars the prosecution of an unrelated murder case because the State had notice of it at the time of the plea. The State contended that this oral part of the agreement was ambiguous and that affidavits from the attorneys involved in the plea showed that the plea agreement was not intended to encompass the murder case. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the State and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Williams v. Texas" on Justia Law

After his motion to suppress was denied, appellant David Clement, Jr. was found guilty of felony driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to four years in the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Finding that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest, the court of appeals reversed appellant’s conviction and remanded the case to the trial court. The state filed a motion for rehearing, arguing that the appellant had failed to preserve his challenge to the legality of the arrest. The court of appeals denied the motion for rehearing. The issues this case presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals' review were: (1) whether suppression motion’s mere citation to the Fourth Amendment and probable cause, or a belated closing argument that anything after the “stop” be suppressed due to lack of probable cause for “arrest,” preserved an illegal arrest claim; and (2) whether the trial court erred by basing its illegal arrest holding on the officer’s subjective reasoning rather than the objective facts he articulated that routinely support a DWI arrest. The Court concluded that appellant preserved his claim of illegal arrest, and overruled the state’s first ground. However, the Court also concluded that, by basing its holding that appellant was illegally arrested on the officer’s subjective reasoning, the court of appeals misapplied the law. View "Clement v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Luis Sanchez was charged with the third-degree felony of assaulting an individual with whom he “has or has had” a dating relationship. The indictment alleged that appellant knowingly or recklessly impeded the normal breathing or circulation of Rachael Price [“Price”] by applying pressure to Price’s throat or neck. The trial court found him guilty in a bench trial and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment and a $7,500 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant’s conviction, and Appellant appealed, challenging whether he could be convicted of assaulting his spouse based solely on their past dating relationship under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(b)(2) and Texas Family Code section 71.0021. Finding no reversible error in the Court of Appeals' decision, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. View "Sanchez v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Christopher Sutton was charged with having an improper relationship between educator and student. The complaint alleged appellant was an employee of Caney Creek High School (CCHS) when he engaged in the sexual contact or deviant sexual intercourse with G.T., a person enrolled at CCHS. Appellant was convicted on all five counts and received a ten year probated sentence on each count. The Court of Appeals reversed appellant’s convictions, holding that the record did not contain legally sufficient evidence to allow the jury to reasonably conclude that appellant worked at CCHS. The State appealed, and finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. View "Texas v. Sutton" on Justia Law

The facts of this case were similar to those in "Ex Parte Wrigley," (178 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)) except for one important twist: in this case appellant was sentenced on the second offense before his parole on the first offense was revoked. So, the question this case presented for the Court of Criminal Appeals' review was whether, if a defendant commits a second offense while on parole for a first offense, is the trial court able to stack the second sentence on top of the first sentence if the defendant’s parole on the first offense has not been revoked before he is sentenced on the second offense? Following appellate court precedent, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court could stack a new sentence on a prior sentence for which the defendant is on parole, “irrespective of parole revocation.” To be consistent with its opinion in Wrigley, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the timing of a defendant’s parole revocation regarding the original offense affects whether a trial court has the ability to stack a second sentence on top of that original offense pursuant to Article 42.08(a). In this case, because there was no evidence that appellant’s parole had been revoked at the time he was sentenced on his second offense, the trial court’s cumulation order was invalid. The Court modified the judgment of the court of appeals accordingly and reformed the trial court judgments to delete the cumulation order. View "Byrd v. Texas" on Justia Law