Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Two days after appellant Joshua London’s arrest for possession of a controlled substance, the trial court found him indigent and appointed counsel to represent him. London was convicted of possession of cocaine after pleading guilty without an agreed recommendation as to punishment. Appellant was sentenced to 25 years in prison. The trial court included in the judgment an order to pay $329 in court costs. The judgment provided only the $329 amount and no break down of how those costs were calculated. Rather than challenge the constitutionality of the trial court’s imposition of court costs through a hearing pursuant to Article 103.008 or a separate civil lawsuit, Appellant sought to raise, on direct appeal, an as-applied challenge to two provisions in Article 102.011 that imposed mandatory court costs upon conviction. The court of appeals, relying upon the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision in "Curry v. Texas," held that Appellant failed to preserve error on this claim. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to determine whether Appellant could raise his as-applied challenge for the first time on appeal, and whether a formal bill of exceptions was necessary to provide a sufficient record for the court of appeals to properly evaluate the claim on direct appeal. Without considering the merits of the underlying claim, the Court held that Appellant was not required to raise his as-applied challenge in the trial court because his first opportunity to do so was on direct appeal. The Court also held that Appellant’s as-applied challenge could be evaluated upon the record presented. Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded for the court of appeals to consider the merits of Appellant’s as-applied challenge. View "London v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant was convicted of misdemeanor assault and placed on community supervision. He appealed that conviction, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Court of Criminal Appeals filed and set this application for an original writ of habeas corpus to consider whether an original writ of habeas corpus in with the Court of Criminal Appeals was the proper avenue for seeking an out-of-time petition for discretionary review (PDR) from a judgment imposing community supervision. The Court concluded that it was not. "Relief must first be sought at the trial level. Because Applicant has not attempted to obtain habeas corpus relief at the trial level, we dismiss this application." View "Ex parte Valdez" on Justia Law

Relator Luis Solis-Gonzalez was indicted by grand jury for capital murder. The State move for and was granted DNA testing of biological material that had been collected in the case. Because of the large number of pieces of biological material collected, the laboratory advised the trial court that it would be unable to complete testing on all pieces until June of 2015, nearly three years after relator was indicted. At a pretrial hearing, the State asserted that it had submitted all of the collected material (more than 200 samples), but argued that testing every sample was unnecessary and that the testing that had already been performed was sufficient. The defense asserted that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 38.43 created an “absolute right to have all the evidence tested.” The trial court found that the defense response did not legally support further delay. Relator filed a motion for leave to file an emergency application for a writ of mandamus that would require that all biological material be tested. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the trial court has, in the absence of agreement by the State and defendant, the discretion to determine when all necessary biological evidence has been tested. Because it did not abuse that discretion when it ruled that further testing is unnecessary, the Court denied relief. View "In re Luis Solis-Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Appellant David Schlittler challenged the statute under which he was convicted, arguing the statute was unconstitutional as applied to him. The statute defined the offense of Improper Contact with a Victim under Texas Penal Code Section 38.111, which prohibited a person confined in a correctional facility after being convicted of certain sex offenses from contacting the minor victim of the offense or a minor member of the victim’s family. Appellant was convicted under that statute for contacting his biological son while imprisoned for the aggravated sexual assault of his former stepdaughter, who was also his son’s half-sister. Appellant argued that, because it prohibited contact between him and his biological son, the statute, as applied, infringed upon his fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of his son, in violation of his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. After review of the specific facts of this case, including a permanent injunction issued as a result of a civil-court order, the Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with appellant's arguments and affirmed his conviction. View "Schlittler v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Essie Hopkins was found guilty of aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. The State sought to enhance Appellant’s punishment under the habitual-offender statute with two prior aggravated assault convictions. Appellant pled true to those two prior convictions. The trial court accepted Appellant’s pleas and found the enhancements true. Subsequently, the trial court sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment. He appealed, arguing in part that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove the enhancement allegations because the State failed to prove the sequentiality of the two prior convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed the conviction. View "Hopkins v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Cynthia Ambrose was a former kindergarten teacher who was convicted by jury of misdemeanor official oppression. At trial, a purported accomplice, Ramirez, testified. After the jury found her guilty, Ambrose filed a motion for new trial alleging that the jury instructions were erroneous in that they failed to instruct the jury that Ramirez’s accomplice-witness testimony had to be corroborated. The trial court agreed with Ambrose, and it made what it characterized as findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its ruling. On appeal, the court of appeals assumed without deciding that the trial court properly determined that the jury instructions were erroneous, but, as to the matter of harm, it disregarded the trial court’s findings and conclusions and it instead determined that Ambrose was not egregiously harmed under the substantive application of the "Almanza" factors. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the court of appeals properly held: (1) that the "Almanza" harm standard applied to jury-charge error reviewed on appeal, even when the error was addressed in a motion for new trial; (2) that it was not required to defer to the trial court’s factual findings in this case; and (3) that the record failed to show that Ambrose was egregiously harmed by the error in the charge. The Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Texas v. Ambrose" on Justia Law

At trial, defense counsel learned about a possible right-to-counsel violation that occurred before trial. Evidence involving and relating to the alleged violation was admitted at trial, but counsel did not complain until appeal. The court of appeals reversed appellant’s conviction without considering preservation of error. After its review of this matter, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the court of appeals erred in failing to address preservation of error, and held that appellant forfeited his complaints by failing to raise them at trial. View "Darcy v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Mark Twain Simpson entered an open plea of guilty to second-degree felony robbery and true to an enhancement provision alleging one prior conviction for aggravated robbery. The trial court found Simpson guilty, and sentenced him to twenty-five years’ confinement. Simpson filed a motion for new trial, alleging that his sentence constituted a grossly disproportionate punishment. The trial court granted a new punishment trial. On the State’s appeal, the court of appeals held that the record evidence did not substantiate Simpson’s claim and vacated the trial court’s order. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to decide whether the court of appeals applied the proper standard of review. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. View "Texas v. Simpson" on Justia Law

In a prosecution for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated, the State obtained evidence of Appellee Hayden Huse's blood-alcohol concentration by issuing a grand jury subpoena for his hospital medical records. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress on two grounds relevant to this case: (1) that obtaining Appellee’s medical records without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, necessitating suppression under both the federal exclusionary rule and Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; and (2) that a misuse of the grand jury subpoena process caused the State’s acquisition of Appellee’s medical records to violate both state and federal law, also requiring suppression of the evidence under the Texas exclusionary rule. The State appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the Seventh Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted Appellee’s petition for discretionary review to address two issues. (1) did the advent of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) materially impact the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding in "Texas v. Hardy" with respect to Fourth Amendment standing to complain of the State’s acquisition of specific medical records?; and (2) did the State acquire Appellee’s medical records by way of a grand jury subpoena process that violated either HIPAA or state law, thus necessitating that they be suppressed under Article 38.23? The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately answered both questions “no.” Accordingly, it affirmed the court of appeals. View "Texas v. Huse" on Justia Law

Appellant James Leming pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the offense of driving while intoxicated, a felony for him because he had two prior DWI convictions. The trial court assessed his punishment at ten years’ incarceration in the penitentiary. Prior to his plea, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the product of the traffic stop by which the offense was discovered. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, and Appellant challenged that ruling in a single point of error on appeal. The Sixth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. The court of appeals concluded that, on the particular facts of this case: (1) the arresting officer lacked even a reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant for failing to maintain a single lane; and (2) the stop was not a legitimate exercise of the arresting officer’s community care-taking function. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State Prosecuting Attorney’s (SPA) petition for discretionary review, and disagreeing with the lower court's judgment, reversed. View "Leming v. Texas" on Justia Law