Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In a prosecution for misdemeanor driving while intoxicated, the State obtained evidence of Appellee Hayden Huse's blood-alcohol concentration by issuing a grand jury subpoena for his hospital medical records. The trial court granted Appellee’s motion to suppress on two grounds relevant to this case: (1) that obtaining Appellee’s medical records without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, necessitating suppression under both the federal exclusionary rule and Article 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure; and (2) that a misuse of the grand jury subpoena process caused the State’s acquisition of Appellee’s medical records to violate both state and federal law, also requiring suppression of the evidence under the Texas exclusionary rule. The State appealed. In an unpublished opinion, the Seventh Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted Appellee’s petition for discretionary review to address two issues. (1) did the advent of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) materially impact the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding in "Texas v. Hardy" with respect to Fourth Amendment standing to complain of the State’s acquisition of specific medical records?; and (2) did the State acquire Appellee’s medical records by way of a grand jury subpoena process that violated either HIPAA or state law, thus necessitating that they be suppressed under Article 38.23? The Court of Criminal Appeals ultimately answered both questions “no.” Accordingly, it affirmed the court of appeals. View "Texas v. Huse" on Justia Law

Appellant James Leming pled guilty to, and was convicted of, the offense of driving while intoxicated, a felony for him because he had two prior DWI convictions. The trial court assessed his punishment at ten years’ incarceration in the penitentiary. Prior to his plea, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the product of the traffic stop by which the offense was discovered. The trial court denied his motion to suppress, and Appellant challenged that ruling in a single point of error on appeal. The Sixth Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s ruling, holding that the trial court should have granted the motion to suppress. The court of appeals concluded that, on the particular facts of this case: (1) the arresting officer lacked even a reasonable suspicion to detain Appellant for failing to maintain a single lane; and (2) the stop was not a legitimate exercise of the arresting officer’s community care-taking function. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State Prosecuting Attorney’s (SPA) petition for discretionary review, and disagreeing with the lower court's judgment, reversed. View "Leming v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Jose Elizondo, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agent, while off duty, shot and killed Fermin Limon Sr. Elizondo claimed self-defense, but the jury convicted him of murder, and he was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison. Elizondo petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals to review the appellate court’s analysis of the alleged jury-charge errors. After review, the Court concluded that the court of appeals erred by upholding the trial court’s inclusion of a provoking-the-difficulty instruction in the jury charge. Moreover, the Court hold that the trial court’s erroneous inclusion of a provoking-the-difficulty instruction caused Elizondo “some harm.” Therefore, the appellate court's judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Elizondo v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Andrew Jones appealed the court of appeals’ dismissal of his appeal for want of jurisdiction. In particular, appellant contended that because the trial court’s certification of the right of appeal was defective by indicating that he waived his appellate rights, the court of appeals erred by upholding that certification as a basis for dismissing his appeal. Appellant claims that he did not waive his right of appeal because he did not sign any document that would be adequate to show a valid waiver of that right, and he further contends that the record does not otherwise indicate that he waived his right to appeal. The State maintained the court of appeals properly found that appellant waived his right of appeal based on the plea agreement. Pursuant to that agreement, the State abandoned one of the two punishment-enhancement paragraphs that had been alleged, thereby reducing the minimum punishment that appellant could have received from twenty-five years in prison to five. In exchange, appellant agreed to plead guilty, waive his right to trial, and waive his right to appeal. After review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that, although he did not have an agreed punishment recommendation from the State, the record supported a determination that appellant did enter into a bargained-for waiver of his right of appeal in exchange for the State’s abandonment of the enhancement. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals. View "Jones v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Carlton Wood was found guilty of evading arrest and the trial court found that the enhancement alleged in the indictment was “true.” Appellant was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that there was no basis for the trial court’s finding that the enhancement paragraph was “true.” The court of appeals held that the State failed to prove the conviction used for enhancement. The court of appeals reversed the punishment portion of the judgment and remanded the case for a new punishment hearing. The State appealed, arguing: (1) the court of appeals erred by refusing to apply a presumption that the defendant pled “true” to the enhancement; (2) where the trial court finds an enhancement “true” and the defendant does not object, the presumption should be applied; and (3) the evidence supported the court’s finding of “true,” contrary to the court of appeals’ holding. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not apply a presumption that Appellant pled “true,” and concluded that the evidence in this case was sufficient to prove the enhancement allegation. Accordingly, the Court reversed the court of appeals. View "Wood v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Heriberto Saenz filed an "amended" application for habeas relief from his convictions for murder and aggravated assault. He claimed he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. In particular, Applicant argued that trial counsel failed to impeach one of the State’s witnesses, Jerry Gonzalez, with a prior inconsistent statement Gonzalez made in an interview with the police, and Applicant further contends that he was prejudiced as a result of counsel’s error. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the plain language of Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Article 11.07 permitted it to consider Applicant’s amended application, that the doctrine of laches did not preclude its consideration consideration of this matter, and that Applicant established his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on counsel’s failure to adequately challenge the evidence used to establish Applicant’s identity as the person who committed the offense. View "Ex parte Saenz" on Justia Law

Appellant Ike Brodnex was charged with tampering with physical evidence and possession of a controlled substance after he was stopped by police and found to be carrying crack cocaine. Appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence, which the trial court denied. After a bench trial, the trial court acquitted Appellant of the tampering offense but found him guilty of the possession offense. Appellant pled true to three enhancement paragraphs, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years’ confinement. Appellant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the officer did not have sufficient grounds to come into contact with him and that the discovery of the drugs was the result of an excessive pat-down search. The court of appeals affirmed. After refusing Appellant’s petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals granted review on its own motion in order to determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to detain a suspect based upon observing the suspect walking with another person at 2 a.m. in an area known for narcotics activity and based upon the officer’s unsubstantiated belief the suspect was a “known criminal.” Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court held that the facts apparent to the arresting officer at the time he detained Appellant did not provide him with a reasonable suspicion for the detention. Thus, Appellant was illegally detained, and the crack cocaine that was found in the subsequent search should have been suppressed. The court of appeals was therefore reversed and the case remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Brodnex v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Patricia Harkcom was charged with possession of one gram or less of methamphetamine. The Court of Appeals determined it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed her appeal. Appellant petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for discretionary review. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed: "[t]he Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended in 2002 to prevent trivial, reparable mistakes or defects from divesting appellate courts of the jurisdiction to consider the merits of both state and defense appeals in criminal cases. … We do not require 'magic words' or a separate instrument to constitute notice of appeal. …In this instance, appellant used the materials available to her while incarcerated. We know that, by adding the simple word 'APPEAL' to the Order requesting counsel, appellant was able to make clear to the trial-court judge that she was attempting to invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction because the judge further amended the document by adding the words 'ON APPEAL' after the phrase 'Order Appointing/Denying Counsel,' crossing out 'Denying,' and appointing appellate counsel. The trial-court judge thereby recognized appellant’s intent to give a notice of appeal and request appellate counsel. Construing the Rules of Appellate Procedure liberally leads us to conclude that appellant gave sufficient notice of appeal to invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction." View "Harkcom v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Henry Skinner was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for killing his girlfriend and her two sons in the home that they shared. On direct appeal, his conviction was affirmed. Subsequent to his conviction, DNA testing was conducted, and the trial court found that the test results were not favorable to Appellant. He appealed that finding, arguing whether it was reasonably probable that, had the DNA results been available at trial, he would not have been convicted. "In light of Appellant’s advisory and the nature of this issue," the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that further fact-finding and analysis by the trial court was in order. The Court abated this appeal and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Skinner v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of murder for killing her former boyfriend. She appealed, arguing that her right to a public trial was violated. The Fourth Court of Appeals agreed and reversed her conviction, holding that Appellant’s right to a public trial was violated during voir dire because the public was asked to leave the courtroom to accommodate a large venire panel. On discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals. The State subsequently filed a timely motion for rehearing, in which it argued that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision would be nearly impossible for trial judges to implement and that the Court erroneously dismissed its burden-of-proof ground for review despite the fact that it granted Appellant relief. Deferring to the trial court’s findings of fact that were supported by the record, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a necessary prerequisite before an appellate court can resolve whether a defendant met his burden to show his trial was closed to the public based on the totality of the evidence was to make a finding. Only then can an appellate court resolve the ultimate legal question of whether a defendant’s public-trial right was violated. No such finding that appellant met her burden was made in the record, so the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded this case for additional findings of fact. View "Cameron v. Texas" on Justia Law