Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Kennie Cook, Jr. was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child. He argued on appeal the trial court erred in admitting an officer's direct opinion on the complainant’s credibility, which he contended, harmed Appellant. The Sixth Court of Appeals found the evidence legally sufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict, but found the trial court erred in admitting the officer's opinion on whether the complainant was testifying truthfully. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed Appellant was harmed by the admission. Finding this ground dispositive, the Court dismissed the State's first two grounds for review as improvidently granted. The judgment was reversed and remanded to the court of appeals to reach the merits of Appellant’s remaining grounds. View "Cook v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Mark Dunham, was a door-to-door salesman for Capital Connect. On or about June 15, 2016, Appellant rang the doorbell of Eloise Moody, an 81- year-old lady recently widowed and diagnosed with cancer. When Moody answered, Appellant pointed at the “Central Security Group” alarm sign in Moody’s front yard and said: “I’m here to update your security.” Appellant also said, referring to the Central Security Group sign, “I’ll put a light on it, make it visible from the street” which he explained would be helpful to “update the neighborhood.” Appellant was not wearing a uniform or name tag and did not say what company he worked for. Moody, therefore, understood Appellant to be employed by her alarm company (Central) and that he was intending to place a light on the sign in her front yard. Appellant managed to gain access to Moody's home and convinced her to cancel her existing security contract and enter a five-year agreement with Capital Security at a higher cost. Appellant was charged with deceptive business practices to which he pled not guilty. A jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to one year in jail. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction and whether the jury charge erroneously authorized a non-unanimous verdict. Based on its construction of Texas Penal Code § 32.42(b), and its review of the record, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the Court agreed with the court of appeals on both points: (1) there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction; and (2) jury unanimity was not required on the specific manner and means of the offense because it was not an “essential element” of the offense. View "Dunham v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Vital Garcia was convicted by jury of first-degree aggravated assault on a family member resulting in serious bodily injury for shooting his then- girlfriend with a firearm. The question presented for the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was whether the court of appeals improperly acted as a thirteenth juror by concluding that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find that the two gunshot wounds inflicted on the victim caused serious bodily injury, namely, because neither bullet hit a vital organ. Here, the Court found the evidence presented to the jury demonstrated that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds to her thigh and chest; she suffered significant bleeding to the point that she blacked out and believed she would die; her injuries were described as “deep lacerations” which required twelve surgical staples to close; and her treating physician believed that her wounds constituted “serious bodily injury.” Considering the cumulative force of the evidence and allowing the drawing of reasonable inferences, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that the victim faced a substantial risk of death as a result of her injuries. Therefore, the court of appeals erred by concluding that the jury acted irrationally in finding that the victim suffered serious bodily injury. The Court reversed the lower court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Garcia v. Texas" on Justia Law

The State charged Appellants with second-degree felony assault on a public servant. The State alleged in Eluid Lira’s indictment that he had previously been convicted twice for felony possession of a controlled substance and twice for felony possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. The State alleged in Scott Huddleston’s indictment that he had previously been convicted for murder. Both Appellants were represented by the State Counsel for Offenders. Both Appellants reached plea agreements with the State and their cases were set for back-to-back pleas via a “zoom/video-conference plea docket.” Prior to the hearing, counsel for Appellants filed identical motions objecting to the trial court’s setting the cases for plea hearings via a Zoom videoconference. In the motions, Appellants argued that pleading by videoconference would violate their constitutional right to counsel, right to public trial, and statutory rights under Articles 27.18 and 27.19 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Ultimately, the State argued that Emergency Orders issued by the Supreme Court of Texas controlled over the Code of Criminal Procedure. On appeal, the Appellants argued that their statutory right to enter a guilty plea in person in open court was a substantive right. Because of this, it was not subject to the Texas Supreme Court’s emergency orders regarding the modification or suspension of deadlines and procedures. The State argued that, if preserved, Appellants’ arguments failed because the Texas Supreme Court had the authority to modify or suspend “the act of criminal defendants appearing live in live courtrooms[.]” The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals surmised the question in Appellants' cases boiled down to the "simple question of whether the Supreme Court’s Emergency Order granted a trial court authority to preside over videoconferenced plea hearings when the Appellants had not consented." To this, the Court concluded: no, a trial court has no authority to hold a videoconferenced plea hearing when the defendant has not consented. The court of appeals was affirmed and the matters remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Lira v. Texas" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to address whether the requirements for the inference of falsity that this Court adopted in Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) should apply in cases involving a police officer with a demonstrated pattern of misconduct in drug-related cases. The Court concluded that it should, and remanded the case for the habeas court to determine whether evidence substantiated Applicant Aaron Mathews’ Coty claim. In particular, the Court was concerned with whether there was evidence that Officer Goines committed repeated acts of misconduct in pursuit of illicit-drug investigations. This was relevant to the second Coty prong; depending on when a second instance of misconduct occurred, it might also be relevant to the fifth Coty prong. After the case was remanded, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided Ex parte Jeffery, 2022 WL 4088689 (Tex. Crim. App. September 7, 2022). The habeas court found that all the Coty prongs were met in Applicant’s case and that a presumption of falsity applied. The habeas court also determined the misconduct was material. The Court of Criminal Appeals determined the habeas court's finding were supported by the record, and thus, granted relief. View "Ex parte Aaron Mathews" on Justia Law

Appellee Sanitha Hatter was charged with felony assault against a peace officer, and two misdemeanor cases of driving while intoxicated (DWI). The felony prosecutor and defense counsel on the assault case reached an agreement in which the prosecutor promised to dismiss the assault case in exchange for Appellee’s promise to plead guilty to the DWI cases. The prosecutor later assured Appellee’s counsel that, no matter what happened to the DWI cases, he would dismiss the assault case and not re-file it. The assault case was dismissed, but shortly thereafter the DWI cases were also dismissed instead of Appellee entering guilty pleas. The felony prosecutor re-filed the assault case. Appellee moved for specific performance, asking the trial court to order the State to move to dismiss the assault case in accordance to the earlier promise not to re-file. The trial court granted the motion, and the re-filed assault case was dismissed. The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the State and Appellee had entered into an enforceable immunity agreement. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found the agreement between Appellee and the State was in the nature of a plea bargain agreement—not an immunity agreement—the court of appeals applied an inapplicable test for determining whether the trial court erred in granting the motion for specific performance. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded this matter to the court of appeals to determine whether the trial court’s order could be sustained by a theory of law applicable to the case. View "Texas v. Hatter" on Justia Law

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals filed and set this application to determine the appropriate disposition in light of Applicant Phillip Dennis’ pleadings for post-conviction habeas relief. In 2017, Applicant was convicted of felony driving while intoxicated, and sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. In 2018, he filed an application for writ of habeas corpus alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate whether Applicant’s prior Arkansas DWI conviction should have been used as a jurisdictional enhancement in this case. Upon receiving the 2018 application the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the case, but it did not receive the supplemental record with findings of fact and conclusions of law from the habeas court until 2020. Applicant’s sentence discharged in 2019 while his writ application was pending. Having considered the habeas court’s findings, the Court of Criminal Appeals agreed and concluded that Applicant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit. View "Ex parte Phillip Dennis" on Justia Law

In late June 2013, Appellant Danna Cyr and her husband, Justin Cyr, took their four-month-old child, J.D., to the emergency room in Lubbock. Upon their arrival, medical staff quickly discovered J.D. was suffering from life-threatening brain hemorrhaging. Physicians were able to save J.D.’s life, but the bleeding resulted in permanent physical and cognitive dysfunction. The cause of the child’s injuries was uncontroverted: J.D. was violently assaulted by her father. Appellant was indicted, convicted, and sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment for reckless injury to a child by omission. The State sought its general verdict under two theories: (1) Appellant failed to protect J.D. from Justin; or (2) Appellant failed to seek reasonable medical care despite her duty to act as J.D.’s parent. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted discretionary review to decide whether Appellant was entitled to a jury instruction under Texas Penal Code § 6.04(a)’s concurrent causation provision for acts “clearly insufficient” to cause the proscribed harm. Because the Court found concurrent causation was not raised by the evidence presented at trial under Texas Penal Code § 22.04(a) and § 6.04(a), it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "Cyr v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Gustavo Sandoval was charged with the capital murder of Javier Vega, Jr. (“Harvey”), by intentionally causing his death in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. A jury found Appellant guilty, for which he was sentenced to death. Appeal to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was automatic. Appellant raised twenty-seven points of error. Finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and sentence. View "Sandoval v. Texas" on Justia Law

A number of defendants in misdemeanor cases arising in Kinney County, Texas filed habeas applications in a district court in Travis County (the District Court). The District Court permitted those applications to remain pending after granting relief on one of them. Relator, the Kinney County Attorney, sought to prohibit the District Court from considering or resolving the remaining applications. Because a district court in Travis County was not a local court for these misdemeanor cases arising out of Kinney County, the District Court was required to refrain from resolving the merits in these habeas cases. Consequently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that Relator was entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition. View "In re Texas ex rel. Smith" on Justia Law