Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Anthony Granville was arrested for causing a disturbance on a school bus. His cell phone was taken from him during the booking procedure and placed in the jail property room. Later that day, a Huntsville Police "School Resources Officer" was told that the day before he was arrested, Granville used his cell phone to take a photograph of another student urinating in the boys' bathroom. The officer (who was not involved in arresting Granville) drove to the jail and retrieved the cell phone from the jail property room, and examined its contents without first getting a warrant. The officer found the photograph he was looking for, then took the phone to his office, and printed a copy of the photograph. He kept the phone as evidence. Granville was charged with felony Improper Photography, and he filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the officer could not search his cell phone without a warrant. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, both the officer and the prosecutor contended that if an officer had probable cause, he could search anything in the jail property room that belonged to a jail inmate. The trial judge ultimately granted the motion to suppress, concluding that because the officer had neither a search warrant nor exigent circumstances to make a warrantless search of that phone. The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the court of appeals. View "Texas v. Granville" on Justia Law

Appellant Manley Johnson was charged with and convicted of, aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. The judgment ordered him "to pay all fines, court costs, and restitution as indicated above." The amount of $234 was written in the blank on the judgment labeled "Court Costs." The Court of Criminal Appeals granted the State's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in deleting the specific amount of $234 in court costs from the trial-court judgment. After careful consideration, and "to afford future litigants a 'roadmap' to questions regarding court costs," the Court held that: (1) a claim with respect to the basis of court costs need not be preserved at trial to be raised for the first time on appeal; (2) Appellant's claim was ripe for review; (3) a record on appeal could be supplemented with a bill of costs; (4) the document in the supplemental clerk's record was a bill of costs; (5) the court of appeals erred when it failed to consider the supplemental bill of costs; (6) a bill of costs need not be in the record to support a particular amount of court costs; and (7) court costs are mandated by statute and, therefore no need for an ordinary sufficiency review. View "Johnson v. Texas" on Justia Law

Christopher Garfias was charged with and convicted of aggravated robbery by threat and aggravated assault causing bodily injury. On appeal, Garfias argued that these multiple convictions violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. The appellate court agreed, and vacated his sentence for aggravated robbery. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed that Double Jeopardy was violated, and accordingly reversed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Garfias v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Craig Reynolds was charged with and convicted of failure to comply with sex-offender registration requirements. Appellant served his entire sentence and was released in August of 1995. The registration statute in effect at the time did not require Appellant to register as a sex offender. The statute, however, was amended in 2005, putting Appellant's duty to register in dispute. He was convicted of failing to register in 2009, but appealed, arguing: (1) the amended statute did not require him to register; (2) such retroactivity would be unconstitutional; and (3) that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's refusal to find his affirmative defense of mistake of law. The court of appeals upheld the conviction. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that Appellant's retroactivity argument was not preserved for review. Furthermore, the Court found that the amended sex-offender-registration requirements applied to Appellant because the "savings clause" that previously exempted him was deleted by the 2005 amendments. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Reynolds v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Larry Ray Swearingen, was convicted in 2000 of capital murder for which he was sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the judgment and sentence. He then filed seven applications for writs of habeas corpus, which were denied. In this case, the State appealed the trial court's decision to grant appellee's fourth Article 64 motion for DNA testing. In this appeal, as in a prior action, appellee did not establish that biological evidence existed or that, where it did, exculpatory test results would have affected his trial. Appellee argued that since Article 64 was amended in 2011, the law of the case changed and he was entitled to another review of the merits. Although the law has been amended, these amendments did not affect all of the Court of Criminal Appeals' previous determinations. In the instances where the amendment did not impact the Court's analysis, the trial court erred by failing to adhere to our previous determinations. Therefore the Court reversed the trial court's order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Texas v. Swearingen" on Justia Law

Appellant Joshua Ragston was indicted for one count of capital murder, one count of murder, and one count of aggravated robbery, all stemming from an incident that occurred in 2009, when appellant was 17 years old. Appellant was jailed and held on no bond for the capital murder charge, and bond was set at $500,000 each for the murder and the aggravated robbery charges. Appellant filed a motion for bond reduction, arguing he was entitled to release on a personal recognizance bond for the capital murder charge pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.151. The trial court ordered that appellant would continue to be held without bond on the capital murder and murder charges and reduced the bond on the aggravated robbery charge to $250,000. Appellant then filed an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order on his motion for bond reduction. The Court of Appeals granted the State's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. View "Ragston v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with evading arrest with a motor vehicle. He pleaded no contest and received two years' deferred-adjudication community supervision. In March 2008, the State filed a motion to adjudicate his guilt. Appellant was arrested in September 2010, more than two years after his community supervision had expired. In late 2010, after conducting a hearing on the State's motion, the trial court revoked appellant's deferred adjudication and sentenced him to two years' confinement in state jail. Appellant wanted to appeal the trial court's judgment on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. But because appellant did not file any motions that would have extended the appellate deadlines, his notice of appeal was due within thirty days. That date fell on a Saturday, which made the notice of appeal due on Monday. The ultimate issue this case presented to the Court of Criminal Appeals was whether a pro se, incarcerated defendant's notice of appeal timely filed when it was mailed to the court of appeals on or before the filing deadline; forwarded by that court to the proper trial-court clerk; and received in the trial court within the ten days permitted under the mailbox rule. Appellant argued that the court of appeals erred by dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the basis that his notice of appeal, which was mistakenly sent to the court of appeals and forwarded to the district-court clerk within ten days of the filing deadline, was not timely filed under the mailbox rule. The Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with appellant. The Court concluded that, because the rules of appellate procedure required the clerk of the court of appeals to forward appellant's notice of appeal to the trial-court clerk, and because his notice of appeal was actually received by the convicting court within the time limits established under the mailbox rule, appellant's apparent mistake in sending his notice of appeal to the court of appeals instead of to the district-court clerk was, at most, a harmless procedural defect that did not render the notice of appeal untimely. View "Taylor v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Steven Weinstein was convicted of murdering Jerry Glaspie. He filed a post-conviction application for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he was denied due process because: (1) the State failed to disclose that its key witness had hallucinations and delusions; and (2) the State presented false testimony when that witness lied about not having hallucinations and delusions. The habeas judge initially filed findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Court of Criminal Appeals deny relief, but the Court remanded the case and asked her to determine: (1) whether the witness' testimony was false; and, if so, (2) whether applicant had shown a reasonable likelihood that the false testimony affected the judgment of the jury. In revised findings, the judge found that the State unknowingly presented false testimony when the witness testified that he did not suffer from auditory or visual hallucinations. The judge also found that he was a key witness in establishing applicant's intent to murder. She concluded that there was a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the witness admitted to having hallucinations. The Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the habeas judge's factual findings that the testimony about his lack of delusions was false, but the Court concluded that applicant has failed to prove that the false testimony was "material." View "Ex parte Steven Weinstein" on Justia Law

Appellant signed an operating agreement with Priefert Manufacturing Co., Inc. to sell Priefert's farm and ranch equipment on consignment. Appellant agreed to sell this equipment at his retail store in Stephenville, located in Erath County. Priefert delivered its equipment to appellant's retail store from its headquarters in Mount Pleasant, Titus County. Appellant picked up inventory at Priefert's headquarters on several occasions and traveled back to his store. After making sales at his store, appellant reported them daily to Priefert's headquarters. Priefert then sent invoices to appellant for the wholesale price of the equipment that had been sold and the cost of the freight. After the businesses operated under the agreement for over two years, the relationship dissolved by early 2003, when appellant closed his store and admitted to using proceeds from the equipment sales to pay other financial obligations. Priefert filed civil and criminal complaints against appellant in Titus County to recover the unpaid invoices. Appellant filed for bankruptcy and discharged his civil liability. The criminal case, however, proceeded to trial. Appellant was indicted in Titus County for the offense of hindering a secured creditor by misappropriating the proceeds of secured property. The indictment alleged that venue lay in Titus County based on appellant's "sell[ing] or dispos[ing] of secured property" there. The undisputed facts at trial, however, showed that appellant sold property in Erath County. Appellant repeatedly challenged venue on the ground that he had not disposed of any property in Titus County, as the State had alleged in the indictment. On this basis, he filed a pretrial motion to quash, requested a directed verdict after the State rested its case-in-chief, and requested a jury instruction on the special venue provisions in Article 13.09. The trial court denied these requests. The jury convicted appellant of hindering a secured creditor and recommended community supervision. Appellant thereafter appealed. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that venue error at trial is subject to a review for harm by using the standard for non-constitutional errors described in Rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Applying that standard to this case, the Court concluded that the State's failure to prove venue as alleged was harmless because the record failed to show that appellant's substantial rights were affected by the venue of his trial, which occurred at one of the places permitted under Article 13.09 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the specialized venue statute applicable to this case. View "Schmutz v. Texas" on Justia Law

Jonathan Salvador was a laboratory technician at the Houston Police Department's Crime Lab Division. It was discovered that during his six-year tenure, he committed professional misconduct by using evidence in one case to support the evidence in another. In the wake of this situation, DPS notified the prosecuting attorneys, law-enforcement agencies and other affected persons. Applications for writs of habeas corpus based on Salvador's actions followed. Applicant Leroy Coty was charged with possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance weighing at least 400 grams. He pled guilty to the lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance, and per his plea-bargain agreement and was sentenced to 10 years' confinement. He waived his right to appeal as part of the bargain, however still filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that, due to Salvador's misconduct and the fact that the evidence was in the sole custody of Salvador for a period of time, he was entitled to relief. The habeas court did not hold an evidentiary hearing because the judge correctly concluded that his recommendation to grant relief was "mandated due to the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding in [Hobbs] . . . ." However, the trial court made other conclusions of law, including that "[c]ompromises in a chain of custody generally necessitate[d] the presentation of evidence involving tampering or fraud specific to the exhibit in question[,]" and that "[t]he Court concludes that there is no specific evidence that [Salvador] confused, comingled, or compromised the test results . . . , or that [Salvador's] analysis of Applicant's drug exhibit was unreliable." Despite those conclusions, the habeas court recommended that the Court of Criminal Appeals grant relief based on the Court of Criminal Appeals' precedent. Finding that additional findings of fact were required for the Court's decision in this matter, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded this case back to the habeas court for further proceedings. View "Ex parte Leroy Coty" on Justia Law