Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child, and was sentenced to thirty years. On the morning that jury selection was scheduled to begin, the trial court heard argument on appellant's pretrial motion for a hearing to determine the six-year-old child-complainant's competency to testify. Over appellant's objection, the trial court decided to conduct its Rule 601(a)(2) competency examination in camera, with the court reporter in attendance but in the absence of appellant and the attorneys for both sides. Following the examination, the trial court found the child-complainant to be a competent witness. On appeal, appellant raised numerous instances of where he thought the trial court erred, principal among them was that by excluding him and his attorney from the competency examination, the trial court violated his constitutional rights. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals discovered that appellant's principal constitutional argument was the only one the court of appeals did not address in its decision. Although the Court does not ordinarily review issues that the court of appeals does not , the Court made an exception in this case, and still affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "Gilley v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellants Andres Nava and Xiomara Mendez were each indicted and convicted for felony murder and organized criminal activity. Nava was sentenced to sixty years and seven years, and Mendez was sentenced to sixty years and twenty years. The Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to determine whether the appellants suffered egregious harm as a result of error in the jury instructions on the law of parties, and whether their appeals were prejudiced due to a missing portion of the voir dire record. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. View "Nava v. Texas" on Justia Law

A police anti-narcotics unit had been conducting surveillance of a residence for approximately thirty days when officers received a call from a confidential informant advising them that the occupants were preparing to manufacture methamphetamine. Several hours after receiving that call, officers entered the residence without a search warrant and without consent. The officers encountered several individuals, including appellant, whom they handcuffed and escorted to the front yard. Officers performed a protective sweep of the residence, and determined that no methamphetamine was being "cooked" at that time. Two investigators then prepared the search-warrant affidavit. The affidavit relied only on information provided by the confidential informant and did not mention the officers' warrantless entry into the residence. Appellant was arrested and charged with possession of chemicals with intent to manufacture methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine weighing more than 4 but less than 200 grams. The trial court granted in part and denied in part appellant's motion to suppress, holding that the officers' initial entry into the residence was "without a lawful warrant, exigent circumstances, or other lawful basis." Appellant subsequently pled guilty pursuant to a plea-bargain agreement and was sentenced to five years' confinement on each count, to run concurrently. Appellant expressly reserved his right to appeal the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the federal independent source doctrine was applicable in Texas. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that because the independent source doctrine did not circumvent or avoid the statutory exclusionary rule's requirement that evidence obtained in violation of the law be suppressed. As such, the court of appeals erred by rejecting that doctrine as a basis for upholding the trial court's suppression ruling. View "Wehrenberg v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant of criminal mischief for tampering with a metering device in order to divert electricity, which he did not pay for, to the house in which he was residing. The Supreme Court reversed appellant's conviction: it was never communicated to the jury that it must believe the evidence substantiating the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt before it could convict the appellant. Certain key facts to support the charges were hotly contested, and the Court rejected both the court of appeals' finding that the great weight of the evidence established the predicate facts and the implicit conclusion that the jury probably would have found those predicate facts to be true beyond a reasonable doubt had it been required to do so. Considering all of these factors, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the error in the jury charge both affected the very basis of the case and deprived appellant of a fair and impartial trial. Accordingly, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "Hollander v. Texas" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant of felony possession with intent to deliver cocaine in an amount over 400 grams. The trial court sentenced him to thirty years' confinement in the penitentiary. Appellant argued on appeal that the trial court erred to overrule his objection that the State used a peremptory challenge to strike an African-American prospective juror from service on his petit jury in violation of "Batson v. Kentucky." The court of appeals agreed, finding that at least one of the prosecutor's purported explanations for the peremptory challenge was a pretext for racial discrimination, and reversed the appellant's conviction. The State petitioned for discretionary review. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the court of appeals' reliance upon "Snyder v. Louisiana" on the particular facts of this case was in error: "Simply put, the court of appeals erred to conclude that Snyder governs the facts of this case. In our view, the court of appeals' analysis went wrong" by: (1) misinterpreting the prosecutor's proffer of racially neutral explanations for striking the juror in question to include two non-demeanor-based reasons; (2) concluding that the trial court made no ruling with respect to the prosecutor's demeanor-based explanations for his peremptory challenge; and (3) shifting the burden of proof to the State, a la Snyder, to rebut an inference that these purported explanations conclusively established discrimination. View "Blackman v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant's appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Appellant was charged with misdemeanor possession of marijuana. Appellant's motion to suppress asserted that: his seizure was made without any reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in any criminal activity. In making its ruling, the trial judge specifically found that appellant had been detained, saying that she believed that "the officer acted reasonably under the circumstances and did have articulable facts that justified the minimal detention," but also denied appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant then plead guilty to the offense and, pursuant to a plea agreement, was sentenced to twenty days in jail. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the suppression motion and affirmed the trial court's judgment. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals sustained appellant's grounds for review and reversed and remanded the case back to the court of appeals to determine whether the detention was valid. View "Johnson v. Texas" on Justia Law

A magistrate issued a warrant to search Appellant's house for crack cocaine based on an affidavit detailing a controlled purchase in which police used a reliable confidential informant to purchase narcotics through an unknown third party. The third party was not aware of the police operation. However, because there was no information on the credibility or reliability of the unknowing third party, Appellant argued on appeal of his conviction that the magistrate could not have concluded that there was probable cause to believe that the crack cocaine came from Appellant's house. After its review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the magistrate to find probable cause. View "Moreno v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of the Class B misdemeanor of criminal mischief for "throwing screws and nails into the road causing flat tires." On direct appeal he argued that the evidence was insufficient to support the charges against him, namely that, that the damage to the tires was the result of criminal activity. The Supreme Court granted review to clarify that the common-law corpus-delicti rule exists only in confession cases. Because the circumstantial evidence was sufficient under "Jackson v. Virginia" to prove that appellant committed the crime of criminal mischief, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Carrizales v. Texas " on Justia Law

Appellee Mark Meru was convicted of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to 25 years in prison. He filed a motion for new trial, complaining that the trial court erred in refusing to give the requested jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass. The trial court granted appellee's motion for new trial. The State appealed, arguing that criminal trespass could not be a lesser-included offense of burglary because trespass required intrusion of the defendant's entire body, while burglary only requires a partial intrusion. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order for a new trial. The Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals that Appellee was entitled to an instruction on the lesser-included offense of criminal trespass and reversed. View "Texas v. Meru" on Justia Law

Appellant Rodney Anderson was charged with possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, and aggravated assault of a public servant. The jury found him guilty, and he was sentenced to 40 years for the possession offense, and life imprisonment for the aggravated assault. Appellant appealed, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction of aggravated assault of a public servant. The court of appeals held that a rational jury could find that Appellant was guilty of aggravated assault of a public servant under the conspiracy theory of party liability. After granting appellant's petition for discretionary review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant's conviction for the aggravated assault charge under the conspiracy theory of the law of parties. Therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Anderson v. Texas" on Justia Law