Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of misdemeanor possession of marijuana and sentenced to three days' confinement and a fine. On appeal, he challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that there were no specific, articulable facts in the record to support reasonable suspicion for the stop. After its review, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals's judgment, and remanded the case so that court could determine the effect, if any, of the Supreme Court's decision in "Texas v. Mendoza" had on this case. The appellate court again reversed, and the Supreme Court granted the State review on two grounds. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's explicit language made it clear that the court found the officer's offense report credible. Therefore, the Court found the remand to the trial court for additional fact-finding was unnecessary. However, the court of appeals read the report too narrowly and disregarded reasonable inferences from the included facts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and reinstated the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress. View "Delafuente v. Texas" on Justia Law

The City of Plano adopted the 2003 International Property Maintenance Code (IMPC) as part of its local Property Maintenance Code. Appellee was charged by complaint with two violations of section 6-46 and the specific subsections of the IPMC for: (1) not maintaining the exterior of a structure in good repair and in a structurally sound manner; and (2) not supplying hot and cold running water to plumbing fixtures in a house. He was convicted of both counts after separate bench trials. Appellee appealed both cases to the county court at law for trial de novo and filed motions to dismiss the complaints because the State failed to allege that he was given notice that he was in violation of the code and then continued to violate the code as required under subsection 106.3. Appellee's motions were granted, and the State appealed to the Fifth Court of Appeals, which consolidated the two cases. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders, holding that individual provisions of the code could not be taken in isolation and that, when taken as a whole, the code clearly required notice. The City filed a petition for discretionary review, arguing that the municipal code created two offenses: the one contained within the original IMPC and the one created by Plano that did not require notice. The Supreme Court granted review on the issue of whether appellee was entitled to notice of violations of a municipal code before his subsequent violations of the code could result in convictions. Holding that he was, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the courts below. View "Texas v. Cooper" on Justia Law

Albert Turner was charged with capital murder. At trial, he was represented by Patrick McCann and Tyrone Moncriffe. Turner was found guilty and sentenced to death. The trial court appointed counsel for Turner's direct appeal and the Office of Capital Writs ("OCW") to handle Turner's postconviction writ. As part of its investigation, OCW asked Turner to authorize the release of his trial file from McCann. Turner refused to sign the release because OCW is a "state agency," and he wanted to speak with his sister before moving forward. Lacking Turner's authorization, McCann refused to release the file believing that his client was invoking his right to keep his privileged information confidential. In response, OCW filed a motion asking the trial court to order McCann to turn the file over. After a hearing, the trial court ordered trial counsel to relinquish Turner's trial file, and McCann refused. He then petitioned the Supreme Court for leave to file petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition. While McCann's motion was pending, OCW withdrew as Turner's habeas counsel. Subsequently, the Supreme Court dismissed McCann's motion as moot because OCW, a "state agency," no longer represented Turner. The trial court then appointed new habeas counsel, James Rytting, to represent Turner in his postconviction application, and Rytting sought Turner's trial file for investigatory purposes. Rytting stated that he visited Turner twice in person after his appointment, and he agreed that McCann's characterization of Turner was correct in that Turner did not want the file turned over. Rytting also explained that, based on his visits with Turner, if McCann gave the file to Turner, Rytting would never see it. For his part, McCann continued to refuse to relinquish the trial file based on his understanding of his client's wishes. In a second hearing, the trial court ordered McCann to turn over his file again. After failing to comply with the trial court's second order, the court found McCann in contempt. After review of the matter, the Supreme Court conditionally granted McCann relief on his petition for writs of mandamus and dismissed his petition for a writ of prohibition. View "In re PATRICK McCANN et al." on Justia Law

Tommy and Charlie Gill were arrested for murder and held in custody for over ninety days without being formally charged. They applied for habeas relief, arguing that under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 17.151, they were entitled to release on a personal bond or a reduction of bail. The trial judge denied appellants' applications and the court of appeals affirmed those decisions. Because the court of appeals erred in holding that the judge properly considered factors outside of article 17.151 in denying Appellants relief under that provision, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the habeas court. View "Ex parte Gill" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged by indictment with aggravated assault by using a deadly weapon. The indictment also included allegations that appellant previously had been convicted of two felony offenses. After finding appellant "guilty of aggravated assault, as charged in the indictment," the jury found the enhancement paragraphs true and assessed punishment of thirty years' confinement. On direct appeal, appellant raised several claims, including a claim that the evidence was legally insufficient to support the jury's finding that the second enhancement paragraph was true: that paragraph should not have been used to enhance her punishment range because the alleged offense did not occur in the sequence alleged in the indictment. The court of appeals held that the evidence supported the enhancement of appellant's sentence under the habitual-offender statute and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether the opinion of the majority of the First Court of Appeals erroneously relied on an unpublished memorandum opinion as controlling precedent rather than on a published opinion from the Fourteenth Court of Appeals that involved the same issue regarding enhanced sentences and finality of the convictions in enhancement paragraphs. Appellant suggested that the majority opinion in the court of appeals appeared to contradict the Supreme Court's subsequent adoption of the rationale of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. Finding no reversible error in this case, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "Roberson v. Texas" on Justia Law

The complainant was appellant's stepdaughter. In 2006, then eight years old, she told a forensic interviewer that appellant had, on one occasion, told her to sit on his face, at which point he made oral contact with her anus. The complainant also said that appellant had, on one occasion, showed her various "sex toys" and placed one between her legs so that she could "feel the vibration." Appellant responded to these accusations by providing a written statement to police that was admitted at his trial. His statement indicated that, based on prior comments by the complainant, he suspected that she had been sexually active with her brothers. He said that on one occasion, the complainant entered his bedroom, lifted her dress, and exposed herself, causing him to notice that she was not wearing underwear. Appellant stated that he decided to examine her to see if she had any physical evidence of sexual contact or injury. To examine the complainant, appellant laid her down on the bed and spread her legs while she was on her stomach. After that, he opened her buttocks to visually check her anus and labia. He determined that the "examination was inconclusive and her anus did not appear to be streached/ripped [sic]." He maintained that there was no intent for any sexual gratification. This case addresses whether a trial court's omission of a "medical care" defensive jury instruction was harmless error. The Supreme Court concluded after its review of the entire record that the jury rejected appellant's statements invoking the medical-care defense, and, therefore, he was not actually harmed in this case. Furthermore, although the court of appeals erred by referring to the sufficiency of the evidence, it reached the correct disposition. View "Cornet v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with possession of a controlled substance (cocaine). He filed a motion to suppress evidence on the basis that the evidence (the cocaine) was illegally obtained. He also filed a motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant. The latter motion cited two bases for disclosure: (1) that the informant's identity was needed to show that the officers who conducted the arrest and search did not have probable cause based upon a reliable and credible informant, and (2) that the informant's identity was necessary because the informant was a material witness to the defendant's guilt or innocence and upon the possible defense of entrapment. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the dispositive nature of the motion to suppress was a term of appellant's plea agreement and that it rendered moot the second basis for appellant's motion to disclose. Furthermore, the Court concluded that appellant failed to sufficiently apprise the trial court of his intent to challenge the motion to disclose on this second basis or to challenge the dispositive nature of the plea agreement. View "Bland v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted for indecency with a child and aggravated sexual assault. The jury found Appellant not guilty of indecency with a child but guilty of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced him to confinement for fifty years. On appeal, Appellant claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction on the medical-care defense. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding that Appellant would have been entitled to an instruction on the medical-care defense if he had requested it. The State filed a petition for discretionary review which the Texas Supreme Court granted on two grounds: (1) whether in this case Appellant was entitled to the instruction on the medical-care defense; and (2) is it necessarily ineffective assistance of counsel to not request a defensive instruction that depends upon convincing the jury that the defendant lied to them under oath when he denied committing the prohibited conduct? The Court determined that, in his trial testimony, Appellant admitted to penetration (as defined by Texas law) which was sufficient to satisfy the admission requirement of the confession and avoidance doctrine as it related to the medical-care defense. Further, the Court concluded that Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel because the defense was properly raised and trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction on the issue. View "Villa v. Texas" on Justia Law

Ronald Wortham was convicted of injury to a child. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial judge did not err in denying Wortham's request for a jury instruction on the lesser-included offenses of reckless and criminally negligent injury to a child. Because the court of appeals misapplied the two-part analysis used to determine the availability of lesser-included offense instructions, the Supreme Court reversed its judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wortham, Jr. v. Texas" on Justia Law

In two separate indictments, appellant was charged with stalking his former girlfriend. Before trial, the judge permitted the State to consolidate the offenses and denied appellant's motion to sever. The jury convicted appellant of both offenses, and the trial judge sentenced appellant to ten years' confinement for each offense, to run concurrently. On appeal, appellant argued that the trial judge erred by denying his motion to sever. The court of appeals agreed, holding that appellant had an absolute right to sever under Section 3.04 of the Texas Penal Code. Finding the error harmful, the court of appeals reversed appellant's conviction and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the error was harmless because the State was entitled to offer evidence of appellant's prior acts of harassment relevant to the first stalking offense to prove the elements of the second stalking offense. View "Werner v. Texas" on Justia Law