Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury rejected Appellant Codiem Wooten's self-defense claim and convicted him of murder, for which he was sentenced to sixty years' confinement. At the punishment phase of trial, appellant requested a "sudden passion" jury instruction. The trial court denied that request. The Court of Appeals affirmed appellant's conviction, but reversed with respect to punishment, holding the trial court erred by not giving the sudden passion instruction. The State appealed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the appellate court erred in finding "some harm" simply because appellant was subjected to a greater range of punishment than he would had the jury been instructed on sudden passion. View "Wooten v. Texas" on Justia Law

During voir dire, the trial judge said that he personally would want to testify if accused of a crime but admonished the prospective jurors that others might have a different perspective, that a defendant could have good reasons not to testify that were unrelated to guilt, and that the law prohibited the jurors from holding a defendant's failure to testify against him. Defense counsel belatedly requested a mistral but did not ask for an instruction to disregard the trial judge's comments. Holding that the comments constituted fundamental error, the court of appeals reversed the conviction. Upon review of the case, the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of appeals' conclusion that the trial judge's comments constituted fundamental error. Furthermore, the Court concluded that appellant's request for a mistrial did not preserve error because any harm flowing from error in this case could have been cured by an instruction to disregard and in fact was cured by the totality of the trial judge's instructions. Accordingly the appellate court was reverse and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Unkart v. Texas" on Justia Law

The appellee was convicted of driving while intoxicated, and he timely filed a motion for new trial. The motion stated, in relevant part, that the appellee was requesting a new trial, in the interest of justice, because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence. The judge recused himself because the appellee had donated to his campaign, and a visiting judge was appointed to hear the motion. While the appellee's counsel was in the visiting judge's home courtroom and while no representative of the State was present, the judge requested that both parties file memoranda of law on the motion. No one informed the State of the judge's request. The day before the hearing appellee filed a "memorandum of law" in support of his motion. During the hearing, the State strenuously objected to the appellee's memorandum of law on the grounds that it was an untimely amendment to the appellee's motion for new trial and alleged new grounds. The State further argued that the original motion, standing alone, was not sufficient to put the State on notice that pretrial matters would be argued. Counsel for appellee responded that one of the grounds in the original motion (that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence) was a sufficient pleading because it encompassed the evidentiary issues. Counsel said that the memorandum was not an amendment to the motion but merely a more detailed argument as requested by the judge. The judge overruled the State's objections and allowed the hearing to proceed. The appellee argued only that the verdict was "contrary to the law and the evidence" because of the suppression issues. At the end of the hearing, the trial court granted a new trial. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the test in "State v. Herndon" for reviewing granted motions for new trial. A trial court generally does not abuse its discretion if the defendant (1) sets forth a specificˇand valid legal ground for relief in their motion, (2) points to evidence in the record (or sets forth evidence) that substantiates the same legal claim, and (3) shows prejudice under the harmless-error standards of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. In this case, the appellee did not present evidence of the same claim that was raised in his motion, and the State properly objected. Consequently, the Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the appellee's motion and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming. View "Texas v. Zalman" on Justia Law

Appellee, an undocumented alien seeking to remain eligible for "cancellation of removal" from the United States, filed a motion to vacate his 1998 deferred-adjudication misdemeanor judgment for possession of less than two ounces of marijuana. The motion alleged that appellee's guilty plea had been involuntary because it was made without an attorney giving appellee advice regarding deportation. After hearing from appellee's current counsel, the trial judge granted the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, pointing to "evidence" that appellee did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel. The Supreme Court granted the State Prosecuting Attorney's (SPA's) petition to answer two questions: (1) could counsel's statements be considered "evidence"?; and (2) was appellee's 1998 waiver of counsel constitutionally invalid because he was not informed of the possible deportation consequences of his plea? After a brief note on the nature of the pleading filed here, the Court answered both questions no. Therefore the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's original judgment. View "Texas v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

Applicant Jesus De Leon filed two applications for the writ of habeas corpus brought pursuant to Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Pursuant to plea agreements, Applicant pled guilty to one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child, one count of sexual performance by a child, and twenty-two counts of possession of child pornography. The trial court granted Applicant permission to appeal, even though the State argued that Applicant waived all rights to appeal pursuant to a waiver in the plea agreements. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Applicant's guilty pleas were rendered involuntary because the State reindicted Applicant's brother. Accordingly, the Court granted relief. View "Ex parte Jesus de Leon" on Justia Law

In 2009, appellant Anthony Davison entered an open plea of guilty to burglary of a building. Prior to accepting his plea, the trial court admonished appellant as to the range of punishment for such an offense. Both in a written "Guilty Plea Memorandum" and orally, the trial court informed appellant that "a state jail felony has a possible punishment of not less than 180 days and no more than two years in a state jail facility and a fine not to exceed $10,000." But appellant also pled true to three felony enhancement paragraphs, which made him susceptible to punishment as a second-degree felon. On appeal to the Supreme Court, appellant contended that the court of appeals erred in holding that: (1) the failure to administer one of the admonishments of Article 26.13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was harmful under Rule 44.2(b) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure; (2) his guilty plea was therefore rendered involuntary for the purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and was therefore forfeited because not raised by objection at trial; and (3) any constitutional error was harmless under the same rule that governs the standard for harm analyses for claims of statutory error under Article 26.13. Though the Supreme Court rejected certain aspects of the court of appeals' reasoning, the Court ultimately affirmed its judgment. View "Davison v. Texas" on Justia Law

In 2005, the two complainants in this case went to Applicant William Denton's residence. While there, they were assaulted and robbed by applicant and two other men. Each of the two indictments at issue here charged applicant with one count of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated robbery. The jury found applicant guilty of all four charges, with the sentences to run concurrently. The court of appeals affirmed. In his application for habeas corpus, applicant asserted that the convictions for both aggravated robbery and aggravated assault on each complainant violated his constitutional protections against double jeopardy. Finding that applicant has shown that two of his four convictions were in violation of his constitutional double-jeopardy protections that preclude multiple punishments for the same offense., the Supreme Court granted applicant's request for relief, retained the aggravated-robbery convictions and set aside the aggravated-assault convictions. View "Ex parte William Denton" on Justia Law

According to appellant Chidiebele Gabriel Okonkwo, he received $60,000 dollars in the mail from a man in Nigeria whom he had never met, who told appellant that he needed assistance in making purchases in the United States. Appellant claimed that he believed the money was authentic currency. He took the money to three different locations with the intent of obtaining money orders. After he successfully obtained two money orders, he was arrested when a clerk who was suspicious about the authenticity of the money called the police. The police confirmed that the money had been forged. At trial, the sole issue was whether appellant knew that the money was forged. The State petitioned the Supreme Court for discretionary review to ask whether appellant's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on the defense of mistake of fact. Answering in the affirmative, the court of appeals reversed appellant's conviction for forgery of money. On appeal, the State raised two issues: (1) that the court of appeals erroneously used a subjective standard to assess whether defense counsel was ineffective; and (2) under an objective standard, counsel could not be held ineffective for failing to request a mistake-of-fact instruction because the State had to prove that appellant knew the money was forged as an element of its case. The Supreme Court disagreed with the State on its first challenge and agreed on its second. "The court of appeals did properly apply an objective standard, although it erred by failing to weigh the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Furthermore, the court of appeals erred by determining that counsel was objectively ineffective in light of the record in this case, which shows that it was an inconsistent, alternative theory asserted by appellant's trial counsel, and its inclusion may have lessened the State's burden of proof. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals." View "Okonkwo v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant James Gelinas was charged with driving while intoxicated following a roadside stop conducted by Department of Public Safety Trooper Diego Marquez. At trial, Marquez testified that he stopped appellant because he believed appellant failed to signal out of a private parking lot and that the light illuminating the license plate on appellant's car was not white, as required by law. Marquez conceded that the initial ground for the stop proved insupportable because the Transportation Code does not require drivers to signal when turning out of private lots. As a result, the sole ground for the stop became appellant's license plate light. Once stopped, Marquez contended that appellant exhibited a number of signs of and performed poorly on the standardized field sobriety tests. Based on his observations, Trooper Marquez concluded that appellant was intoxicated. The jury instructions given at trial were clearly erroneous in that they stated the exact opposite of what the law provided. "In truth, if the jury found that Gelinas was driving on a public road and failed to comply with the law requiring a white light, the stop would have been legal, not illegal, and thus the jury could have properly considered the testimony and conclusions of Trooper Marquez." Appellant was found guilty of driving while intoxicated and was sentenced to 180 days confinement probated for fifteen months and fined $1000. On appeal, appellant asserted, among other things, that he suffered egregious harm as a result of the charge error. In its analysis, the court of appeals noted the similarities between the facts of the instant case and those in the Supreme Court's "Hutch v. State" plurality opinion. The court of appeals opted to follow the Court's reasoning in Hutch, "offering little more than an account of [the Court's] analysis in Hutch and a blanket conclusion of egregious harm." That court reversed and remanded the case accordingly. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Hutch lacked the persuasive value to which the court of appeals attributed it and reversed. View "Gelinas v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Mauricio Celis was never licensed to practice law in Texas or any other jurisdiction, but he continuously held himself out as a lawyer in Texas over a period of several years in a lucrative business. Appellant acknowledged that he did not have a "cedula," nor a certificate from Mexico's Ministry of Education. Rather, he testified that he had a diploma in judicial sciences and that he, therefore, believed that he was "considered a lawyer in Mexico." He called two witnesses who testified that every Mexican citizen who was of legal age and sound mind is a "licenciado." Appellant was charged with 23 counts of falsely holding himself out as a lawyer in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 38.122 (the "false-lawyer statute"). With respect to a culpable mental state, the trial court's instructions required the jury to determine only whether appellant intended to obtain an economic benefit for himself in holding himself out as a lawyer. The instructions did not include a culpable mental state with respect to the remaining elements that alleged that appellant had held himself out as an attorney, was not currently licensed to practice law, and was not in good standing with the State Bar of Texas and other applicable authorities. In deciding appellant's petition for discretionary review, the Supreme Court considered three issues: (1) whether the offense of falsely holding oneself out as a lawyer does not require an instruction as to a culpable mental state beyond the intent expressly prescribed by the plain language in that statute; (2) whether appellant was not entitled to an instruction on a mistake-of-fact defense because his requested instruction did not negate the culpability required for the offense; and (3) whether the appellate court properly determined that the trial court's instruction on the definition of "foreign legal consultant" was not an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Celis v. Texas" on Justia Law