Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Deputy Jesse Garza of the Victoria County Sheriff's Office was observing a house known for illegal-narcotics activity. He saw a sports-utility vehicle ("SUV") approach the house and observed a passenger, appellee Shirley Copeland, got out, left the deputy's sight, and quickly returned to the SUV. After the SUV left the house, the deputy stopped the driver of the SUV for a traffic violation. Suspecting possible narcotics activity, the deputy asked the driver for consent to search the SUV. Danish agreed, but appellee refused. She claimed to be the owner of the SUV even though she was not listed as the owner on the vehicle registration. Appellee and the driver also informed the deputy that they were married under common law. Although appellee continued to refuse consent, the driver again consented, and the deputy searched the SUV. During his search, the deputy found two white pills, later identified as Tramadol, in the middle console. Appellee was arrested and charged with possession of a dangerous drug. Appellee filed a motion to suppress on two grounds: (1) the deputy's extended detention of her was not a permissible "Terry" stop; and (2) "Randolph" applieed to the search of vehicles just as it did to the search of residences. The trial court's order generally granted the motion, but its findings of fact and conclusions of law addressed only the second ground. The State appealed, arguing: (1) the trial court erred by finding that appellee and the driver were married under common law, (2) that appellee had standing to challenge the search; and (3) that the police officer did have valid consent through the driver. Because it held in appellee's favor, the court of appeals did not reach the first alternative ground in appellee's motion to suppress with respect to the length or scope of the detention. The sole ground on which the Supreme Court granted review in the State's petition for discretionary review challenged the court of appeals's application of "Randolph" to consensual searches of vehicles stopped on a public roadway. The Court agreed with the State that Randolph did not apply to vehicular searches and, therefore, reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The case was remanded to appellate court so that it could determine whether the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress should be upheld on the alternative ground asserted in appellee's motion. View "Texas v. Copeland" on Justia Law

On January 26, 2011, appellant was involved in a vehicle accident and was arrested for driving while intoxicated. One of the other people involved in the accident was taken to the hospital. Because of this, without the police obtaining a warrant, appellant was taken to a hospital so that a mandatory, involuntary blood specimen could be taken. Appellant's blood was drawn by Rachel Lopez, an employee of the hospital and an Emergency Medical Technician-Intermediate ("EMT-I"). Appellant moved to suppress the results of the blood test, arguing that Lopez was not a person authorized by section 724.017 of the Transportation Code to take a blood specimen. Specifically, appellant contended that Lopez was not a "qualified technician" within the meaning of the statute because she was part of the hospital's "emergency medical services personnel." Two courts of appeals have held that phlebotomists were "qualified technicians" within the meaning of section 724.017, provided that their qualifications were established on the record. The record in this case showed that Lopez's primary duties were that of a phlebotomist and that she was qualified to be so. Lopez was trained to draw blood, and her primary duty at the hospital for the six years she was employed there was to draw blood. The Supreme Court concluded that Lopez was indeed qualified within the meaning of the statute. Furthermore, the Court concluded that functionally, Lopez was not emergency medical services personnel; "that training and her license and title had little to do with what she actually did at the hospital, which was almost exclusively drawing blood." Because Lopez did not function as emergency services personnel, section 724.017(c) and its restrictions on emergency services personnel are not applicable in this case. The Court reversed the appellate court that misapplied the statute to this facts of this case, and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Krause v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Dansby, Sr. argued on direct appeal that his deferred adjudication community supervision was revoked unconstitutionally as a penalty for invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination by refusing to answer questions during the course of a court-imposed sexual history polygraph examination about past sexual assault offenses. In an unpublished opinion, the Dallas Court of Appeals declined to reach that issue, holding that the appellant's community supervision had been legitimately revoked on another basis-that he failed to successfully complete the court-ordered sex offender treatment program that the sexual history polygraph was designed to facilitate. The Supreme Court granted appellant's petition for discretionary review to address his contention that he was essentially discharged from the treatment program because he refused to answer incriminating questions during the course of the sexual history polygraph, and that the court of appeals therefore improperly dodged his constitutional claim. View "Dansby v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Gregg Baird hired Dawn Killian to stay at his home and care for his dog while he was away on vacation. During her stay, Killian used appellant's computer in his master bedroom and found child pornography. At a pre-trial suppression hearing, appellant claimed that Killian's access to his bedroom and computer was illegal; therefore, the State could not use the evidence against him at his trial. The trial court denied appellant's motion to suppress the images taken from his computer. Specifically, the trial court found that appellant did not explicitly exclude Killian from his bedroom or from his computer; that he walked her through the master bedroom and bathroom; and that he told her to "[h]elp [her]self to anything." Based on these fact findings, the trial court determined that Killian had the appellant's effective consent to enter the bedroom and use the computer, and held that, without establishing that Killian violated the law, appellant could not exclude the material. Appellant challenged the trial court's finding, pointing to his own testimony that this comment was only made in the kitchen, and specifically in reference to food. However, after review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that appellant repeated that statement at least once during the tour of the home and told her also to "[h]elp herself to everything." That supported the trial court's finding that appellant gave Killian his apparent consent: "[. . .] He did not expressly banish her from the bedroom, nor did he forbid her to use his computer. He showed her how to operate the television and stereo. He did not power the computer down or password-protect it, and he admitted that he allowed his roommate to use it regularly. Given this convergence of facts, the trial court was justified in concluding that Killian had the appellant's apparent consent--that is to say, it is clear and manifest to the understanding that she had his assent in fact-to enter his bedroom and use his computer." View "Baird v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant was found guilty of murder, and his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals in 1992. In 2011, applicant filed this application for post-conviction relief pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07. Applicant contended that he was denied the opportunity to pursue discretionary review by the Supreme Court because his appellate counsel failed to notify him of his conviction's affirmance in the court of appeals until June 1993, by which time the deadline for filing a petition for discretionary review (PDR) had passed. Applicant further contended that counsel's failure to timely notify him of his conviction's affirmance constituted ineffective assistance of counsel and that he should now be afforded the opportunity to file an out-of-time PDR. In response, the State invoked the equitable doctrine of laches and argued that applicant be barred from proceeding with his application for post-conviction relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that appellate counsel did not provide applicant with notice of the court of appeals's opinion until after the deadline for filing a PDR, and that applicant had the information necessary to seek an out-of-time PDR as early as 1993 but failed to do so until almost two decades later. The trial court concluded that applicant failed to show that, absent counsel's conduct, he would have timely filed a PDR. "Recognizing that our current approach to laches in the habeas corpus context has imposed an unreasonably heavy burden upon the State, we now adopt a revised approach that is consistent with the Texas common-law definition of that doctrine." The Court expanded the definition of prejudice under the existing laches standard to incorporate all forms of prejudice so that a court may consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding whether to hold an application barred by laches. In light of the revised approach to the doctrine of laches, the Supreme Court remanded this case to the trial court to give both applicant and the State an opportunity to present additional evidence. View "Ex parte Alberto Perez" on Justia Law

Appellant Christina Jones claimed her conviction for fraudulent use or possession of identifying information violated the doctrine of in pari materia because that statute conflicted with the statute defining the offense of failure to identify, carrying a lower penalty. Specifically, Appellant asserted that fraudulent use or possession of identifying information (Texas Penal Code 32.51(b)), a state jail felony, and failure to identify (Texas Penal Code § 38.02(b)), a class B misdemeanor, were in pari materia and thus she should have been charged under 38.02(b), the more lenient statute. The court of appeals rejected this argument, holding that these two statutes are not in pari materia because they have different purposes, require different elements of proof, and carry different penalties. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed the court of appeals. View "Jones v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant Jefferie Daniel was charged with the offense of forgery of a check in cause number 2000CR1247, allegedly committed on September 27, 1999. 2011, the Bexar County District Clerk issued a "Bill of Cost" with respect to that cause. In addition to the $295.25 that were specifically assessed in the judgment as court costs in 2002, the belated "Bill" also assessed a cost for "APPOINTED ATTY" in the amount of $7,945.00. The applicant subsequently filed a pleading denominated as a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus challenging the district clerk's apparently unilateral assessment of appointed attorney fees as a cost of court on due process grounds. Rather than immediately accepting that recommendation, and without specifically addressing the trial court's concern with the cognizability of the applicant's claim, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the trial court for further fact development. The trial court forwarded amended findings of fact and conclusions of law. Relying upon "personal recollection," but without addressing whether the applicant was indigent and represented by appointed counsel at trial, the trial court made an express finding of fact that the applicant was determined to be indigent for purposes of appeal on May 6, 2002, and that counsel was duly appointed to represent him for appellate purposes on May 21, 2002. Moreover, the trial court determined, "[t]here [was] no record that the court conducted any hearing or findings into [the applicant's] ability to pay his court-appointed attorney fees after [he] was determined to be indigent." On the basis of these amended findings, the trial court recommended that the Supreme Court grant habeas corpus relief by deleting the "Bill of Cost." Mandamus relief was conditionally granted. View "In re Jefferie Daniel, Relator" on Justia Law

A jury convicted appellant Lemuel Burt of misapplication of fiduciary property and assessed his punishment at 14 years' incarceration and a $10,000 fine. The trial court orally pronounced this sentence on January 15, 2009, after which the trial court commented to the parties, "The sooner we can get that restitution matter taken care of, the better." The judgment, dated January 16, 2009, contains a restitution order for $591,785. Appellant filed a motion for new trial on January 15, 2009, but it was denied. Appellant appealed, arguing that the restitution order must be vacated because the trial court did not orally pronounce restitution in open court, and the written judgment therefore did not properly reflect the orally pronounced sentence. Appellant argued in the alternative that the trial court improperly calculated restitution to include losses from individuals not named in the indictment. The court of appeals held that appellant failed to preserve the restitution issues by failing to raise them in the trial court. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that because appellant did not have an opportunity to object to the restitution order in the trial court, he could not have preserved the error for review and that the error was therefore not forfeited. The court of appeals was reversed and the case remanded for consideration of the merits of the appellant's restitution claims. View "Burt v. Texas" on Justia Law

"Anne" was six years old at the time of an incident with appellant, her step-grandfather. Anne and her young relatives, Emily and Charlotte, were watching television with appellant in his living room. While Charlotte and Emily sat across the room from them, appellant touched Anne's genitals as she sat on his lap. When she pushed his hand away, he restrained Anne so that she could not leave. Charlotte started yelling, "He won't let her go, he won't let her go." The commotion was heard by several adults who were outside of the house, including appellant's wife, who is also Anne's grandmother, and Anne's parents. Appellant was charged with indecency with a child by contact and he pleaded not guilty. The case was tried to the bench along with other accusations of sexual abuse committed against Emily and Charlotte. At trial, the State called a designated outcry witness and offered a 30-minute videotape of Anne's interview. Over appellant's hearsay objection, the trial court admitted the recording in its entirety, and it was played for the court. The outcry witness did not testify about any of Anne's statements; the sole evidence of the statements Anne made to the witness was the videotape of the interview. On the State's petition for discretionary review, the Supreme Court held that Article 38.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure (the outcry statute) is a hearsay exception statutorily limited to live testimony of the outcry witness. The child-complainant's own videotaped statement did not meet the requirements for being admitted under that statute. Because the trial court impermissibly admitted the child's videotaped statement under the outcry statute, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals's judgment reversing appellant's conviction. View "Bays v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellee Tony Betts was indicted for cruelty to animals. The trial court granted appellee's motion to suppress, which complained of a warrantless search and seizure. The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's order. We granted the State's petition for discretionary review to address: (1) whether an accused has standing to challenge a search and seizure conducted in a relative's backyard where he had permission to house dogs when he did not live at the house and the yard was entirely exposed to the public; (2) whether the majority of the court of appeals improperly ignored the trial court's dispositive factfinding in ruling that the search and seizure was not justified under the plain view doctrine; and (3) whether the majority erred by failing to follow the mandates of "State v. Elias," (339 S.W.3d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)), and remanding the case to the trial judge to make fact findings and legal conclusions on the issue of whether entry onto the property was justified under the community caretaking doctrine. The Supreme Court concluded appellee had standing to contest the warrantless search and seizure conducted in his aunt's backyard. The search and seizure were not justified by the plain view doctrine, and the State could not rely on the community caretaking doctrine, which it did not raise to the trial court or the court of appeals. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals was affirmed. View "Texas v. Betts" on Justia Law