Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Charged with offenses committed against two complainants, appellee Robert Rosseau was indicted for 29 counts of sexual assault of a child and one count of indecency with a child. In his petition for discretionary review, appellee challenged the judgment of the court of appeals that reversed the trial court's order quashing a portion of his indictment. On appellee's motion, the trial court quashed multiple paragraphs of the indictment, which were based on a "bigamy provision" that elevated the range of punishment for sexual assault whenever "the victim was a person whom the actor was prohibited from marrying or purporting to marry or with whom the actor was prohibited from living under the appearance of being married under [Texas Penal Code] Section 25.01." With respect to appellee's jurisdictional challenge, the Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals that it had jurisdiction to address the State's appeal of the trial court's order granting the motion to quash. With respect to appellee's argument that the bigamy provision at Texas Penal Code Section 22.011(f) was facially unconstitutional, the Court disagreed with the court of appeals's conclusion that appellee did not present a facial challenge, but agreed with its alternative holding that appellee failed to show that the statute operates unconstitutionally in all its applications. Therefore, the Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Texas v. Rosseau" on Justia Law

When appellee Anthony Duran made a left-hand turn in front of a speeding police car, the police officer braked, turned to follow, pulled the car over, and eventually arrested appellee for DWI. Appellee filed a motion to suppress, claiming that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. The trial judge granted the motion, the State appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the trial judge's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an appellate court must defer to a trial judge's factual findings which, when viewed piecemeal and in isolation, may be ambiguous, but, when read in their totality, reasonably support his legal conclusion. The Court concluded it must. "A reviewing court must apply the same non-technical, common-sense deference-not only to the trial judge's individual factual findings, but also to the totality of those findings-that it uses to assess a magistrate's determination of probable cause. This case depends upon a single fact, not any legal issue: Did the police officer actually see a traffic violation before he detained Mr. Duran? The trial judge's findings indicate that he did not. We must defer to that determination of fact." View "Texas v. Duran" on Justia Law

The State applied for the Supreme Court's discretionary review to address what constituted exigent circumstances permitting police officers to enter a home without a warrant. The Court agreed with the appellate court's holding that probable cause to believe that illegal drugs were in a home coupled with an odor of marijuana from the home and a police officer making his presence known to the occupants did not justify a warrantless entry. However, because the court of appeals did not address the State's alternative ground for finding exigent circumstances regarding child safety, the Court remanded the case to that court to do so. View "Turrubiate v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Herring was 16 years old when he was arrested for, and charged with, aggravated robbery. Because he was a juvenile, he was given his Miranda warnings by a magistrate. There was conflicting testimony as to whether two armed police officers were present when appellant was given these warnings. After the warnings, appellant was questioned by two police officers, and he confessed to the charged robbery, as well as other robberies and burglaries. The confession was reduced to writing by one of the officers, and appellant signed it. At trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress the signed statement, and argued, among other things, that the statement was taken in violation of Family Code Section 51.095 because armed law-enforcement officers were present when he was given the magistrate's warnings. The motion was denied, and a jury found appellant guilty, sentencing him to 20 years' confinement. Appellant appealed and asserted that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. The court of appeals affirmed appellant's conviction. Appellant argued one issue to the Supreme Court: whether Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) permitted law-enforcement officers to be present when a juvenile is initially read his rights. The Court concluded that Section 51.095(a)(1)(A) does not prohibit the presence of law-enforcement officers, and accordingly affirmed. View "Herring v. Texas" on Justia Law

Applicant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and was sentenced to ninety-nine years' imprisonment. His conviction was upheld on direct appeal. Applicant's petition for discretionary review was denied by the Supreme Court. Applicant then filed this application for writ of habeas corpus claiming that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel when trial counsel failed to preserve the issue of the validity of the search warrant for appellate review. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law recommending that the Supreme Court deny relief. After review, the Supreme Court denied relief. View "Ex parte Darron Moore" on Justia Law

Appellee Michael Bonds moved to suppress the evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant by contesting the warrant's validity. The trial judge overruled his motion finding the errors in the warrant's description of the location to be searched did not invalidate the warrant. The court of appeals found the warrant lacked probable cause and reversed. Finding that the warrant was supported by probable cause and sufficiently particular, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals's judgment. View "Bonds v. Texas" on Justia Law

After rejecting a plea bargain of eight years imprisonment, the applicant pleaded guilty in open court and was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and indecency with a child by contact. The judge assessed punishment of twenty years' confinement for each charge, to run concurrently. The applicant filed two applications for writs of habeas corpus alleging that constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel caused him to reject the State's plea-bargain offer. The judge of the convicting court found that trial counsel incorrectly told the applicant that he was eligible for judge-ordered community supervision and shock probation, when only a jury's verdict recommending probation could result in shock probation and the judge could order only deferred adjudication. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court in this case was the determination of the correct standard for granting habeas-corpus relief for ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Sixth-Amendment standard for determining prejudice in cases of ineffective assistance of counsel during the plea-bargaining process, the implications of that decision impacted the Texas Court's review of this case. After further review, the Texas Court held that to establish prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in which a defendant is not made aware of a plea-bargain offer, or rejects a plea-bargain because of bad legal advice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that: (1) he would have accepted the earlier offer if counsel had not given ineffective assistance; (2) the prosecution would not have withdrawn the offer; and (3) the trial court would not have refused to accept the plea bargain. This case was remanded to the habeas court so that it could make findings consistent with the Court's opinion. View "Ex parte Andrew Argent" on Justia Law

Applicant Joel De Los Reyes filed an application for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to advise him that he was almost certainly subject to deportation after he pled guilty to a second crime of moral turpitude. The trial court denied the application, but the El Paso Court of Appeals granted relief, holding that the rule from "Padilla" should be applied retroactively and that trial counsel was ineffective under that rule. After review, the Supreme Court recognized that it could give retroactive effect to "Padilla" as a matter of state habeas law. But the Court declined to do so. The Court adhered to the prevailing retroactivity analysis in Texas and held that "Padilla" did not apply retroactively. The appellate court's judgment was reversed in this case, and the trial court's original denial of applicant's application was reinstated. View "Ex parte Joel de Los Reyes" on Justia Law

After rejecting his entrapment defense, a jury convicted appellant Jose Vega of three drug offenses. On appeal, he argued that the trial judge reversibly erred by not instructing the jury accurately on his entrapment defense because the application instruction did not list inducement by the confidential informant as well as inducement by an undercover officer. The court of appeals held that appellant's failure to request that specific application instruction, or object to its omission, forfeited the issue on appeal. The Supreme Court granted review to reiterate that, "when a trial judge instructs on a defensive issue, he must do so correctly; thus any error in the charge actually given is subject to review under 'Almanza.'" In this case, the Court found that the judge's failure to list the confidential informant in the application charge was harmless because the entrapment instructions, taken as a whole, provided the jury with an adequate vehicle to fully consider and give effect to appellant's entrapment defense. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Vega v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Paul Krajcovic was charged with a murder committed in 2007. A jury found him guilty and sentenced him to fifty-five years' confinement. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request for a jury instruction on the "Castle Doctrine," which went into effect on September 1, 2007. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for discretionary review to address: (1) whether the Court of Appeals' panel majority improperly applied the law on defensive instructions where there was no evidence that supported an inference that the requested defensive instruction on the "Castle Doctrine" applied to the case; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals' panel majority erred by holding the lack of the requested instruction was harmful where there was no evidence whatsoever of "retreat," and where a self-defense claim would have failed regardless of whether Appellant was legally required to retreat or not. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in failing to consider whether the evidence supported the inference that the Castle Doctrine applied to this case. The Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Krajcovic v. Texas" on Justia Law