Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Thomas McQuarrie was convicted of sexual assault. The trial court denied his motion for new trial, which alleged that after having retired to deliberate, the jury received other evidence not then admitted by the court that was detrimental to Appellant's case. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly excluded the jurors' affidavits and testimony pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 606(b) and that Rule 606(b) was constitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the jurors' testimony and affidavits offered by Appellant at the hearing on his motion for new trial, and the court of appeals erred to hold otherwise. The internet research conducted by a juror about the effects of date rape drugs constituted an "outside influence." View "McQuarrie v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with aggravated robbery. The evidence at trial showed that he and his two roommates hatched a scheme to steal money at gunpoint from a woman driving a food truck. Appellant was the designated getaway driver. Appellant's defense was that he was merely present when his roommates committed the robbery. The jury convicted him. The court of appeals, relying on the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in "Johnson v. Texas" found reversible error because the trial judge, over appellant's objection, declined to apply the law of parties more explicitly in the application paragraph. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition to decide whether objected-to error in the application paragraph is subject to the usual "Almanza" harm analysis or a per se finding of harm. After review, the Court concluded that the usual Almanza factors applied and that any error in the present application paragraph was harmless. The Court therefore overruled Johnson to the extent that it suggests a per se finding of harm. View "Vasquez v. Texas" on Justia Law

In November 2010, Appellant was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. In his automatic appeal, Appellant raised 46 points of error. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence of death. View "Green v. Texas" on Justia Law

Appellant Bradley Crenshaw was convicted of driving while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, determining that the trial court erred in submitting a jury charge that included both the subjective and per se definitions of intoxication, even though the information alleged only the subjective definition. The Supreme Court granted the State's application for discretionary review. Upon review, the Court concluded that the per se definition of intoxication was only in the abstract section of the jury charge, and it was not incorporated into the application paragraph. The application paragraph tracked the language of the information, which alleged the subjective theory of intoxication, and thus restricted the jury's consideration to only those allegations contained in the information. The jury was presumed to have understood and followed the court's charge, absent evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the Court presumed that the jury convicted Appellant of DWI pursuant to the subjective theory of intoxication, and reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's conviction. View "Crenshaw v. Texas" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Robinson was convicted of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, namely cocaine, in the amount of 200 grams or more but less than 400 grams, and the jury sentenced him to twenty years in prison with a $10,000 fine. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, finding that, although the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to suppress, the trial court's failure to provide a jury instruction pursuant to Article 38.23(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was error for which the record demonstrated egregious harm, warranting remand for a new trial. The Supreme Court granted the State Prosecuting Attorney's (SPA) petition for discretionary review to address its sole issue with regard to the propriety of the trial court's decision to deny an Article 38.23(a) jury instruction. Upon review, the Court held that that the court of appeals erred to conclude that the appellant was entitled to an Article 38.23(a) jury instruction since there was no dispute about the material historical facts. The only dispute was about the legal significance of those facts - -a dispute that juries are not authorized to resolve. Therefore the judgment of the court of appeals was reversed.

Appellant Billy Dee Riley, Jr. asserted on appeal that because of his trial counsel's ineffective assistance, he was denied an opportunity to be placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision. The court of appeals agreed and sustained his complaint. The State appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was "apparent" that counsel's performance in giving incorrect advice regarding probation was deficient. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, the Court found that, while appellant had shown deficient performance by trial counsel, he failed to prove that had defense counsel properly informed appellant of his ineligibility for probation, there was a reasonable probability that his trial would have produced a different result. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion for new trial.

Appellant was indicted for aggravated sexual assault. The indictment also alleged, for enhancement purposes, that appellant had previously been convicted in Utah of the offense of sexual exploitation of a child. Upon appellant's conviction, the trial judge found the enhancement allegation to be true and imposed an automatic life sentence under Penal Code Section 12.42(c)(2). On appeal, appellant contended that the Utah offense was not the type of offense that could be used for enhancement under the automatic-life sentencing provision. The court of appeals rejected appellant's contention and affirmed the judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Utah offense contained elements substantially similar to the Texas child-pornography offense and affirmed both the trial and appellate courts.

Appellee Gilbert Duarte was charged with possession of cocaine found during a search of his house that was made pursuant to a warrant. The affiant police officer relied upon information provided by a first-time informant who was providing information with the expectation of leniency on his pending criminal charges. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge, who found that the affidavit in this case failed to provide the magistrate with a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to search Appellee's home. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals, which had reversed the trial judge's order granting appellee's motion to suppress.

A DPS trooper stopped appellant for speeding. When the trooper asked appellant whether she had ever been in trouble for anything, she answered "no." This case involved a motion to suppress evidence that was seized because, among other things, a criminal history check revealed that appellant's answer was inaccurate. The case also involved the meaning of "disputed fact issue" in the context of an Article 38.23 jury instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals correctly decided the suppression question but incorrectly decided the jury instruction issue. Consequently, the Court reversed the court of appeals' judgment.

Applicant Ronald Rogers pled guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and attempted aggravated sexual assault. Wearing a white mask, he hid in the stall of a women's restroom in an office building and attacked a woman, T.G., as she exited another stall. He pinned her to a wall and held a knife to her throat. T.G. pushed Applicant and began screaming. She ran out of the restroom, and other workers noticed her upset state. Applicant tried to leave the building but was stopped after a struggle with bystanders. When Applicant was apprehended, he was found carrying several items, including nylon rope, duct tape, handcuffs, gloves, and a glass pipe. A jury assessed punishment of a total of seventy-five years' confinement and $10,000 in fines. On appeal, the First Court of Appeals affirmed Applicant's conviction. Applicant filed applications for writs of habeas corpus, alleging that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel at the punishment stage of trial. The convicting court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that the Court of Criminal Appeals deny relief. The Court filed and set the applications, and granted relief. "Here, counsel failed to adequately investigate Applicant's whereabouts during the attack, and apparently he was aware that Applicant had been excluded by DNA. Had he presented this evidence, the probative value of [the victim's] testimony may not have been substantially outweighed by undue prejudice."