Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was indicted with charges related to the sexual assault of his daughters and subsequently pled guilty to two counts of injury to a child. At issue was whether Texas Penal Code Section 3.03(b)(2)(B) authorized a trial judge to order consecutive sentences when a defendant was originally charged with multiple sexual offenses but pleads guilty, pursuant to a plea bargain, to multiple nonsexual offenses. Because the court found that the statutory language was ambiguous, the court turned to its legislative history. This history showed that the legislature enacted this provision to ensure that defendants who, pursuant to a plea bargain, were placed on deferred adjudication for certain specified sex offenses were subject to the same requirements, disabilities, and punishments that had previously been applied only to those formally "convicted" of a sex offense. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, although for different reasons than that relied upon by the lower court.

Defendant was charge with aggravated robbery. Because the trial court's notations on the defense motions at issue were not memorialized in a written order, the court of appeals dismissed the state's appeal for want of jurisdiction. The state appealed the dismissal to the court. The court held that State v. Rosenbaum did not need to be revised where Rosenbaum dealt with distinguishable facts; because there was no written order from which to appeal, the court of appeals correctly held that it had no jurisdiction over the state's appeal; and the court declined to address the State's remaining assertions. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant was convicted of murdering his wife. The trial judge denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police during custodial questioning at a hospital after a magistrate had given him his Article 15.17 rights. The trial judge rejected defendant's claim that he had invoked both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel when he asked the magistrate for an appointed attorney but also said that he wanted to talk to the police who were standing outside the hospital room. The court granted the State's petition for discretionary review to clarify the distinction after Montejo v. Louisiana between the Fifth Amendment right to interrogation and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Because, under Montejo, defendant never invoked his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights to counsel during custodial interrogation, the court concluded that the trial judge properly denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements made as a result of that police questioning. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Defendant argued on appeal that his trial was unfair because the trial court compelled him to testify at the punishment phase in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to silence. The court of appeals held that defendant did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to remain silent. Because it also concluded that defendant's failure to object did not waive his complaint for appellate review, it sustained defendant's Sixth Amendment claim and remanded the case to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. The court held, however, that defendant's choice to testify was voluntary and that his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was not violated. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and affirmed the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated sexual assault of an eight-year-old child, his step-daughter. On appeal, defendant contended that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the medical-care defense to digital penetration. The court granted defendant's petition for discretionary review to address three issues with respect to his conviction of the count pertaining to the digital penetration of the child's sexual organ: (1) whether the medical-care defense was available when the accused, a layperson with respect to medical science, was attempting to ascertain information regarding the existence of a relevant medical fact, (2) whether the doctrine of confession and avoidance applied to the medical-care defense, such that a defendant attempting to claim the defense must "essentially admit" to each element of sexual assault, including digital penetration of the sexual organ, and (3) if so, whether the defensive evidence in this case amounted to a concession of the elements of the offense, thus rendering the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the defense erroneous. The court responded to all three issues in the affirmative and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Appellant Scott Kirsch, was convicted of his second driving while intoxicated (DWI) offense. A passerby witnessed Appellant stopped in the middle of the road at an intersection. After a few moments, he began slowly tilting to one side before falling over completely, one leg under his motorcycle, the other still straddling it. The passerby pulled beside Appellant and asked if he was ok, but he declined any help. She drove away and saw in her rearview mirror Appellant made no attempt to get up. She called the sheriff to report the incident. When sheriff deputies arrived to assist, they found Appellant attempting to kick-start his motorcycle. The deputy concluded that Appellant was intoxicated and placed him under arrest. In the written charge to the jury, the instructions defined "operate" as "to exert personal effort to cause the vehicle to function." Defense counsel objected to use of the term as it was not defined in the Penal Code, and alleged the prosecutor made his own definition. In his petition for discretionary review, Appellant argued that the court of appeals erred by affirming the trial court's charge to the jury. Upon review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the trial court erred in defining that term, and reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Appellee was indicted for the murder of her husband nearly 23 years later. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, alleging that the pre-indictment delay violated, inter alia, her rights to due process, due course of law, and a fair trial. The court of appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing the indictment and reversed and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings. After review, the court affirmed the court of appeals, holding that there was no evidence in the record that the prosecutorial delay was intended to gain a tactical advantage over appellee or for another improper purpose. The court also held that the 23-year delay did not offend due process and therefore remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to eighty years' imprisonment. After his conviction was affirmed defendant filed an application for writ of habeas corpus claiming that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance at the guilt and punishment phases of his trial. The court held that it could not conclude that defendant satisfied his burden of establishing that counsel's performance was deficient for failing to object to an officer's opinion that defendant looked "arrogant" in his photos; failing to move for a mistrial after the prosecutor asserted in a question that defendant threatened his girlfriend with a gun; failing to file a motion in limine and objecting to the prosecutor impeaching defendant with a drug conviction that arguably was inadmissible; and failing to object to the prosecutor's punishment argument that defendant did not show remorse. The court also could not say that, in the face of all the evidence the jury heard about the murder, it was reasonably probable the jury would have reached a different conclusion had defendant's trial counsel performed in the manner defendant now claimed. Accordingly, the court denied relief.

Defendant was convicted of possession with the intent to deliver cocaine and sentenced to 30 years in prison. Defendant then filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus under Article 11.07, in which he contended that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance at trial. The court twice remanded defendant's application and requested that the convicting judge make specific findings and determine if trial counsel was ineffective. The convicting judge filed findings and recommended that relief be denied. The court held that because those findings were supported by the record, the court adopted them and denied relief.

Defendant was convicted of four counts of indecency with a child by sexual contact and one count of aggravated sexual assault of a child. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the outcry witness's testimony from a pre-trial hearing was admissible. The court held that a pre-trial hearing conducted under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 38.072 section 2(b)(2) was intended only to determine the reliability of the complainant's out-of-court statement. Therefore, defendant's opportunity for cross-examining the outcry witness at such a hearing was inadequate to allow the admission of the hearing testimony at trial. The court reversed the court of appeals and remanded to that court for a harm analysis.