Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant of driving while intoxicated after the trial judge denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search warrant for blood. The court of appeals held that the search-warrant affidavit established probable cause to believe that evidence of intoxication would be found in defendant's blood even though the officer did not specify when, on the day before he obtained the search warrant, he had stopped defendant. At issue was whether a search-warrant affidavit for blood must contain the time the DWI arrestee was stopped. The court held that, under the totality of the circumstances standard set out in State v. Jordan, the affidavit in this case was not sufficient to show probable cause because there could have been a twenty-five-hour gap between the time the officer first stopped defendant and the time he obtained a search warrant for blood. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals.

This case arose when a fight broke out between the Kirby Block gang and the Manett Boys gang. Defendant was indicted and went to trial for murder. The jury charge contained instructions on defense of a third person and defendant objected to the instruction as not consistent with the current self-defense statute. The jury charge did not contain any instructions regarding a presumption of reasonable conduct in the self-defense context, nor did defendant request any such instructions. Defendant was convicted and appealed. On appeal, defendant contended, inter alia, that the trial judge erred in failing to delete the complained-of references to a duty to retreat and that the trial judge erred in failing to include instructions regarding a presumption of reasonable conduct. Defendant subsequently claimed that the court of appeals erred in disposing of his complaints with respect to the defense-of-others instructions in the jury charge. The court held that the trial court erred in submitting the italicized portions of the jury charge because those instructions were not authorized by statute and they constituted comments on the weight of the evidence. The court also held that the court of appeals' analysis on whether defendant was entitled to a presumption charge was incomplete. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings.

In these applications for post conviction writs of habeas corpus, applicant contended that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel misinformed him about the terms of a plea offer made by the State. Applicant argued that counsel was deficient for incorrectly conveying the terms of the State's plea offer and that, but for counsel's error, applicant more than likely would have accepted the offer. The court held that, although counsel did convey the State's plea offer to applicant, the information as to a deadly-weapon finding was incorrect and therefore, this constituted a deficient performance and satisfied the first prong of the Strickland v. Washington test. The court also held that applicant had suffered prejudice from counsel's deficient performance and therefore met the second prong of the Strickland test. Accordingly, relief was granted.

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor driving while intoxicated and she appealed. The Fifth Court of Appeals found error in the trial court's "synergistic effect" instruction to the jury. While the court agreed with the outcome of the court of appeal's judgment, that court's harm analysis simply repeated its error analysis. The court held that the "synergistic effect" instruction delivered in this case introduced a specific mode of action and supported the State's theory that the combination of hydrocodone and alcohol produced intoxication. Under the facts of this case, the court did not find such an instruction harmless and affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of burglary of a habitation and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. The Eleventh Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction, holding that the trial judge erred by denying his request for a lesser-included-offense instruction on criminal trespass. The court agreed that defendant was entitled to an instruction on criminal trespass where the evidence supported an instruction on that lesser-included offense. Therefore, the court affirmed the court of appeal's judgment.

Defendant was convicted of three offenses of indecency with a child by exposure. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting defendant's double jeopardy argument that he received multiple punishments for the same offense. The court held that defendant's right against double jeopardy was violated when he was convicted on three counts of indecency with a child by exposure that resulted form a single act of exposure. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded to the trial court to reform the judgment and sentence.

A jury convicted defendant for murder and for engaging in organized criminal activity. In a petition for discretionary review, defendant contended that the court of appeals erred by holding that the trial court did not improperly comment on the weight of the evidence in its answer to the jury's question. The court held that, although it would usually constitute a comment on the weight of the evidence for a trial court to focus on a particular piece of evidence in its initial charge to the jury, a trial court's answer to a question a jury asked during deliberations would not necessarily constitute an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed the court of appeal's judgment.

Defendant was convicted of reckless driving and deadly conduct. The court of appeals concluded that defendant's two convictions represented multiple punishments for the same offense in violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy and reversed the conviction for reckless driving. The State petitioned for review. The court held that the court of appeals correctly concluded that, when the same conduct violated two different statutory provisions, the two offenses were the same for double jeopardy purposes if one offense contained all of the elements of the other. The court of appeals compared the elements of the two offenses, as charged, and concluded that they were the same for double jeopardy purposes in this case. This analysis was correct, but incomplete. The court of appeals did not consider whether the Legislature intended the conduct to be punished only once. Therefore, the court granted Ground one of the State's petition for Discretionary Review, vacated the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the cause for further proceedings.

Defendant was convicted of intentional murder committed in the course of a robbery, a capital offense, and the jury answered the statutory special issues in such a way that the trial court was obligated to assess the death penalty. Direct appeal was automatic to the court. In fourteen points of error, defendant contended that the trial court erred in various respects. The court disagreed and found defendant's contentions to be without merit. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence of death.

Defendant was convicted by a jury of driving while intoxicated. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and the court granted review to determine: "In a driving while intoxicated case, where the evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction on the theory that the defendant was intoxicated by alcohol, is it proper for the trial court, in its charge, to also authorize a conviction on an alternative theory that the defendant was intoxicated by a drug, or a combination of alcohol and a drug, where the evidence merely shows that medications prescribed for the defendant were found in her car?" The court held that because there was evidence relating to the challenged portions of the definition, the charge was proper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals.