Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent appealed the URSB's determination that her property was an urban nuisance and that the property should be demolished. The trial court affirmed the USRB's finding that respondent's home was an urban nuisance and awarded the city attorneys fees. The trial court then severed respondent's constitutional claims and tried them to a jury. At the close of trial, the City moved unsuccessfully for a directed verdict on the grounds that the Board's nuisance determination was res judicata, precluding respondent's takings claim. The jury rejected the City's contention that respondent's home was a public nuisance and awarded her for the destruction of her house. The trial court denied the City's post-verdict motions and signed a judgment in conformance with the verdict. The court of appeals affirmed but held that the USRB's nuisance finding could not be preclusive because of the brief delay between the nuisance finding and the house's demolition. The City subsequently petitioned the court for review, arguing that the lower courts erred in failing to give the URSB's nuisance determination preclusive effect in respondent's taking claim. The court held that the determination was not preclusive because substantial evidence review of nuisance determination resulting in a home's demolition did not sufficiently protect a person's rights under Article I, Section 17 of the Texas Constitution.

A property owner appealed an administrative determination that his property was a nuisance and he also asserted a takings claim. The property owner then nonsuited the case. He later filed this suit, again alleging that the government illegally took his property. Because the property owner was collaterally estopped from doing so, the court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.

Plaintiff sued Ryland in 2007 and the case went to trial in May 2010. On May 4th, the jury returned a verdict for plaintiff. On May 25, 2010 - after the jury verdict but before the judgment was signed - Ryland filed a JNOV motion on legal insufficiency grounds. Though not styled as a motion for new trial, the JNOV motion also requested a new trial in the alternative. Prior to holding a hearing on the JNOV motion, the trial court signed a judgment for plaintiff on June 14, 2010, initiating the appellate time table. The judgment also purported to deny Ryland's JNOV motion. The court held that because an arguable interpretation of the procedural rules allowed Ryland's premature, JNOV motion to extend the appellate timetable to 90 days, the court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1 without hearing oral argument, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case to that court.

This case arose out of patent infringement litigation. At issue was whether federal courts possess exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over state-based legal malpractice claims that require the application of patent law. The federal patent issue presented here was necessary, disputed, and substantial within the context of the overlying state legal malpractice lawsuit. Additionally, the patent issue could be determined without creating a jurisdictional imbalance between state and federal courts. Therefore, the court concluded that exclusive federal jurisdiction existed in this case. Accordingly, without reaching the merits of the legal malpractice claim, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and dismissed this case.

This action arose out of condemnation proceedings initiated by the State after the landowners and the State could not agree on the amount of compensation for a .33 acres out of a 3.5 acre tract of land fronting U.S. Highway 290 in Travis County. At issue was whether the trial court erred by only charging the jury to find the pre-taking value of the tract when there was evidence the taking did not cause damage to the remainder and whether there was any evidence the remainder suffered compensable damages. The court concluded that the trial court committed charge error by inquiring whether the landowner suffered damages to the remainder. The court also held that there was no evidence the taking caused compensable damages to the remainder and based on the jury findings, the value of the tract taken could be determined. Accordingly, the court reversed the court of appeals judgment and remanded to the trial court for rendition of judgment.

Relator was held in contempt of court and confined for perjuring himself during a deposition. At issue was whether a trial court could hold a litigant in contempt for perjury committed during a deposition and whether the court should exercise mandamus jurisdiction to provide a forum for a civil litigant who was deprived of liberty pursuant to a court's contempt order, and the Court of Criminal Appeals had declined to exercise its habeas jurisdiction. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion where such perjury did not obstruct the operation of the court. The court also held that relator had no adequate remedy by appeal where the underlying suit was civil in nature and the Court of Appeals declined to grant relator leave to file a habeas petition in that court. Accordingly, mandamus was the appropriate remedy to correct the trial court's abuse of discretion and the court conditionally granted relief.

Appellant, an African-American resident of Texas, sued appellees alleging that their credit-scoring systems employed several undisclosed factors which resulted in disparate impacts for minorities and violated the federal Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3601, 3619. At issue, in a certified question, was whether Texas law permitted an insurance company to price insurance by using a credit-score factor that had a racially disparate impact that, were it not for the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1012(b), would violate the FHA, absent a legally sufficient nondiscriminatory reason, or would using such a credit-score factor violate Texas Insurance Code ("Code") sections 544.002(a), 559.051, 559.052, or some other provision of Texas law. The court answered the certified question by holding that Texas law did not prohibit an insurer from using race-neutral factors in credit-scoring to price insurance, even if doing so created a racially disparate impact.

Respondent filed a sex discrimination suit against petitioner alleging violations of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, Tex. Lab. Code 21.001-.556, where petitioner terminated its employment of respondent citing as the basis for its decision a reduction in force due to worsening business conditions. The parties sought arbitration and petitioner appealed the arbitrator's reward. At issue was whether the Texas General Arbitration Act ("TAA"), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 171.001-.098, precluded an agreement for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error, and if not, whether the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 1-16, preempted enforcement of such an agreement. The court held that the TAA presented no impediment to an agreement that limited the authority of an arbitrator in deciding a matter and thus allowed for judicial review of an arbitration award for reversible error. The court also held that the FAA did not preempt enforcement of an agreement to expanded judicial review of an arbitration award enforceable under the TAA. The court further held that, on remand, the court of appeals must determine whether the record was sufficient to review petitioner's complaints. Therefore, the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed and the case remanded to that court for consideration of the merits of petitioner's challenges to the arbitration award.