Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit was whether police may seize a shotgun from a home when the weapon was not involved in an apparent crime, the crime scene had been secured, and there was no immediate danger to any person. Officers were dispatched to defendant Shawn Gordon's home on a domestic dispute. defendant's girlfriend stated she and defendant fought earlier in the day; she invited officers in. Officers observed an unstrung crossbow and the butt of a shotgun. For safety reasons, the officer took the shotgun, leaving the crossbow behind. Defendant was ultimately arrested for aggravated assault, and he challenged the seizure of the shotgun. The Tenth Circuit concluded that police may not seize weapons incident to arrest that are no apparently involved in a crime, where the scene had been secured, and no immediate danger to any individual was apparent. View "United States v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Andrew Yellowbear, Jr. was convicted for the murder of his daughter. He brought suit against the Wyoming Department of Corrections for the alleged violation of his Constitutional and statutory rights, specifically, that the Department denied him access to the prison's sweatlodge that he might practice his religion. Prison officials insisted that the cost of providing the necessary security to take plaintiff from the special protective unit in which he was housed to the sweat lodge and back was "unduly burdensome." The district court discerned no violation and entered summary judgment against plaintiff. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded: "Mr. Yellowbear has sought some access to a sweat lodge. The prison has refused any access. [. . .] As litigated to [the Court], the burden on Mr. Yellowbear's religious exercise is high (no access of any kind, ever, to a religious exercise) and the cost to the prison left undefined by the record and thus presumably low. In these circumstances, we don't doubt a reasonable trier of fact could find a RLUIPA violation." View "Yellowbear, Jr. v. Lampert" on Justia Law

In 2010, three individuals ran for the Colorado House of Representatives, House District 61: Kathleen Curry was a write-in candidate; Roger Wilson was the Democratic nominee, and Luke Korkowski was the Republican nominee. Under Colorado law, individual contributions to Ms. Curry were capped at $200, and individual contributions to each of her opponents were capped at $400. Contributors to Ms. Curry’s campaign sued state officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The district court rejected the claims and granted summary judgment to the state officials. The Tenth Circuit reversed on the equal-protection claim; and in light of this, declined to address the summary-judgment ruling on the First Amendment claims. View "Riddle v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee John Schulte appealed his conviction on one count of making false statements to the government. He allegedly made the false statements during a voluntary interview with a Food and Drug Administration agent during the execution of a search warrant on his employer, Spectranetics', offices. Plaintiff claimed two of the charged statements were not false, and therefore, could not support the verdict as a matter of law. As to all five statements, he contended the government failed to prove both his intent to supply false information and the materiality of the statements to the government's investigation. Finding no error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Schulte" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Steven Smothers sued his former employer Solvay Chemical, Inc. for alleged discrimination against him on the basis of his medical disability in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. He worked eighteen years until Solvay fired him, allegedly because of a safety violation and dispute with a co-worker. Plaintiff maintained the company's true motivation was retaliation for his taking medical leave. The district court granted Solvay summary judgment on plaintiff's FMLA and ADA claims and on his state law claim for breach of implied contract. It dismissed the remaining state law claims as moot based on its resolution of plaintiff's breach of contract claim. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court on the FMLA and ADA claims, and affirmed on the state law breach of contract claim. View "Smothers v. Solvay Chemicals Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Daniel Herriman voluntarily turned himself in and confessed to planting a bomb near a gas pipeline. When he was criminally charged for this conduct, he pled not guilty by reason of mental illness. The jury convicted him nonetheless. Defendant then sought a downward adjustment to his sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines on the ground that he accepted responsibility for his actions. The district court did not adjust defendant's sentence, and he appealed the district court's decision. Finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's sentence. View "United States v. Herriman" on Justia Law

Defendant–Appellant Dhanzasikam Toledo appealed his conviction for voluntary manslaughter. Defendant is an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation, and lived with his mother and step-father within the borders of the Navajo Nation. The families lived on the same parcel of land (about 125 yards away), separated by a barbed-wire fence. Everyone lived in relative harmony until an argument flared over money; alcohol and racism had strained their relations. Defendant and his mother, both devout in their Navajo beliefs, thought that "skinwalkers" would come onto and around their land; Defendant believed his uncle Arvin, was versed in the "skinwalker way." According to Sanders, Arvin did this "almost [running]" toward the fence and came "nose tip to nose tip" with Defendant. Sanders perceived Defendant to say "I'm not afraid of you" and knock Arvin to the ground. In reality, Defendant had fatally stabbed Arvin. At trial, Defendant testified that he had no intention of killing his uncle and that his only intent in the moment of the stabbing was to defend himself. In addition to Arvin's physique and temperament, Defendant testified that he had a very real fear of his uncle's supernatural abilities. A federal grand jury indicted Defendant for second degree murder. After the close of evidence, the district court indicated its skepticism as to whether the evidence supported the defense's theories of self-defense and involuntary manslaughter. The court instructed the jury on only second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. The jury acquitted Defendant of second degree murder and convicted him of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant was sentenced to 76 months' imprisonment followed by a three-year term of supervised release. Defendant appealed the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense and the lesser included involuntary manslaughter. The Tenth Circuit concluded after its review that a reasonable jury could have concluded that Defendant's actions were a reasonable response to the threat he perceived from Arvin. Further, the evidence also could have supported that Defendant's actions, though taken in self-defense, were less than reasonable and amounted to criminal negligence. The district court therefore erred in denying an involuntary manslaughter instruction. The case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "United States v. Toledo" on Justia Law

Defendant–Appellee Michael Ko was sentenced to sixty months' imprisonment for a federal conviction of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant was committed to the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") and served most of his sentence in prison. With six months left in his sentence, however, the BOP transferred Defendant to the Grossman Community Corrections Center. With approximately four months left in his sentence, the BOP transferred Defendant to confinement at his home in Leavenworth. Before transferring, Defendant signed a Community Based Program Agreement with the BOP, recognizing that, even though he enjoyed relative freedom in his own home, he would "legally remain in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons and/or the U.S. Attorney General." One evening Defendant was late returning home, and his bracelet alerted the Grossman Center. After multiple unsuccessful attempts to locate or contact Defendant, the Grossman Center contacted the U.S. Marshals, resulting in a complaint charging Defendant with escape and a warrant for his arrest. Defendant was later arrested in Kansas City. A federal magistrate judge dismissed the criminal complaint against Defendant, concluding that he was not in "custody" at the time of his alleged escape. A federal grand jury subsequently indicted Defendant on an identical charge, issuing a superseding indictment. The district court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss the superseding indictment. The court agreed with the magistrate judge’s earlier holding that the statute under which Defendant was charged did not contemplate absconding from home confinement. The court concluded that, in "the absence of Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit precedent addressing the facts of this case," the rule of lenity required dismissal. The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded that dismissal: the terms of Defendant's imprisonment entailed constant monitoring, a monitoring bracelet, and spatial and temporal bounds. "In that way, the restrictions on his life in home confinement were sufficiently limiting so as to constitute custody under [the statute]. So long as a prisoner is confined to serve a term of imprisonment at a place designated by the BOP, he is in 'custody' and liable for escape." View "United States v. Ko" on Justia Law

A grand jury charged Officer Harold Wells and two others with multiple offenses relating to the performance of their official duties. Following trial, a jury convicted Wells on two counts of violating federal drug laws and two counts of theft of government funds. The other two defendants were acquitted on all counts. On appeal, Wells argued: (1) the district court erred in ruling he had no expectation of privacy while conducting a consent-based search of a motel room outside the presence of the room’s occupant; (2) the drug convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence; (3) the district court erred in excluding certain audio recordings contained on a key fob; and (4) the district court erred when it denied his motion for a mistrial after a government witness testified about the possibility he had previously negotiated a plea deal with the government. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Wells" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Edward Christy appealed a district court order granting in part the government's motion to reconsider and denying his motion to suppress on the basis of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Christy met K.Y. on AgeMatch.com, a dating website, and the two exchanged sexually explicit emails and photographs. Christy arranged to pick K.Y. up from her home in Westminster, California, and bring her to his home in Albuquerque, which he did. K.Y.'s parents later reported her missing. FBI Task Force Officers Carvo and Fletes investigated K.Y.'s disappearance. Using her telephone records, they found that K.Y. received three calls from Christy around the time of her disappearance and obtained Christy's address and other information from his cellular provider. Christy was indicted by a federal grand jury, charged with one count of transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, and three counts of possession of matter containing visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. He moved to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the warrantless search of his house, including his statements to the detective and all evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrants. The district court found that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered Christy's house without a warrant, and granted the motion to suppress. The government moved for reconsideration, which the court granted to consider (inter alia) whether the illegally seized evidence was nonetheless admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court determined that, absent the illegal search, Officer Carvo would have legally obtained a warrant and discovered the evidence, thus, the court denied Christy's motion to suppress. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the motion to reconsider and correctly applied the inevitable discovery doctrine. View "United States v. Christy" on Justia Law