Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Glenn Coyne, a Grand Junction Police Department (GJPD) officer, answered Plaintiff Misti Lee Schneider 's 911 call about an altercation with her teenage son and, during a visit to her home late the next night, raped her. Shortly thereafter, Officer Coyne was arrested and fired, and a few days later committed suicide. Plaintiff sued the GJPD under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of her substantive due process right to bodily integrity. She alleged that inadequate hiring and training of Officer Coyne, inadequate investigation of a prior sexual assault complaint against him, and inadequate discipline and supervision of him caused her to be raped. In district court, the defendants did not contest Plaintiff's allegations about Officer Coyne's conduct. They moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Officer Coyne did not act under color of state law and that Plaintiff could not prove that they caused the rape or were deliberately indifferent to the risk that it would happen. The district court denied summary judgment on the first ground, holding that a reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Coyne acted under color of state law. It granted summary judgment on the second ground, concluding that Plaintiff could not prove essential facts to establish 1983 liability. Plaintiff appealed that ruling; defendants cross-appealed the color of state law ruling. "The events alleged in this case are tragic, and Officer Coyne's alleged conduct was a terrible crime. The state cannot prosecute Officer Coyne because he is dead, and Ms. Schneider is left with suing his supervisors and employer. . . . to hold [defendants] liable for Officer Coyne's actions, she faces stringent proof requirements under 1983 law, proof she is unable to muster." Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Court dismissed defendants' cross-appeal as moot. View "Schneider v. City of Grand Junction" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees filed suit after law enforcement officials forced them to move to an unfavorable location to engage in protest activities but allowed a group espousing the opposite viewpoint to remain in place on private property - property that happened to be prime real estate for the political demonstration in question. They identified Defendants-Appellants Kerry Sheehan, Matthew Thomas, and Edward Mims as responsible for the decisions leading to this disparate treatment, and they claim each defendant is liable for viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment. The district court denied Defendants-Appellants’ motions for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, and this interlocutory appeal followed. Finding that some of the evidence against defendants was not legally sufficient to establish viewpoint discrimination, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendants' motions for summary judgment. View "Pahls, et al v. Thomas, et al" on Justia Law

After Dr. Brian Howard received a knee implant manufactured by Sulzer Orthopedics, Inc. that failed to bond properly, Howard and his wife filed suit against Sulzer alleging negligence per se. Following the completion of earlier consolidated litigation, the district court dismissed the Howards' negligence per se claim, predicting that it would not be cognizable under Oklahoma state law. The Tenth Circuit stayed the Howards' appeal pending the resolution of a question of state law certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court. That question was answered, and the Tenth Circuit now reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings. The Oklahoma Court held that Oklahoma law allowed private individuals to maintain a parallel claim for negligence per se based on violation of a federal regulation whose enforcement lies with a governmental entity. The court further concluded that "[t]he existence of a provision in federal law providing that all enforcement proceedings 'shall be by and in the name of the United States' did not prohibit a state law claim for negligence per se based on violation of the federal regulation." Noting that Howard did not claim he should have been entitled to bring a private action under the FDCA, but rather brought a state claim based on duties that "parallel, rather than add to, federal requirements," the court determined that Howard's negligence per se claim should have been allowed to proceed. View "Howard, et al v. Zimmer, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

In a copyright infringement case, Enterprise Management Limited, Inc. and Mary Lippitt appealed a summary judgment in favor of Donald Warrick. Lippitt contended, contrary to the district court's holding, she demonstrated a prima facie case of copyright infringement. At issue was a diagram Lippitt created in the course of her work in organizational management. The diagram aimed to encapsulate and communicate the results of her research on the failures of complex organizational change initiatives. She created and registered the first version of the diagram in 1987; sometime around 1996, she updated it. She registered the update as part of a larger work in 2000; it was also included in materials she registered in 2003. In his motion for summary judgment, Warrick argued: (1) Lippitt could not prove she held a valid copyright on the diagram because she could not produce the diagram from the materials accompanying her 1987 registration to show its similarity to Warrick's diagram; (2) Lippitt's diagram was not copyrightable; and (3) Warrick's diagram did not infringe on any protected expression in Lippitt's diagram. After hearing arguments, the court granted Warrick's motion without issuing a written opinion. Lippitt contended summary judgment was inappropriate. In her view, her copyright infringement claim was viable because her diagram was entitled to copyright protection and Warrick admits to copying her duly registered diagram. Finding no merit to Warrick's arguments on appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Enterprise Management Limited, Inc. v. Warrick" on Justia Law

Officer Shane Prickett of the Florence City Police Department used a Taser on Petitioner Lara Roosevelt-Hennix while Petitioner's hands were cuffed behind her back and she was seated in the back seat of a police car. She brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Prickett subjected her to excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Prickett argued he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied qualified immunity in an brief oral ruling at the conclusion of the hearing on Prickett's summary judgment motion. The issue before the Tenth Circuit in this case centered on whether Prickett clearly established by the evidence in the record, on his assertion that Petitioner actively resisted the officers' proper attempts to place her in leg restraints. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the record contained sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude Petitioner informed the officers she was physically unable to comply with their request to move her feet outside the patrol vehicle. Furthermore, the record contained sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude the officers never attempted to aid Petitioner in moving her feet before applying the taser. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Prickett's motion for summary judgment. View "Roosevelt-Hennix v. Prickett, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003 ("Lloyds") appealed the district court's denial of its summary judgment motion and subsequent grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. ("BYA") in an action arising out of a professional liability insurance contract. The district court concluded Lloyds failed to pay sufficient indemnity to BYA for claims brought against BYA in an arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers. The underlying suit alleged BYA agents mismanaged and unlawfully "churned" the investment accounts of its clients. The court concluded the claims brought in the arbitration did not relate back to earlier claims brought outside the policy period and, therefore, rejected Lloyds' argument coverage was precluded altogether. Additionally, the court rejected BYA's argument that Lloyds was equitably estopped from denying coverage due to its course of conduct in receiving and defending the claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of the law of the case, and therefore abused its discretion in making its judgments in this case. Accordingly, the district court's decisions were reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. v. Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003" on Justia Law

Petitioner Frances M. Flood, a federal inmate, sought a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial of her 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion. The Tenth Circuit granted a COA on two issues: (1) whether Petitioner's trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest that deprived her of effective assistance of counsel; and (2) whether the district court erred in denying Petitioner's motions for an evidentiary hearing, discovery, and judicial notice. Upon review, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's motion. "In short, we simply cannot find a conflict of interest based on these facts. . . . Nor do we find any abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Ms. Flood's motions for discovery and judicial notice." View "United States v. Flood" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kimberly Squires filed an action against Defendant Breckenridge Outdoor Education Center asserting claims for negligence and gross negligence following a ski accident in which she was injured. The magistrate judge granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment in part, concluding that Plaintiff's mother, Sara Squires, had validly released any claim for negligence against Defendant by signing an acknowledgment of risk and release of liability. Plaintiff appealed, arguing summary judgment was inappropriate because the Release was unenforceable for three reasons: (1) the Release was as an invalid exculpatory agreement; (2) Mrs. Squires's decision to sign the Release was not voluntary and informed, as required by Colorado Revised Statute Section 13-22-107; and (3) to the extent the Release was otherwise enforceable, it was voidable because it was procured through fraud. Finding no error in the trial court's decision to grant partial summary judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Squires v. Breckenridge Outdoor Educ Cntr" on Justia Law

Defendant Michael Allen Browning was convicted by jury for the murder of Harry and Teresa Hye, the parents of his girlfriend Cenessa Tackett. Browning received a death sentence as punishment for these crimes. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this conviction and sentence on direct appeal and denied post-conviction relief. What the jury (and defense attorneys) did not know was that Tackett, who became the most important witness at trial, had been diagnosed with a severe mental disorder. According to records from her psychiatrist that were in the State's possession, Tackett blurred reality and fantasy, suffered from memory deficits, tended to project blame onto others, and had an assaultive, combative, and even potentially homicidal disposition. In subsequent proceedings, the contents of Tackett's mental health records came to light, prompting the federal district court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. The court reasoned that Tackett's mental health records were favorable to Browning and material to his defense, especially considering Browning's trial strategy to paint Tackett herself as complicit in the murders. The district court therefore ruled that the Constitution obligated the State to disclose those records to Browning before trial. Given the central role Tackett played at trial and the severity of her mental health diagnosis, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the psychiatric information was favorable to Browning and material to his defense, and that the Oklahoma courts could not have reasonably concluded otherwise. View "Browning v. Trammell" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Adrian Luna-Acosta appealed a district court's judgment sentencing him to thirty-three months' imprisonment, filed five months after the court orally announced a sentence of twelve months. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Defendant argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify the twelve-month sentence. Agreeing with Defendant's argument, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court and remanded the case for resentencing based on the orally-announced sentence. View "United States v. Luna-Acosta" on Justia Law