Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

An Oklahoma jury convicted Defendant Brian Darrell Davis of the first-degree murder and rape of Josephine “Jody” Sanford, the mother of his girlfriend Stacey Sanford. On the recommendation of the jury, Defendant received a 100-year prison sentence for the rape and a death sentence for the murder. After unsuccessfully appealing to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) and pursuing postconviction relief in state court, Defendant unsuccessfully sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. The district court denied a certificate of appealability (COA) but the Tenth Circuit granted a COA on two issues: whether Defendant’s statements to police officers while he was hospitalized were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; and whether his counsel was ineffective in failing to present scientific evidence that he was impaired while making those statements. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed on those issues because the OCCA did not unreasonably determine the facts or unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting these claims. The Court also denied Defendant’s Motion for Additional Issues in COA because no reasonable jurist could have disputed the district court’s resolution of the issues raised in the motion. The Court did, however, grant a COA on a claim that Defendant apparently thought was encompassed by its prior grant of a COA (the claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that police officers coerced him into making his hospital statements by withholding pain medication). But the Court affirmed the denial of the claim.

The issue on appeal before the Tenth Circuit in this case was whether the use of a particular desk in special education classrooms was permissible under the United States Constitution. The desks in question wrap around the student on the front and the sides and have a securing bar that runs behind the student’s chair. A student can only remove herself by sliding under or crawling over the desk’s surface when the bar is in place. Ebonie S., a young girl with multiple disabilities, was often required to sit in this type of desk. Ebonie’s mother, Mary S., filed suit on her behalf under 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the use of the desk violated the Fourth Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause, as well as the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on the constitutional claims, but denied summary judgment on the statutory claims. Plaintiff appealed the grants of summary judgment. "Plaintiff devote[ed] much effort to arguing that the use of the desk was prohibited under Colorado law and was contrary to well-established educational standards. But it is not our office to decide the lawfulness of the desk under state law or the wisdom of using the desk as a matter of pedagogical policy. . . . We hold only that use of the desk under the circumstances presented did not violate the Fourth or the Fourteenth Amendments."

Robert Madrid worked for Petitioner Public Service Company of New Mexico (PNM) as a bill collector. "Angered by a particularly obstinate customer," and without permission, Madrid drove to the customer's home and disconnected the customer's gas service. It would later be determined that the customer was not a customer of PNM. PNM fired Madrid. Madrid responded by filing a grievance against PNM with his union, arguing that Madrid's termination violated its collective bargaining agreement with the Company. In making its argument, the union hypothesized that PNM treated Madrid more harshly than other employees guilty of similar conduct. The union sent PNM three discovery requests for documents to prove its hypothesis. Those requests became the subject of the appeal before the Tenth Circuit, as PNM refused to comply. An ALJ determined that PNM had engaged in an unfair labor practice, and ordered the Company to comply with the discovery requests. The National Labor Relations board adopted the ALJ's decision. PNM appealed the Board's order, and the Board cross-petitioned to have its order enforced. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit was unpersuaded by PNM's arguments on appeal, and affirmed the Board's decision.

Defendant-Appellant Taurus Hoyle appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, and his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) to 262 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant contended that the government offered insufficient evidence that he possessed a firearm, and that the charged possession affected interstate commerce. With regard to his sentence, Defendant argued that two of the three prior convictions relied upon by the district court did not qualify as predicate convictions for the ACCA’s enhanced sentencing provisions. Specifically, Defendant argued that the two Kansas convictions were not qualifying predicates because the convictions no longer disqualified him from possessing firearms as a matter of state law. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed that Defendant's firearm possession rights were restored by operation of state law, thus precluding either of the two state convictions from qualifying as ACCA predicates. Therefore the Court vacated Defendant's sentence, and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing.

Plaintiff Los Alamos Study Group filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Defendants were the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the United States Department of Energy (DOE), NNSA’s administrator, and the DOE secretary. The complaint alleged that the design proposed for construction of a Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (the Nuclear Facility) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory) had changed so much since an original environmental analysis in 2003 that a new analysis was required and that all work on the facility should be halted until the conclusion of such analysis. The district court dismissed the claims on two grounds: (1) that they were prudentially moot because Defendants began an environmental analysis after the complaint was filed and committed to refraining from all construction on the Nuclear Facility until the analysis was complete, and (2) that the case was not yet ripe because there had been no final agency action. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court on the ripeness issue. The Court therefore did not address prudential mootness and dismissed the case.

Defendant Armando Ramos attacked the legal validity of his sentence for receipt of child pornography. Defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury in Kansas on two counts relating to the receipt and possession of child pornography. The charges arose out of an investigation that began with a tip from German authorities who were "policing the [e]Donkey peer-to-peer file sharing network and observed a known child pornography file available for download" at an IP address that was later traced by Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to Defendant. ICE executed a search warrant at Defendant's home, seizing multiple computers, hard drives, DVDs, and CDs containing thousands of images and videos of child pornography. During the search, an investigator interviewed Defendant who then admitted to being the sole user of the computers in his home, and to using eMule, the "specific program that . . . access[es] the [e]Donkey network," as a vehicle for obtaining child pornography. On appeal, Defendant raised multiple objections to his presentencing report (PSR). He also raised an issue that the mandatory-minimum provision of 18 USC 2252(b)(1) was unconstitutional. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenge to the sentence he received, and concluded that that he could not establish that his sentence was affected by application of the mandatory minimum of 18 USC 2252(b)(1).

Plaintiff-Appellant Devon Energy Production Company, L.P. appealed a district court's judgment which dismissed Devon’s declaratory-judgment action against Defendant-Appellee Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc. for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. More specifically, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 57, Devon sought a declaratory judgment that federal law completely preempted Mosaic’s anticipated state-law claims emanating from Devon’s unauthorized drilling in a federally managed area of New Mexico known as the "Potash Area," and that the only remedies available to Mosaic were derived from the federal administrative and judicial remedies of the Administrative Procedure Act and certain regulatory provisions of the U.S. Department of the Interior that govern oil, gas, and potash leasing and development within the Potash Area. Devon alleged that the district court had federal-question jurisdiction over its declaratory-judgment action under 28 U.S.C. 1331. The district court concluded that there was no federal-question jurisdiction to support Devon’s action and dismissed its complaint, and subsequently denied Devon’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). Upon review of the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Petitioner Shahid Iqbal appealed a district court's denial of his motion for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Petitioner is a native and citizen of Pakistan who acquired lawful permanent residency in the United States in 2002. On July 11, 2008, he filed an application for naturalization with the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). On August 17, 2009, he successfully passed a naturalization examination, but the USCIS did not adjudicate his application due to an ongoing background check by the FBI. On June 18, 2010, still having received no decision on his application, Petitioner filed this action. On September 13, 2010, the USCIS denied Petitioner's naturalization application on the ground that he had not met the physical presence requirements for naturalization. Based on the denial, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Petitioner's petition as moot. In the alternative, Defendants asked the district court to decline jurisdiction in deference to the agency’s expertise in adjudicating naturalization applications. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that once Petitioner filed his petition, the USCIS no longer had jurisdiction to adjudicate the naturalization application. On April 5, 2011, Petitioner filed his motion for an award of attorney fees and expenses under EAJA, arguing that he was a prevailing party because the district court denied the government’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the USCIS for a determination of the merits of his naturalization application. He also argued that the government’s delay on his application and its position on its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction were not substantially justified. The district court denied the fee motion, concluding that Petitioner was not a prevailing party because he had obtained no judicial determination on the merits of his claims, the court had not ordered the USCIS or the FBI to act within a certain period of time, and the court had not retained jurisdiction after remanding the matter to the agency. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny attorney's fees.

Defendant-Appellant Anthony Shippley served as the "Sergeant at Arms" for a chapter of the Mongols Motorcycle Club. After a massive nationwide investigation and "take down" of the club in 2008, Defendant was arrested on federal drug conspiracy charges. His chief accuser, Benjamine Maestas (a former club president, longtime felon, and federal informant) testified at trial that Defendant was responsible for supplying considerable amounts of high quality cocaine for resale to retail customers. The jury returned a general verdict finding Defendant guilty. But in response to the court's special interrogatories, the jury indicated that Defendant had not conspired to distribute any of the drugs listed in the indictment. "In effect, the jury both convicted and acquitted Mr. Shippley of the charged conspiracy." The district court ordered the jury to deliberate further; further deliberations quickly yielded an unambiguous guilty verdict. Defendant appealed his conviction. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit could "not say the district court's chosen course was legally impermissible, at least not for the reasons [Defendant] offer[ed]." The Court ultimately rejected Defendant's challenges to a second and separate drug conviction as well as to a sentencing enhancement. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and sentence.

Plaintiff-Appellant Jimmie Allison’s causes of action arose from conduct on Kirtland Air Force Base, a federal enclave established in 1954. Because Allison’s state law claims were based on legal theories created by common law after that date, they are barred unless federal statutory law allows them to go forward. Because no federal statute authorized state employment and tort claims of the sort underlying this case to be asserted against federal contractors, Plaintiff's suit was barred by the federal enclave doctrine. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing Plaintiff's case.