Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant Arrienne Mae Winzler brought state law claims against Defendant-Appellee Toyota Motor Sales USA, Inc. (Toyota) on behalf of a proposed nationwide class of 2006 Toyota Corolla and Toyota Corolla Matrix owners and lessees. She alleged that the cars harbored defective "Engine Control Modules" ("ECMs"), making them prone to stall without warning. As relief, she asked for an order requiring Toyota to notify all relevant owners of the defect and then to create and coordinate an equitable fund to pay for repairs. Before addressing whether Plaintiff's class should be certified, the district court held her complaint failed to state a claim and dismissed it under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). As Plaintiff began her appeal, Toyota announced a nationwide recall of 2005-2008 Toyota Corolla and Corolla Matrix cars to fix their ECMs. Arguing that these statutory and regulatory processes were exactly the relief sought in Plaintiff's complaint, Toyota asked the Tenth Circuit to find that its recall rendered Plaintiff's case moot. "Because prudential mootness is arguably the narrowest of the many bases Toyota has suggested for dismissal, and because it is sufficient to that task, [the Court has] no need to discuss any of Toyota's other arguments for the same result." The Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.

Defendant Johnny Black was convicted of first-degree murder and battery with a dangerous weapon. On the recommendation of the jury, Defendant received a death sentence on the first-degree murder conviction. After unsuccessfully appealing to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) and pursuing two postconviction proceedings in state court, Defendant unsuccessfully applied for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254 in the Oklahoma federal district court. Defendant appealed the district court's decision, raising 14 claims of error at trial, including ineffective assistance of counsel. On the first eight claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court on the merits generally because the OCCA did not unreasonably apply federal law in rejecting these claims. On the remaining claims the district court denied relief on the ground of procedural bar. Before the Court could determine whether it agreed with the district court, the Court needed to resolve a question of Oklahoma procedural law: whether Oklahoma's bar of Defendant's second postconviction application was independent of federal law or instead required the OCCA to examine the merits of Defendant's federal constitutional claims. The Court therefore certified a question of state law to the OCCA, abating this appeal pending consideration by the OCCA of the Tenth Circuit's certification request.

Plaintiff-Appellant David R. Ribeau, Jr., appealed a district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendants-Appellees Dean Katt and Richard Smith. The district court dismissed Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim alleging that Defendants violated his right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Mr. Smith was Plaintiff's immediate supervisor at the Unified School District 290 (USD 290) in Ottawa, Kansas. Plaintiff worked as a maintenance mechanic. In 2008, Plaintiff was fired after 24 years on the job for alleged poor work performance. Mr. Katt, USD 290's superintendent, told Plaintiff that the USD 290 Board of Education had given its approval for his termination. Due to the Defendants' representations, Plaintiff believed he could not file a grievance because the Board had already approved his termination. The Board, however, had not yet given its approval: the Board did not approve Plaintiff's termination until approximately one month later. The district court found Plaintiff was an at-will employee and had no protected property interest in his continued employment. Plaintiff timely appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Upon review, the Court found that any entitlement Plaintiff had to a pre-termination Board hearing derived from his express employment contract. The language of that contract was unambiguous and did not provide for a pre-termination hearing before the Board. Plaintiff therefore had no legitimate claim of entitlement to a pre-termination hearing under state law, and the district court was correct to dismiss his 1983 claim.

Defendant-Appellant Raul Cruz was convicted, after a jury trial, of possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, and was sentenced to 63 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release. On appeal, he argued that the district court erred (1) by not requiring the government to disclose a confidential informant involved in a controlled buy, and (2) in relying on certain disputed facts about the controlled buy contained in the PSR. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found no abuse of the district court's discretion and affirmed Defendant's conviction and sentence.

"By all appearances, Defendant Howard Kieffer had a successful nationwide criminal law practice." Defendant managed to gain admission to multiple federal trial and appellate courts across the country where he appeared on behalf of numerous criminal defendants. Defendant never attended law school, sat for a bar exam, nor receive a license to practice law. A North Dakota jury convicted Defendant of mail fraud and for making false statements. The jury found Defendant gained admission to the District of North Dakota by submitting a materially false application to the court, then relied on that admission to gain admission to the District of Minnesota, District of Colorado, and Western District of Missouri. The district court sentenced Defendant to 51 months' imprisonment and ordered him to pay restitution to six victims of his scheme. A jury in Colorado also convicted him of making false statements, wire fraud and contempt of court. The district court sentenced Defendant to 57 months' imprisonment to run consecutively to the 51 month sentence previously imposed on him in North Dakota. The court further ordered him to pay restitution to seven victims of his scheme unaccounted for in North Dakota, and directed him as a special condition of supervised release to obtain the probation office's preapproval of any proposed employment or business ventures. Defendant appealed his most recent convictions and sentence from Colorado, each based on his Sixth Amendment right to have the Government prove, and a jury find, all elements of the charged crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, Defendant presented five challenges to his sentence, three of which bore directly upon the district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the record reflected that by the time of Defendant's actual sentencing, the district court had decided to sentence him within the advisory guideline range. The court then proceeded to calculate Defendant’s guideline range incorrectly on the basis of numerous procedural errors, both factual and legal. As a result, the court selected a sentence from the wrong guideline range. Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence on Counts I and II of the superceding indictment and remanded the case for resentencing. The Court affirmed the district court in all other respects.

Defendant Manuel Avitia-Guillen, a citizen of Mexico, lawfully entered the United States in 1955. He obtained permanent resident status in 1988 but was deported in June 1996 after being convicted of an aggravated felony. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") discovered Defendant in Denver, Colorado, in May 2011. A grand jury indicted Defendant with one count of being found in the United States. At trial, the Government called a fingerprint examiner with the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (CBI) to testify that Defendant's fingerprints matched those on his 1996 deportation records. Defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, but the district court denied the motion, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. The district court sentenced Defendant to the low end of the guideline range, 41 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued the district court failed to make adequate findings of reliability with respect to the CBI expert's testimony. "The issue Defendant raises on appeal is extremely narrow[:] . . . the district court erred 'by failing to create an adequate record demonstrating that it satisfied its gatekeeping obligations.'" Defendant did not object to the expert's methodology at trial. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did not plainly err in its implicit determination that the CBI expert's testimony was based on "reliable principles and methods" that were "reliably applied."

Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Zinna appealed the district court's attorneys' fee award following a successful 42 U.S.C. 1983 civil rights suit against county official Defendant-Appellee James Congrove. On its consideration of the jury verdict favoring Plaintiff, the district court determined the damage award was nominal and the victory merely technical. It proceeded to award Plaintiff $8,000 in attorneys' fees under section 1988 ($1,000 for each day of an eight-day trial). In light of the Tenth Circuit's jurisprudence applying "Farrar v. Hobby," (506 U.S. 103, 116-22(1992)(O'Connor, J., concurring)), the Court concluded that the district court's award was arbitrary, reversed, and remanded.

Upon entering a plea agreement with the government, Defendant Marcus Oakes pled guilty in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma to one count of distributing cocaine base. At the sentencing hearing, the government breached its promise in the plea agreement not to oppose Defendant's request that his sentence be concurrent with a prior federal sentence, and the district court sentenced him to 37 months' imprisonment to run consecutively to the other sentence. When the breach was brought to the court's attention a few minutes later, the court struck from the record the improper part of the government's argument but resentenced Defendant to the same consecutive sentence. On appeal Defendant contended that the breach required that his sentence be vacated and resentencing be set before a different judge. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court: "Defendant does not seek, and we would not order, that he be allowed to withdraw his plea. Therefore, the sole remedy for the government's breach is resentencing. Ordinarily, we would order resentencing before another judge. But a defendant can choose to be resentenced before the same judge, that choice can properly be made by defense counsel, and defense counsel made that choice below. Hence, there is no further remedy available for Defendant on direct appeal."

Defendant-Appellant Dennis Dean Neff entered a conditional guilty plea on one count of traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to distribute cocaine. He was sentenced to sixty months' incarceration. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Defendant reserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence. On appeal, Defendant argued that the state trooper's initial stop of his vehicle was unconstitutional because the trooper lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity under "Terry v. Ohio," (392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the facts known to the trooper at the time of the initial stop did not rise to the level of reasonable, articulable suspicion by providing a particularized and objective basis for wrongdoing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's denial of the motion to suppress and remanded the case with directions to vacate Defendant's conviction.

Defendant-Appellant John Lloyd Whitley was pulled over in his truck based on information that he was a felon in possession of a firearm. During the stop, officers observed two firearms in plain view and found another firearm and ammunition in their subsequent search of the vehicle. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the stop was not justified. After the district court denied his motion to suppress, Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. Finding that the police had a reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment denying Defendant's motion to suppress.