Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant David Martinez-Zamaripa pled guilty to being an alien present in the United States after deportation. The district court imposed a sentence of 54 months based on a 16-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) for prior conviction of a crime of violence, citing Defendant's Oklahoma conviction for indecent proposal to a child in 1995. Defendant appealed the sentence, arguing that his state conviction should not have been considered a crime of violence under the Guideline. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Defendant's Oklahoma conviction was indeed a crime of violence, and affirmed his sentence.

Defendant Deshane Gantt pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence for which he was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. He appealed the sentence, arguing that it was both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence, finding the sentence was procedurally reasonable because the district court adequately explained why it varied from the guideline sentence, and it was substantively reasonable because the length of the sentence was not an abuse of discretion.

Defendant Cody M. Justice pled guilty in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas to possession of a firearm by a felon. In calculating Defendant's offense level under the sentencing guidelines, the district court applied a four-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(4) for possession of a weapon with an obliterated serial number and another four-level enhancement under USSG 2K2.1(b)(6) for possession of a firearm in connection with another felony offense. It then imposed a sentence of 108 months' imprisonment. On appeal Defendant contended that the district court improperly applied the 2K2.1(b)(4) enhancement because the serial number to his gun was restored with chemicals and therefore was not obliterated; that the evidence was insufficient to support the 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement; and that the court applied the 2K2.1(b)(6) enhancement without making the factual finding that a firearm facilitated his drug possession. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit held that "obliterate" in the context of 2K2.1(b)(4) means "to make indecipherable or imperceptible, not necessarily irretrievable;" that the evidence sufficed to show that a firearm facilitated Defendant's possession of drugs by emboldening him; and that the district court's failure to make a specific facilitation finding was not plain error.

Defendant Antonio de los Santos pled guilty to the offense of being a felon in possession of firearms. Before sentencing, the Government filed notice of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence under the ACCA based on Defendant's four prior convictions for serious drug offenses. These included one conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on or about November 10, 1992, and three convictions for distribution of cocaine occurring on or about November 2, 1992, November 16, 1992, and November 24, 1992. Defendant objected, arguing that each of these convictions arose from a single criminal episode and thus should be treated as a single conviction for purposes of section 924(e)(1). The district court orally overruled Defendant's objection to the Government's ACCA notice and sentenced him accordingly. The district court concluded the offenses involved were sufficiently separate and distinct. Specifically, the district court stated Defendant had a meaningful opportunity to cease his criminal conduct, but did not do so. On appeal, Defendant did not challenge whether his convictions qualify as "serious" drug offenses under the ACCA. Rather, he challenged only whether the four convictions were "committed on occasions different from one another." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding no single criminal episode existed in this case because each violation occurred at distinct, different times.

Defendant-Appellant Cedric Burks provided codes to an auto-theft ring that were used to create working keys for specific vehicles. One such vehicle was stolen in Nevada, stripped to its frame, and subsequently discovered and auctioned by authorities. Several months later, the same vehicle reassembled, was identified in Utah. Based on this discovery, Defendant was charged and convicted of aiding and abetting the possession and transportation of a stolen. On appeal, he argued that the jury was improperly instructed on the affirmative defense of withdrawal and was allowed to make an improper inference that Defendant's associates knew the vehicle was stolen. The Tenth Circuit disagreed on both points: "First, assuming that withdrawal is an affirmative defense to a conviction premised on accomplice liability, [the Court held] that the jury was properly instructed that the burden of proving the defense rested on [Defendant]. Second, [the Court held] that the jury was properly instructed that it could infer that Defendant's associates knew the vehicle was stolen."

Defendant-appellant Rayne Alisa Osborn appealed a district court's order denying her a reduction of her criminal sentence under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3582(c)(2). Osborn argued that the district court abused its discretion in declining to apply an ameliorative amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines to reduce her term of incarceration. In May 2008, Osborn sought and obtained a reduction of her sentence based on an ameliorative amendment to the Guidelines, Amendment 706, which made her eligible for a two-level reduction in her offense level. Osborn contended the district court erred in denying her relief "based on historical factors used to justify the initial sentence and the [earlier] partial reduction of that sentence." Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the court acted well within its discretion in denying the joint motion for sentence reduction.

Defendant Reshard Benard challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a vehicle stop on January 16, 2009. Following the denial of his suppression motion, Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to conspiracy to manufacture cocaine base and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He was then sentenced to a twenty-year sentence, the mandatory minimum for his conspiracy charge. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in failing to suppress Defendant’s post-arrest statements, particularly his statement that his girlfriend might have left a gun in his car. The district court concluded that, although Defendant was in custody at the time this statement was made, he was not subjected to interrogation. Having so held, the Court then considered whether the district court’s failure to suppress this evidence entitled Defendant to withdraw his conditional guilty plea under Rule 11(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Court could not conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant would still have agreed to waive his right to a jury trial as to the counts of conviction absent the district court’s error. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court’s suppression error required remand of both counts of conviction under Rule 11(a)(2).

Oklahoma state prisoner Petitioner James DeRosa was convicted of two counts of first-degree felony murder for the 2000 stabbing deaths of two people, and was sentenced to death on both counts. Petitioner unsuccessfully challenged his convictions and sentences on direct appeal, as well as in an application for state post-conviction relief. He then sought federal habeas relief by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied his petition but granted a certificate of appealability (COA) as to one issue: his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Tenth Circuit, in turn, granted a COA on two additional issues: (1) whether the cumulative effect of the improper comments of the prosecuting attorney made during both phases of trial was harmless; and (2) whether allowing the jury to hear the responses of two victim-impact witnesses who testified during the penalty phase of trial was harmless constitutional error. Taking each issue in turn, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Petitioner's convictions, finding that the evidence presented at trial "overwhelmingly" established that Petitioner committed the murders, and that his trial counsel's alleged failure to present evidence of mitigating circumstances was unfounded. The jury found the existence of two aggravating factors with respect to each of the murders. The evidence presented by the prosecution, which was essentially uncontroverted, overwhelmingly supported the jury’s findings. Further, the jury was properly instructed by the trial court on the use of mitigating evidence and its role in the sentencing deliberations, as well as the proper role of victim-impact evidence. Consequently, the Court concluded that the admission of the improper portions of the victim impact testimony did not have a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."

A jury convicted Defendant Tracy Don Cartwright of being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The probation office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) that classified Defendant, based on three prior Oklahoma burglary convictions, as an armed career criminal subject to a 15-year minimum sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Defendant objected to that classification, arguing two of the three identified crimes did not qualify as "burglary convictions" within the meaning of section 924. The district court overruled Defendant's objections to the PSR and sentenced him accordingly. Defendant appealed, asking the Tenth Circuit to decide two questions: (1) whether an Oklahoma second-degree burglary conviction based on entry into a building by an instrument capable of completing the intended crime qualifies as a "burglary" under the ACCA and, (2) whether a nolo contendere plea to another Oklahoma second-degree burglary conviction qualifies as a "conviction" under the ACCA. Considering each of the issues Defendant raised on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed: because the Government properly showed Defendant had three prior violent felony convictions for purposes of the ACCA, the Court affirmed the district court's decision to overrule Defendant's objections.

Appellant Derrick Handley appeals his sentence, following revocation of his supervised release and imposition of a new term of incarceration of twelve months and supervised release of four years, on grounds his supervised release exceeds the amount allowed by law under 18 U.S.C. 3583(h). Appellant pled guilty to one count of distributing more than five grams of crack cocaine for which he was sentenced to seventy-two months imprisonment and four years of supervised release, to begin in early 2008. Jurisdiction for his term of supervised release was transferred to the federal district court in Kansas. Over the next few years, Appellant would appear before the Kansas court for multiple violations of the terms of his release. The release was revoked, and Appellant was sentenced again for another term of imprisonment followed by additional years of supervised release. After a third violation of the terms of his release, Appellant was again sentenced to prison and another term of supervised release. Appellant appealed the last prison term and supervised release period on the grounds that the district court exceeded the maximum amount allowable by law under 18 U.S.C. 3583(h). Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed that the district court exceeded its discretion in sentencing Appellant, and affirmed his sentence.