Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellant Abram Venzor-Granillo appealed the district court’s application of an eight-level sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(C). He argued the district court erred by using the modified categorical approach to conclude his prior Colorado conviction for first degree criminal trespass was a theft offense, warranting the enhancement. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court properly applied the modified categorical approach because the Colorado statute under which Defendant was convicted was ambiguous: it reached a broad range of conduct, some of which merit the enhancement and some of which do not. The charging document and plea agreement underlying Defendant's prior conviction revealed he admitted all the elements of the generic offense of attempt to commit theft. Therefore, the district court did not err in imposing the sentence enhancement.

Defendant-Appellant Raul Rosales-Garcia pled guilty to one count of illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326 and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 37 months. On appeal Defendant challenged his sentence, alleging that the district court incorrectly applied the Sentencing Guidelines. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed, reversed the district court's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.

Plaintiff-Appellant Fedwa Khalik appealed the district court's decision that dismissed her Title VII employment discrimination case for failing to state a claim. Plaintiff was hired by Defendant United Air Lines in 1995, rising to the position as "Business Services Representative" before she was terminated in 2009. She claimed she was terminated because of her race, religion, national origin and ethnic heritage. She also brought a retaliation claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act. More than two months after Defendant filed its motion to dismiss and three weeks after the deadline to amend pleadings had passed, Plaintiff sought to amend her complaint. The district court denied Plaintiff's motion to amend as futile and untimely and granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the federal claims for failure to state a claim. The district court also exercised pendent jurisdiction and dismissed the state law discrimination and retaliation claims as similarly not plausible. Upon appeal, Plaintiff argued that the district court used a "heightened" standard of proof in making its determination that she had not stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon review of the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit found that "While the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that Plaintiff establish a prima facie case in her complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim." The Court found that Plaintiff's general assertions of discrimination and retaliation, "without any details whatsoever of events leading up to her termination, are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint.

Lead Plaintiff William Poppo filed a class action complaint on behalf of all persons who purchased Level 3 securities between October 2006 and October 2007. Plaintiff brought suit under the under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and under state securities law. Plaintiff also asserted claims against individual defendants as "control persons" pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Act. The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and Plaintiff appealed. "The fundamental weakness in plaintiff’s complaint is that he [gave the Tenth Circuit] a great volume of puzzle pieces that, despite [the Court's] best efforts, [the Court could not] fit together." The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint.

Appellant Rick Strandlof was charged under the Stolen Valor Act (18 U.S.C. 704(b)) which makes it illegal to falsely claim to have received a military award or honor. The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the Act is constitutional. Despite never having served in the armed forces, Appellant founded the Colorado Veterans Alliance, and frequently told veterans he graduated from the United States Naval Academy, was a former U.S. Marine Corps Captain, and had been wounded in combat in Iraq. He bragged of receiving a Purple Heart, and he boasted that he had been awarded the Silver Star for gallantry in battle. A number of local veterans found Appellant to be an unconvincing imposter. Angered by Appellant's lies, they contacted the FBI and reported their suspicion that Appellant was a phony. After military officials confirmed Appellant never attended the Naval Academy or served in the military, the government filed a criminal complaint in the District of Colorado charging him with making false claims about receipt of military decorations or medals, in violation of the Act. Reasoning that false statements are generally protected by the First Amendment, the district court declared the Stolen Valor Act unconstitutional and dismissed the charges against Appellant. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with that reading of Supreme Court precedent and reversed: "[a]s the Supreme Court has observed time and again, false statements of fact do not enjoy constitutional protection, except to the extent necessary to protect more valuable speech. Under this principle, the Stolen Valor Act does not impinge on or chill protected speech, and therefore does not offend the First Amendment."

Defendant-Appellant Miguel Games-Perez was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon. Claiming that he was unaware that he was actually a felon, he filed a motion in limine, seeking a pre-trial ruling that the government was required to prove that he actually knew he was a felon. When that motion was denied, Defendant filed a motion to enter a conditional guilty plea, asking to reserve the right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion in limine. The district court granted Defendant's motion, pursuant to which he entered his conditional guilty plea. The district court sentenced him to fifty-seven months' imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing that his case was distinguishable from established case law that held scienter was not required to be convicted of possession as a convicted felon. Upon review of Defendant's criminal history and his then-current probation, the Tenth Circuit concluded Defendant had a constructive knowledge of having been a felon: "it was pellucidly clear to him that he could not violate his probation, by possessing a firearm, and escape the consequences of his felony conviction. Thus, Mr. Games-Perez knew, as a matter of fact, that he was losing the benefit of his bargain when he picked up a gun while on probation. He just did not know the legal consequences of it–up to ten years in federal prison." The Court affirmed the district court's decision.

This was a case of first impression for the Court. John Doe, a registered sex offender, brought a facial challenge under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to a ban enacted by the City of Albuquerque that prohibited registered sex offenders from entering the City's public libraries. The district court denied a motion to dismiss brought by the City and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Doe. The court concluded that the ban burdened Doe's fundamental right to receive information under the First Amendment and that the City failed sufficiently to controvert Doe's contention on summary judgment that the ban did not satisfy the time, place, or manner test applicable to restrictions in a designated public forum. The City appealed both the denial of its motion to dismiss and the grant of Doe's summary judgment motion. The City, relying on a mistaken interpretation of case law regarding facial challenges, erroneously contended that it had no burden to respond to Doe's motion. Consequently, the City failed to present any reasons for its ban. "Had the City done so, it is not difficult to imagine that the ban might have survived Doe's challenge," because the Court recognized the City's "significant interest in providing a safe environment for its library patrons, especially children." However, with no response, the Court was "bound by the record" and affirmed the district court's decision in favor of Doe.

Plaintiff-Appellant Sonja Morris appealed the district court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings on her First Amendment retaliation claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983, and grant of summary judgment on her claim for sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in favor of Defendant Memorial Health System. Plaintiff worked as a registered nurse for Memorial and in 2007 joined the "Heart Team" which was performed all heart surgeries at the hospital. During her time with the Team, Plaintiff contended that the lead surgeon harassed her on multiple occasions. Despite participation in a teambuilding program, Plaintiff submitted a Notice of Claim on Memorial in 2008. The hospital removed Plaintiff from the Heart Team and into a more "comfortable" work environment. In 2009, Plaintiff filed suit against Memorial claiming her First Amendment rights were violated when she was removed from the Heart Team because she submitted her Notice of Claim. The district court granted Memorial's motion on the First Amendment claim on the ground that the notice did not contain "speech" as determined by case law. Furthermore, the court held that Plaintiff could not establish that the alleged harassment was based on her gender or pervasive enough to affect her work environment. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the district court did not err in affirming the district court.

Relying on "Atkins v. Virginia" (536 W.S. 304, 321 (2002)), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) granted Petitioner-Appellant George Ochoa a post-conviction jury trial to determine whether he was mentally retarded. The jury found Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he was mentally retarded, and the OCCA affirmed. The Tenth Circuit granted Petitioner permission to file a second 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition to raise his "Atkins" claims in federal court. After the district court denied Petitioner's second 2254 habeas petition on the merits, Petitioner appealed to the Tenth Circuit. Petitioner contended Oklahoma law, which focuses on whether a defendant is mentally retarded at the time of trial, instead of whether he was mentally retarded at the time of the commission of the crime, is "contrary to, or . . . an unreasonable application of" "Atkins." Furthermore, Petitioner contended his trial was fundamentally unfair. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found the district court properly resolved Petitioner's case, and that none of the alleged errors at trial entitled him to habeas relief.

In August 2010, Defendant Byron Ventura-Perez pled guilty in Colorado to illegal reentry after having been deported subsequent to an aggravated-felony conviction. Defendant raised two issues on appeal: (1) he contended the district court miscalculated his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines; and (2) he contended that when the court imposed his sentence, it improperly refused to consider sentencing disparities created by fast-track programs in other districts. Finding no error in the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendant's sentence.