Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Payne County Jail Administrator Brandon Myers appealed a district court's order that denied his motion for summary judgment that asked for qualified immunity. While held as a pretrial detainee at the Payne County Jail, Plaintiff John David Palmer suffered from an infection of the flesh-eating methicillin-resistent staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) bacteria. The jail's medical transport officer took Plaintiff to Dr. Daniel Hill who did not diagnose Plaintiff as having MRSA, but drained the boils Plaintiff had developed, administered an injection of an antibiotic, and prescribed two more antibiotics for oral use at the jail. Dr. Hill advised that Plaintiff should return in two days for a follow-up visit, but warned that if Plaintiff developed a fever, he should be taken to the hospital. Ultimately, Plaintiff developed a fever, his condition worsened, and he alleged in his complaint against prison officials that their inattention or delay in taking him to the hospital caused him tremendous suffering and caused him to accumulate $24,000 in medical bills. Upon review of the trial court record and the applicable legal authority, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to deny Mr. Myers qualified immunity.

Pro se prisoner Petitioner Eric Griffin appealed a district court's dismissal of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. The court dismissed Mr. Griffinâs petition after he failed to respond to its order to show that (1) the court had jurisdiction over his claims, and (2) he stated a valid claim for federal habeas corpus relief. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district courtâs dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and denied his appeal.

Defendant-Appellant Alan Tukes appealed his federal conviction for bank robbery, arguing that the governmentâs evidence was insufficient to prove that the bank was insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (âFDICâ) at the time of the crime. At trial, a prosecutor asked the bankâs branch manager: âNow, the Compass Bank, is that a bank that is federally insured by the [FDIC]?â She responded: âYes, it is.â When asked whether the bank âhasâ any documentation proving its insured status, she replied: âYes. We have a certificate.â When asked whether the certificate âhangsâ in the branch, the manager replied in the affirmative. The district court admitted the certificate, dated November 8, 1993, into evidence. The government offered no additional evidence of the bankâs insured status. At summation, Defendant argued that the government had not proven that the bank was FDIC insured at the time of the robbery. The jury returned a guilty verdict. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the Tenth Circuit concluded "it is clear that a rational juror could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the bank was insured at the time of the robbery." The Court affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Martinez appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. Plaintiff filed suit against Kevin Milyard and Susan Jones, his previous and current wardens, respectively. His complaint included a long list of grievances. Plaintiff alleged that prison employees erroneously billed him for repairs and medical services, confiscated his personal items without following the proper procedures, and failed to separate Plaintiff and another inmate after a physical altercation between them. He further contended that prison facilities lacked adequate amenities and that prison staff failed to provide him with time for fresh air and exercise. Finally, Plaintiff alleged that the Colorado Department of Corrections improperly garnished his deposits. Plaintiff's complaint failed, however, to tie any of these specific allegations to Milyard or to Jones. Because Plaintiff failed to advance "a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal," the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of Plaintiff's case.

Plaintiff-Appellant Ed Henry appealed a district courtâs final judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees police officers Jacob Storey and Amy Fangio after a jury trial. He contended that the district court erred in (1) granting judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) to these Defendants on two of his claims and (2) rejecting a proposed jury instruction. In 2008, Plaintiff filed a civil-rights complaint against several Defendants arising from a night-time police stop. Plaintiff, an African-American, was pulled over in a rental vehicle. He was ordered out, handcuffed, and placed in the back of a marked police vehicle. After an investigation, officers realized that the rental vehicle driven by Plaintiff had been erroneously reported as stolen. Plaintiff was then released. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that he was singled out because of his race, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. He also alleged that the officers used excessive force. Defendants put on no evidence. Plaintiff proposed a jury instruction to the effect that the officersâ compliance with standard operating procedures could not be considered in determining whether they used excessive force. The court did not so instruct the jury. The jury ultimately found that Officer Storey had not engaged in racial profiling and that Officer Fangio had not used excessive force. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Defendants that the submitted jury instructions âcomprehensively and correctlyâ covered the elements of the excessive force claim. The Court affirmed the district court's decision in all other respects.

Petitioner Margarito Escalera Luevano applied for an adjustment of status during his removal proceedings based on his eligibility for an immigrant visa. He also requested an indefinite continuance in anticipation of the receipt of a visa. The immigration judge (IJ) determined he was not then eligible for adjustment of status and denied the request for a continuance because the anticipated visa would not be available for several years. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Tenth Circuit that the IJ abused his discretion in denying the requested continuance. He also claimed that the removal proceedings against him should have been terminated because his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. Petitioner admitted to the facts underlying the charge of illegal entry following a stop in Yellowstone National Park by Immigration officials, but withdrew his concession of removability because he believed the section of the Immigration and Nationality Act permitting adjustment of status rendered him nonremovable. The IJ denied his request for adjustment of status because no visa number was available and then ordered removal. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that although the agency cases permit, and may even require, an IJ to continue proceedings in order to await mere processing of a properly filed visa petition with a current priority date, there was no agency or court precedent for requiring an IJ to grant an indefinite continuance so that a petitioner may remain in this country while awaiting eligibility for adjustment of status. Petitioner was not eligible for adjustment relief at the time of his removal proceedings: "[m]oreover, [Petitioner] was unlikely to be eligible within a reasonably proximate time." Accordingly, the Court denied Petitioner's petition for review and motion to stay removal.

Petitioners Mihiretab Teshome Jobira and Beza Teshome Jobira petitioned the Tenth Circuit to review final orders of removal. The Jobiras are natives and citizens of Ethiopia. They claimed to be brother and sister. In September 2006, the Jobiras entered the United States on visitor visas. On the date their visas expired, they applied for asylum and protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT). According to their applications, the Jobiras were arrested on several occasions in 2005 as a result of their activities organizing fellow high school students in support of the "Coalition for Unity and Democracy" (CUD). They alleged that during their detentions, they were interrogated, held in squalid conditions, and severely beaten or tortured. After hearing the Jobirasâ testimony, an immigration judge issued an oral decision denying relief and granting voluntary departure. The judge concluded the Jobirasâ story had not proven credible for a number of reasons. The Jobiras appealed the judge's denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). A single member of the BIA dismissed their appeal. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the Jobiras failed to meet the persecution standards for asylum, and necessarily failed to satisfy the higher standards required for restriction on removal under the immigration laws or relief under the CAT. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the BIA's and immigration judge's decisions.

Defendant Juan Soto-Munoz applied to the Tenth Circuit for a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court's denial of his petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Defendant pleaded guilty to an indictment charging him with possession with the intent to distribute marijuana. His plea agreement included a waiver of his right to appeal or to pursue a collateral attack on any matter connected to his prosecution, conviction or sentence, except to the extent that the sentence exceeded the sentencing guidelines range determined by the district court. He was sentenced to 87 months' imprisonment, followed by four years of supervised release. Defendant attempted to appeal his conviction and sentence, but the Tenth circuit granted the government's motion to enforce the appeal waiver in the plea agreement. Upon re-review, the Tenth Circuit denied Defendant's COA application and dismissed his appeal, because "Defendant has shown no reason not to enforce his plea agreement's waiver of his right to pursue a collateral attack on his conviction and sentence."

Defendant Alfonzo Moya-Breton filed a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. 2255 at the district court claiming that he had received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court denied the motion and Defendant's request for a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal the denial. A jury convicted Defendant on "multiple counts," and he was sentenced to 360 months' imprisonment. According to Defendant's affidavit, after the district court pronounced sentence, he turned to his trial counsel and asked about an alleged maximum sentence of 17 years, but counsel said that "he did not know what happened." On appeal, Defendant argued: (1) that trial counsel "fail[ed] to negotiate, secure, and/or disclose a plea offer with the government where the evidence demonstrated overwhelming guilt;" (2) that trial counsel "grossly misadvised [him] of applicable laws, statutes, and potential sentencing exposure;â (3) that trial and appellate counsel "fail[ed] to object [to] an . . . inapplicable weapon enhancement;" and (4) that trial and appellate counsel "fail[ed] to investigate, discover, and exploit false testimony given by the governmentâs primary witness during trial." Upon review of the trial record, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Defendant failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." The Court denied his application for a COA and dismissed his appeal.

Pro se prisoner Defendant Franklin Kemp petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court's denial of his application for post-conviction relief. Defendant was convicted in 1999 on incest charges, and sentenced to 42 years' imprisonment. The district court denied Defendant's petition as untimely. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit also concluded that Defendant's petition was untimely. Accordingly, the Court denied Defendant's application for a COA and dismissed his appeal.