Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellee Carl Roy Burleson and two companions were stopped by a Roswell police officer because they were walking in the middle of the street and because they were carrying an unleashed dog, which aroused the officerâs suspicions. After telling the three individuals that they were not permitted to walk in the street and satisfying himself that the dog was not stolen, the officer asked the individuals for their names and requested a warrants check on each of them. Police dispatch informed the officer that Defendant had an outstanding warrant, and during the ensuing arrest, the officer found two handguns and ammunition on Defendant. In the district court, Defendant moved to suppress evidence of the handguns and ammunition as fruit of an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the motion, concluding that at the time the officer obtained Defendant's identity and requested the warrants check, the officer had already completed the purposes of the detention and thus he had no lawful basis to further detain Defendant. The government appealed that decision. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit found that the district court erred in concluding that Defendant's stop had been completed when the officer ran the warrants check against Defendant. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the district court's factual finding that the officer had "no objective basis for fearing for his safety" was "clearly erroneous." The Court reversed the district court's grant of Defendant's motion to suppress, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

The City of Hugo, Oklahoma, and the Hugo Municipal Authority, a public water trust, (collectively "Hugo") contracted with the City of Irving, Texas, ("Irving") for the sale of water Hugo has been allocated or sought to be allocated under permits issued by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("Board"). Hugo and Irving brought suit against the nine members of the Board for a declaration that certain Oklahoma laws governing the Boardâs water allocation decisions were unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause and an injunction prohibiting their enforcement. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board, and Hugo and Irving appealed. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Hugo, as a political subdivision of Oklahoma, lacked standing to sue the Board under the dormant Commerce Clause. Irving, whose injury was solely premised on a contract it entered into with Hugo, likewise could not demonstrate standing because any injury to Irving cannot be redressed. Concluding no plaintiff had the necessary standing, the Court vacated the district courtâs order and remanded the case back the district court to dismiss for lack of federal jurisdiction.

Tarrant Regional Water District ("Tarrant"), a Texas state agency, applied to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board ("the OWRB") for permits to appropriate water at three locations in Oklahoma for use in Texas. Just before filing its applications, Tarrant sued the nine members of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board in the district court for the Western District of Oklahoma and sought a declaratory judgment to invalidate certain Oklahoma statutes that govern the appropriation and use of water and an injunction preventing OWRB from enforcing them. Tarrant alleged that the Oklahoma statutes restricted interstate commerce in water and thereby violated the dormant Commerce Clause as discriminatory or unduly burdensome. Tarrant further alleged that Congress did not authorize Oklahoma through the Red River Compact ("Compact") to enact such laws. OWRB responded that Congress did authorize Oklahoma to adopt these statutes by consenting to the Compact. Tarrant also claimed that the Compact preempted the Oklahoma statutes insofar as the Compact applied to Tarrantâs application to appropriate water located in the Red River Basin. The district court granted summary judgment for OWRB on both the dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause claims. After that decision, Tarrant took steps to export to Texas Oklahoma water that was not subject to the Compact. Tarrant negotiated a contract with property owners in Stephens County, Oklahoma to export groundwater to Texas and also entered a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Apache Tribe concerning the Tribeâs potential water rights. In court Tarrant then reasserted its dormant Commerce Clause challenge based on these transactions. The district court dismissed the Stephens County matter for lack of standing and the Apache Tribe matter as not ripe. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the grants of summary judgment on the dormant Commerce Clause and preemption issues, and the dismissals based on standing and ripeness: [w]e hold that the Red River Compact insulates Oklahoma water statutes from dormant Commerce Clause challenge insofar as they apply to surface water subject to the Compact."

Plaintiffs Ginger James and Deborah Tennison brought suit under 42 U.S.C.1983 alleging Defendant Prue Public Schoolsâ (the District) termination of their employment violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They appealed a summary judgment that rejected their claims, in which the district court determined (1) their pre-termination hearing satisfied their due-process rights, and (2) they failed to show their speech was a motivating factor for the termination. The School Board became concerned about the Districtâs finances. It initiated a financial investigation by retaining a financial consultant and terminated the treasurerâs employment. Without recommending any particular positions to be cut, Jones further opined there would have to be some reduction in personnel and it appeared the District had too many administrators. Eliminating the positions of an elementary and a high-school principal, it decided, would have the least impact on the students and was in the Districtâs best interest. Accordingly, the Board voted to eliminate the positions due to lack of funds and to dismiss Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the issues Plaintiffs raised in their appeal did not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding a denial of due process. Furthermore, they did not establish the occurrence and/or the content of the speech sufficiently for the district court to hold in their favor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district courtâs decision.

Murray County Oklahoma deputy sheriff Craig Billings, and City of Sulphur Police Officers Steve Watkins and Tony Simpson appealed a district courtâs denial of their motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. Joshua Burchett is Plaintiffs Christina Mascorroâs son and Jose Mascorroâs 17-year-old stepson. Billings conducted a traffic stop of Joshua because the teenager was missing taillights. Instead of stopping, Joshua drove two blocks to his parentsâ house, ran inside, and hid in the bathroom. The evening ended with the Mascorro familyâs arrest, charged with obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duties. All charges against the Mascorros were dismissed. The Mascorros brought this action against Billings, Watkins and Simpson asserting claims of unlawful entry, excessive use of force, false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. Watkins and Simpson moved for dismissal on the excessive force and malicious prosecution claims. The district court dismissed the Mascorrosâ claims against Watkins and Simpson under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but left all other claims intact. The district court granted Billings, Simpson, and Watkinsâ motions on claims against them in their official capacities, but denied summary judgment on all other issues, including their qualified immunity defense. The officers brought this interlocutory appeal on the single issue of whether they were entitled to qualified immunity. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded: "[w]hile hot pursuit of a felon might be sufficient, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found an entry into a personâs home permissible based merely on the pursuit of a misdemeanant. [. . .] No reasonable officer would have thought pursuit of a minor for a mere misdemeanor traffic offense constituted the sort of exigency permitting entry into a home without a warrant. [. . .] As the evidence and reasonable inferences regarding that single claim, hot pursuit of a traffic offender, taken in the light most favorable to the Mascorros demonstrate[d] a violation of a clearly established constitutional right," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district courtâs decision.

Prisoner (Defendant) Grover Miskovsky, a prisoner of the State of Oklahoma, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in district court alleging that Justin Jones, Director of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (ODOC), had violated his constitutional rights by seizing the money in his prison draw account. The district court granted Jones summary judgment on the constitutional claims, dismissed without prejudice Defendantâs challenge to his state sentence, and gave him leave to amend. After Defendant filed an amended complaint, which named additional defendants, the court dismissed his new claims. Defendant then brought this appeal. In 2000, and Oklahoma state court sentenced Defendant to consecutive terms of 84 yearsâ imprisonment for racketeering, 7 yearsâ imprisonment for indecent exposure, and 2 yearsâ imprisonment for attempted perjury by subordination. The court ordered that that he pay fines, compensation to victims, and costs by using his entire draw account. The prison made no payment from Defendantâs draw account for his state-court fines and costs until 2006. The prison made additional periodic payments toward the amount owed until 2007. In his appeal, Defendant alleged that ODOCâs use of his entire draw account to pay his fines and court costs violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment as well as the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection. A federal magistrate judge recommended that the complaint be dismissed. The district court adopted the recommendation, dismissing most claims with prejudice, although it dismissed without prejudice Defendantâs state-law claims and some claims not factually related to the alleged misuse of his draw account. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district courtâs decision to dismiss Defendantâs case.

In 2010, a federal jury convicted Defendant Risheen Robinson of distributing crack cocaine in violation. After trial, the district court found that Defendant qualified as a âcareer offenderâ under U.S.S.G. 4B1.1 in light of various convictions he had accumulated dating back to 1994. Because of this, the court sentenced him to 262 months in prison and six years of supervised release. On appeal, Defendant attacked the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction and the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. Viewing the evidence through a âdeferential prism,â the Tenth Circuit concluded âa reasonable jury could well have found Defendant guilty as charged.â Finding none of Defendantâs arguments persuasive, the Tenth Circuit affirmed Defendantâs sentence.

Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Lester Washington filed this action against twenty-six defendants who all have various connections to Colorado State University. The district court dismissed Plaintiffâs complaint without prejudice for failing to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), and Plaintiff timely appealed. Because the district court dismissed Plaintiffâs complaint without prejudice, the Tenth Circuit lacked jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffâs appeal and dismissed it.

Pro se prisoner Petitioner Richard Sigala sought a certificate of appealability (COA) from the Tenth Circuit to appeal the district courtâs dismissal of his habeas petition as time barred. After a jury convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder, armed robbery, tampering with evidence, and conspiracy, a New Mexico state court imposed a total sentence of life plus eleven yearsâ imprisonment, followed by two years of statutory parole. Represented by counsel, Petitioner appealed his convictions. The New Mexico Supreme Court vacated his conviction for armed robbery but affirmed all others. Because Petitionerâs armed robbery sentence ran concurrently with his murder sentence, his total sentence remained unchanged, except he received only one year of statutory parole. Three years later, Petitioner unsuccessfully petitioned the New Mexico state courts for the writ of habeas corpus before turning to the federal courts. The petition eventually came before a magistrate judge who recommended it be dismissed with prejudice because it was filed several years after Petitionerâs conviction became final. The district court adopted the recommendation and dismissed the petition. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded "no reasonable jurist could conclude the district courtâs dismissal was incorrect." Accordingly, the Court denied Petitionerâs application for a COA and dismissed his appeal.

A jury convicted Defendant Cesar Acosta-Gallardo on one count of conspiracy to traffic methamphetamine, and on one count of using a telephone to facilitate a felony drug offense. Defendant appealed his conviction, alleging a variance, a "Brady" violation, improper venue, and that insufficient evidence was presented to sustain his conviction for alleged trafficking. Upon review of the trial court record and Defendantâs appellate brief, the Tenth Circuit concluded the government presented ample evidence of interdependence among Acosta-Gallardo and his co-defendants: "[d]rawing reasonable inferences in favor of the juryâs verdict, ample evidence existed to support the juryâs finding that Acosta-Gallardo [was] involved in a single conspiracy. Thus, Acosta-Gallardoâs sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge fails." The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decisions in all other respects, and affirmed Defendantâs convictions.