Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In May 2011 Kansas Governor Sam Brownback signed into law an appropriations bill restricting the classes of entities eligible for Title X of the Public Health Service Act subgrants. The restriction disqualified two family-planning clinics operated by Planned Parenthood of Kansas and Mid-Missouri (Planned Parenthood). Planned Parenthood sued Governor Brownback and Robert Moser, M.D., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), challenging the legislation: (1) that it violated Title X and was therefore unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause; (2) that it violated Planned Parenthood's First Amendment rights by penalizing it for associating with providers of abortion and for its advocacy of access to abortion services; and (3) that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing an unconstitutional burden on the rights of women to choose abortion (a claim not raised on appeal). Ruling that Planned Parenthood had established a likelihood of success on the merits of the first two claims and had otherwise satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, the district court enjoined KDHE from implementing the legislation. After review, the Tenth Circuit vacated the injunction. With regard to the Supremacy Clause claim, the Court concluded Planned Parenthood could not establish a likelihood of success on the merits because there was no private cause of action for injunctive relief for the alleged violation of Title X. With regard to the First Amendment claim, the Court held that that Planned Parenthood could not establish a likelihood of success because the legislation does not restrict the rights of speech or association of subgrantees and the motives of individual lawmakers were irrelevant. View "Planned Parenthood KS & Mid-MO v. Brownback, et al" on Justia Law

Rick Reese owned a licensed firearms store in southern New Mexico and ran it with his wife, Terri, and two sons, Ryin and Remington. In 2012, a jury convicted the Reeses for aiding and abetting straw purchases of firearms from the store. Unbeknownst to them, at the time of trial the FBI was investigating one of the government's witnesses for his alleged involvement in various criminal activities. Arguing that the government's failure to disclose that information before trial violated "Brady v. Maryland," (373 U.S. 83 (1963)), and "Giglio v. United States," (405 U.S. 150 (1972)). The district court concluded that the government had withheld favorable, material evidence from Defendants and accordingly granted their motion for a new trial. The question before the Tenth Circuit was whether the district court erred in doing so. The Tenth Circuit held that the district court erred because the investigation was not material. Therefore the Court reversed the district court's order and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "United States v. Reese, et al" on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Ronald Calhoun appealed the district court's dismissal of his habeas corpus petition. The district court held that appellant was not "in custody," as required to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Appellant argued he was in custody because he must register as a sex offender. The Tenth Circuit issued a certificate of appealability on whether appellant's ongoing registration obligations under Colorado’s Sex Offender Registration Act satisfied the custody requirement of section 2254. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Calhoun v. Colorado Attorney General" on Justia Law

In 2008, the IRS levied defendant John Williamson's wife's wages to collect his back taxes dating back thirty years. The IRS sent a notice of the levy, which Defendant returned, writing across the document: "Refused for cause. Return to sender, unverified bill." He enclosed an affidavit explaining why he did not need to pay income taxes. Subsequent notices of the levy were also returned. Later that year, Defendant sent an invoice for $909,067,650.00 to two IRS agents who had worked on the matter, listing the value of real and personal property allegedly seized by the IRS, added damages for various alleged torts, and then trebled the total "for racketeering." A grand jury indicted Defendant and Mrs. Williamson on two counts: (1) "endeavor[ing] to impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue Code by filing a false and fraudulent Claim of Lien;" and (2) "fil[ing] . . . a false lien and encumbrance against the real and personal property [of the IRS agents] on account of the performance of [their] official duties." Mrs. Williamson pled guilty to the second count in return for dismissal of the first count against her. Defendant, however, proceeded to trial. His defense was essentially that he genuinely believed his lien was proper. A forensic psychologist testified that Defendant suffered from a delusional disorder that prevented him from abandoning his beliefs even when confronted with overwhelming evidence that he was wrong. Defendant requested instructions that would support his "genuine belief" defense to both charges, but the court rejected them and the jury returned verdicts of guilty on the two charges. Defendant was sentenced to four months in prison and three years of supervised release. Defendant appealed his conviction, claiming the district court erred by not giving the requested jury instructions. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Williamson" on Justia Law

A grand jury returned a three-count indictment charging Safiyyah Tahir Battles with: (1) making a false statement to a financial institution (Count I); (2) committing wire fraud (Count II); and (3) laundering money (Count III). Battles exercised her right to a jury trial, and the jury returned a verdict of guilty on Counts II and III. The jury failed to reach a verdict on Count I. As a result, the district court declared a mistrial on Count I and subsequently granted the government's unopposed motion to dismiss that count without prejudice. Battles was sentenced to thirty months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release. The district court also ordered her to make restitution to the victim of her crimes. Battles appealed her convictions and sentence on numerous grounds. Upon careful consideration of the facts of this case and the district court record, the Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's judgment and affirmed Battles's convictions and sentence. The Court dismissed the portion of Battles's appeal pertaining to her Brady claim for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Battles" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted defendants Michael Calhoun, Tommy Davis, and William Tucker on 60 counts of wire fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy to commit wire and mail fraud. The indictment was based on Calhoun's grand jury testimony in which he incriminated himself, Davis, and Tucker. Calhoun testified upon the advice of his counsel at the time, Tom Mills, who was paid by Texas Capital Bank (the alleged victim of the fraud). After Calhoun secured new counsel, defendants moved to quash the indictment and suppress Calhoun's grand jury testimony, arguing the indictment was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and Calhoun's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. The district court denied the motion. In consolidated, pretrial interlocutory appeals, the defendants challenged the denial of their motion to quash, arguing that the Tenth Circuit should exercise its jurisdiction under the "collateral order" exception to the final judgment rule, ("Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.," (337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949)). However, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply, and dismissed these appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "United States v. Tucker" on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Thomas Evans was a property manager and organizer of real estate investment funds, and was owner and president of Evans Real Estate Group, LLC. V R. 212. At first, Evans' business conduct was legitimate (if highly risky), but by April 2005, Evans experienced cash flow problems and was unable to make the high interest payments to investors. He pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, and was sentenced to 168 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. He appealed the sentence. Because the district court erred in calculating loss and failing to award an offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case back to the district court to vacate the sentence and resentence. View "United States v. Evans" on Justia Law

Defendant Scott Fonseca was convicted of possessing stolen firearms and was sentenced to seventy months' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant argued: (1) the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the stolen firearms because they were found as the result of a detention that exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry stop; and (2) the district court erred in allowing the government's introduction of certain testimony (which was contrary to the court's grant of defendant's earlier motion in limine, but without a concurrent objection by defendant) that he had previously sold several guns that were stolen at the same time as the eight firearms found as a result of the Terry stop. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence. View "United States v. Fonseca" on Justia Law

Oklahoma state prisoner appellant Antonio Milton was serving a life sentence without parole for drug-trafficking-related convictions. After exhausting his state court remedies, Milton filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging (in relevant part) his counsel on direct appeal was ineffective for failing to assert a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, specifically that Milton’s trial counsel failed to inform Milton of a favorable pretrial plea offer. The district court denied Milton’s petition, but the Tenth Circuit granted Milton a certificate of appealability to challenge the district court’s ruling on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. Upon further review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the Oklahoma state courts’ resolution of Milton’s ineffective assistance claim could not survive scrutiny under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), and that unresolved issues of fact prevented the Court from completing its own de novo review of the claim. Consequently, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the district court with directions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Milton’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. View "Milton v. Miller" on Justia Law

Various groups and several Colorado state legislators filed suit in federal district court to challenge the Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR) violated the Guarantee Clause of the federal Constitution, was in direct conflict with provisions of the Enabling Act, and impermissibly amended the Colorado Constitution. In order to avoid Eleventh Amendment sovereignty issues, the Governor of Colorado was designated as the named defendant. Governor John Hickenlooper filed his Answer to the plaintiffs' Complaint, and promptly followed with a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and prudential standing, and that their claims were barred by the political question doctrine. That motion was denied by the district court, and the Governor appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, contending the district court erred. The Governor asked the Court to dismiss the case on the same bases that he presented at district court. The ultimate issue before the Tenth Circuit was: whether plaintiffs suffered a particularized injury not widely shared by the general populace that entitled them to have their case heard by the federal courts, and whether the question presented was purely political in nature and should not be reached by the courts. The Tenth Circuit concluded that these plaintiffs could bring their claims, and that the political question doctrine did not bar the Court's consideration. View "Kerr, et al v. Hickenlooper" on Justia Law