Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Supreme Fuels Trading FZE filed suit against four defendants including International Oil Trading Company, LLC (IOTC) under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and made several common-law and statutory claims under Florida law. IOTC appealed the district court's order that it pay $5 million to Supreme Fuels pursuant to a settlement agreement. On appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, Supreme Fuels argued that the district court's order was not appealable. Upon further review, the Court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In a consolidated appeal, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad appealed the District Court's denial of its asserted right to victim status under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA) and sought restitution. In December 2010, the United States filed a criminal information against Alcatel-Lucent, charging it with violating provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). The government simultaneously filed criminal informations against three subsidiaries of Alcatel-Lucent (Alcatel-Lucent France, Alcatel Lucent Trade International, and Alcatel Centroamerica) charging them with conspiracy to violate the FCPA's accounting and anti-bribery provisions. In 2011, Alcatel-Lucent entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and factual proffer with the United States. The agreement deferred prosecution for three years, subject to Alcatel-Lucent's compliance with specific reforms in its accounting and oversight controls, and required Alcatel-Lucent to pay a penalty of $92 million. The facts proffered in Alcatel-Lucent's deferred prosecution agreement identified Appellant Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad (ICE). Alcatel-Lucent admitted that it hired and paid unusually large fees to "consultants," who in turn curried favor with ICE officials and board members to secure telecommunications contracts by offering direct bribes or kickbacks from any contracts awarded by ICE to Alcatel-Lucent or its subsidiaries. After thorough review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

In late 2008, Lou Ann Cassell inherited $220,000 from her aunt. At that time, both Cassell and her wholly owned company, J&L Arborists, LLC, were insolvent. After consulting with attorneys and accountants, she used her $220,000 inheritance to purchase a single-premium fixed annuity. She began receiving monthly payments, and under the annuity contract she is scheduled to receive those payments for the rest of her life. The contract also guarantees the payments for ten years regardless of when Cassell dies. She designated her children as the beneficiaries of the payments if she dies within the ten-year guarantee period. A year after she had purchased the annuity, Cassell and her company filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. She included the annuity as an asset in her Schedule B disclosures, and listed it as exempt under Georgia law on Schedule C. The trustee objected, contending that Cassell's annuity is nonexempt because it does not meet the requirements of the statute. The bankruptcy court held that Cassell's annuity was an "annuity" within the meaning of the Georgia bankruptcy exemption statute. The district court affirmed as to the issues that the bankruptcy court had addressed but remanded the case, leaving it for the bankruptcy court to decide in the first instance whether the annuity payments were reasonably necessary for Cassell's support. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit certified the question pertaining to the Georgia exemption to the Georgia Supreme Court.

In 1982, a jury convicted Defendant Omar Blanco of the first-degree capital murder of John Ryan and armed burglary of the residence where Ryan lived. The court accepted the jury's sentencing recommendation on the murder conviction and sentenced Defendant to death. The court also sentenced him to seventy-five years' imprisonment for the armed burglary conviction. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Blanco's convictions and death sentence and denied collateral relief. In 1987, Defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to set aside his convictions and sentences. The District Court denied the writ as to his convictions but granted the writ as to his death sentence on the ground that he had been denied his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in the penalty phase of his case. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The result of the new penalty-phase proceeding was the same: the jury recommended the death penalty and the court imposed it. In this appeal, the issue before the Eleventh Circuit was whether a writ of habeas corpus should have been granted to vacate Defendant's death sentence. The District Court for the Southern District of Florida decided that it should not. The Eleventh Circuit agreed and therefore affirmed its judgment.

Defendant Johnny Shane Kormondy, a Florida death row inmate convicted of murder, appealed a district court decision that denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Two state court trial proceedings were before the District Court when it ruled. The first proceeding was the guilt phase of Defendant's bifurcated trial in July 1994. The second proceeding was the penalty phase of his 1999 trial. The District Court denied the writ with respect to both phases of the trial. After briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.

This case represented the third decision the Eleventh Circuit issued within a month concerning the application of Amendments 750 and 759 to the sentencing guidelines and the scope of a district court’s authority to reduce a defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2). In the first two decisions, the Court held that those amendments did not authorize a court to reduce a sentence under section 3582(c)(2) if the defendant’s guidelines range remained the statutory mandatory minimum after the amendments or if the guidelines range was otherwise not affected by the amendments. This appeal raised a different issue because the pro se appellant’s original guidelines range of 121 to 151 months was above, and thus not affected by, the applicable statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. As a result, Amendments 750 and 759 would reduce his guidelines range. For those reasons, section 3582(c)(2) gave the district court authority to reduce the sentence in its discretion. But because the district court in this case believed it lacked that authority, the Eleventh Circuit vacated that order denying the motion for resentencing and remanded for the court to determine whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the sentence.

Defendant Daniel Anthony Smith entered a conditional guilty plea to receiving and attempting to distribute child pornography. Exercising his preserved right to appeal, Defendant sought review of the district court's denial of his motion to suppress inculpatory physical and testimonial evidence. He contended on appeal to the Eleventh Circuit, as he did in the district court, that the officers' warrantless and uninvited entry into his house violated the Fourth Amendment and that the evidence that the officers gathered after that entry should be suppressed under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. "Even assuming that the officers' initial entry into Mr. Smith's home violated the Fourth Amendment, suppression is unwarranted because Mr. Smith's later consent was not tainted by the entry." The Eleventh Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the district court and Defendant's conviction.

In 2010, the Georgia legislature enacted a statute barring the unrestricted carrying of weapons or long guns in eight specific locations (the "Carry Law"). The statutory bar did not apply to a license holder if, on arriving at one of the eight locations, a person notifies security or management of the weapon and explicitly follows the security or management personnel's direction for removing, securing, storing or temporarily surrendering the weapon. Refusal to approach security or management personnel or to comply with management's direction is a misdemeanor. One of the eight locations is a "place of worship." In this case, Plaintiffs Edward Stone and Jonathan Wilkins alleged that they wanted to carry handguns to their respective places of worship. Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Carry Law was unconstitutional. The U.S. District court found no merit to Plaintiffs' claims and dismissed their complaints. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing the allegations in their amended complaints were sufficient to make the case that the Carry Law's place-of-worship provision was unconstitutional on its face, or as applied to Plaintiffs. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Plaintiffs' allegations that the Carry Law interfered with their constitutional rights were not sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims.

A federal grand jury charged Appellant Hector Almedina with conspiracy to import 100 grams or more of heroin from Colombia to the United States, from January 2011 through February 2011; importation of 100 grams or more of heroin from Colombia to the United States; conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin; and possession with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin. A jury found Appellant guilty on each count and found that each charged offense involved at least 100 grams of heroin. After a sentencing hearing, the district court ordered Appellant to serve concurrent 97-month terms of imprisonment, which Appellant appealed. After reviewing the record, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Appellant to 97 months' imprisonment. The Court therefore affirmed his sentence.

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), as receiver for Darby Bank & Trust Co., appealed an order of the district court that remanded the underlying case the action to state court. The district court determined that it did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the FDIC had not been formally substituted as a party in the state court action prior to removal. After review, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's remand order. The Court held that, as a matter of federal law, the FDIC is "substituted as a party" in a state court proceeding under 12 U.S.C. 1819(b)(2)(B) once it is appointed receiver and files a notice of substitution, and may at that point remove the action to federal court."