Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, death row inmate Petitioner Carlton Gary was appointed two attorneys to prosecute his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia. After the writ was denied, and before his execution was to take place, the same attorneys represented Petitioner at a clemency hearing before the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. Clemency was denied, but the Georgia Supreme Court stayed Petitioner's execution to enable him to pursue a motion for deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing in the court in which he was convicted and sentenced, the Superior Court for Muscogee County (the "DNA motion"), and depending on the outcome of the DNA motion, an extraordinary motion for a new trial. The Superior Court granted Petitioner's DNA motion. Based upon "newly discovered DNA evidence," Petitioner began preparation for an extraordinary motion for new trial. The attorneys appointed to represent Petitioner in the District Court and at the clemency hearing prosecuted the DNA motion and are preparing, and intend to prosecute, his extraordinary motion for a new trial. In three appeals before the Eleventh Circuit, Petitioner challenged three orders: Appeal No. 09-16198 arose from the District Court's denial of a motion for funds to pay two experts to appear in person at Petitioner's clemency hearing; Appeal No. 11-10705 involved the District Court's partial denial of a voucher submitted by Petitioner's counsel for payment of services rendered in pursuing the extraordinary motion for a new trial; and Appeal No. 11-15396 addressed the District Court’s denial of a motion for funds to pay an expert to assist Petitioner's attorneys in connection with the DNA motion. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Petitioner's appeal in 11-10705, and affirmed the district court's decisions in his other two appeals.

Plaintiff Cristobal Ramirez brought a Title VII employment discrimination case and represented himself in district court. He survived summary judgment (in part) and proceeded to trial. At the conclusion of the presentation of his evidence, Defendant, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), orally moved for judgment as matter of law. The district court granted the motion on the sole ground that Plaintiff's claim was time-barred because he did not contact an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) Counselor within forty-five days of the alleged discrimination. Plaintiff, still appearing in the case pro se, appealed to the Eleventh Circuit where he was appointed counsel. Upon review, and with the benefit of counseled briefing and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court. Because the EEOC found that there was a satisfactory reason for Plaintiff's delay in making initial contact with the EEO Counselor, and because the DOT did not challenge that finding, but, instead, undertook investigation and conciliation, the DOT and the district court were bound by the EEOC’s finding.

The narrow question presented to the Eleventh Circuit concerned whether a Tax Court petition that challenged a notice of deficiency as invalid, "was a proceeding in respect of the deficiency" so as to suspend the limitations period. The IRS selected Petitioner-Appellant Shockley Communications Corporation's (SCC) return for audit. SCC was closely held, and Petitioners-Appellants Terry Shockley, Sandra Shockley and Shockley Holdings, LP were shareholders in SCC. The IRS began the statutory procedures required prior to formal "assessment" of SCC's tax. If a proceeding regarding the taxpayer's deficiency is placed on the Tax Court docket, the IRS must wait to assess until the Tax Court decision becomes final, plus 60 days thereafter. Receipt of the notices was the issue before the Tax Court. After review and oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit held that the petition at issue here suspended the running of the statute of limitations, and reversed.

Appellants Charity Benton, Patricia A. Smith, and Gail Zucker appealed the district court's order remanding Appellee Orvel W. Lloyd's civil rights lawsuit to Florida state court. Appellants properly removed the case to the Middle District of Florida. Although the district court recognized Appellants' right to remove the action to federal court, the district court determined that allowing Lloyd to proceed in federal court would contravene the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") which bars "three strikes" prisoner litigants like Lloyd from bringing civil suits in federal court as indigents. After reviewing the district court's order and the parties' briefs, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's order and remand this case for further proceedings.

Pro se Defendant-Appellant Deshawn Glover appealed a district court's denial of his motion to reduce his sentence based on a retroactive amendment to the sentencing guidelines that lowered base offense levels for certain crack cocaine crimes. He contended that Amendment 759 to the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 759 (Nov. 2011), abrogates the Eleventh Circuit's holding in "United States v. Mills," (613 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2010)), and gave the district court authority to reduce his sentence as a result of Amendment 750, which revised the crack cocaine quantity tables in U.S.S.G. 2D1.1 to conform to the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. "[T]he the statutory provision, the Sentencing Commission's corresponding policy statement, and the commentary to that policy statement all make it clear that a court cannot use an amendment to reduce a sentence in a particular case unless that amendment actually lowers the guidelines range in that case. It is that simple." Neither of the Amendments changed Defendant's guidelines range. Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded Defendant was not entitled to resentencing.

Florida death row inmate Duane Eugene Owen appealed a district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Owen was sentenced to death for two murders in 1984 for which he was separately tried, convicted and sentenced. On appeal, Owen raised multiple issues, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him, and ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit found no error or violation of Owen's constitutional rights. The Court affirmed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief.

Polypore International appeals the Federal Trade Commission's decision finding a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act and ordering divestiture. The Commission held that Polypore's February 2008 acquisition of Microporous would substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in relevant markets. Polypore and the acquired Microporous Products are producers of battery separators. Polypore internal memos reveal that it had developed an "MP Plan," which was a response to competition from Microporous. The MP Plan sought to secure long-term contracts with customers that Polypore thought were in danger of switching to Microporous. Polypore's 2008 budget projected that it would lose increasing amounts of business to Microporous and would be forced to reduce prices if it did not acquire Microporous. The Commission issued an administrative complaint charged that Polypore's acquisition of Microporous may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly for several types of battery separators, in violation of the Clayton Act. After a four-week hearing, the ALJ issued an extensive opinion holding that the acquisition was reasonably likely to substantially lessen competition in four relevant markets. Upon review, the Eleventh circuit concluded the Commission did not err when it treated the acquisition as a horizontal merger, found that there was a single market for deep-cycle separators, and included Microporous's Austrian plant in its divestiture order.

Defendant-Appellant James Early pled guilty to two counts of robbing a bank by violence with what turned out to be fake bombs. He was ultimately sentenced to a 210-month sentence. Defendant appealed his sentence, arguing the evidence was insufficient to convict him. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit found no reversible error and affirmed Defendant's sentence.

Defendant-Appellant Branch Banking & Trust Company (BB&T) appealed the denial of its motion to compel arbitration of a putative class action brought by Plaintiff-Appellee Lacy Baras, a customer of BB&T. Barras alleged in her complaint on behalf of herself and the class she sought to represent that BB&T charged her and others overdraft fees for payments from checking accounts even when the account contained sufficient funds to cover the payments. She also alleged that BB&T supplied inaccurate and misleading information about account balances, and failed to notify customers about changes to BB&T's policies for processing checking account transactions, thereby increasing overdraft charges assessed against customers. Barras asserted claims under the state Unfair Trade Practices Act for unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and unconscionability, and sought to certify a class of BB&T account holders who were likewise charged allegedly inflated overdraft fees. BB&T moved to compel arbitration of all of Barras's claims pursuant to a provision in its "Bank Services Agreement" (BSA). The district court denied BB&T's motion, holding that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable under state law, and could not be enforced. Before the Eleventh Circuit decided BB&T's appeal to that order, the Supreme Court decided "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion" (131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011). The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of that decision. On remand, BB&T renewed its motion to compel arbitration, and again the district court denied it. BB&T appealed that ruling, arguing that: (1) the question of whether the arbitration provision was enforceable must be resolved by an arbitrator; (2) the cost-and-fee shifting provision in the agreement that the district court held unconscionable did not apply to the arbitration provision; (3) "Concepcion" prohibited application of the state unconscionability doctrine to the arbitration provision; (4) the cost-and-fee shifting provision is not unconscionable; and (5) the cost-and-fee shifting privision was severable from the arbitration process. Taking each argument in turn, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case with instructions to compel arbitration.

Plaintiffs-Appellants Curves, LLC d.b.a. Curves Bar & Grill and James Gann operated an alcohol-selling nightclub in Spalding County, Georgia. Defendant Spalding County’s ordinances prohibit nude dancing where alcohol is sold. Plaintiffs sued, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances and asserting claims for malicious arrest and malicious prosecution. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. The District Court also granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs’ malicious arrest and malicious prosecution claims. Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s summary judgment ruling on the merits. In addition, Plaintiffs also question the impartiality of the District Judge and sought retroactive recusal and vacatur of summary judgment. Upon review, the Eleventh Circuit declined to reach the constitutionality of the ordinance at question here, and finding no evidence of malice, the Court affirmed District Court’s decision granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.