Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendants were convicted of multiple charges stemming from their involvement with a company called the Jive Network, which had various Internet websites to distribute prescription drugs. The government alleged that the websites allowed customers to order controlled substances without submitting any medical records or any prescriptions. On appeal, the court addressed issues related to the rule of lenity and vagueness; state of mind under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. 846; the meaning of "proceeds" under 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i); sufficiency of the evidence; continuance of the trial; severance; comments by the district court; jury tampering and alleged juror misconduct; remaining evidentiary rulings; prosecutorial misconduct; the Allen charge; the jury's question; cumulative error; judicial participation in plea discussions; and remaining sentencing issues. The court affirmed the convictions of all five defendants, as well as Akhil Baranwal and Geunnet Chebssi. The court vacated Jude LaCourt's sentence and remanded before a different district judge.

Defendant was convicted of conspiracy and possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court should have suppressed evidence seized at his property because the search was illegal and, in any event, the evidence was insufficient to support his conspiracy conviction. An alternative ground could justify affirming the district court's decision not to suppress the evidence, regardless of whether the search was illegal. Because it was the district court's role to find the facts, the court remanded the case to that court for the limited purpose of allowing it find whether the officer at issue would have sought the oral search warrant for the house and outbuilding if he had not already conducted the protective sweep of that house.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's order dismissing his complaint against Target and Virginia Winn. Plaintiff, a Hispanic male, alleged that Winn, a white Target cashier, refused to serve him based on his race and publicly humiliated him when she turned him away from her register. Plaintiff brought suit against Winn for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED); against Target for vicarious liability and for negligent training, supervision, and retention; and against both defendants for violating his right to make contracts under 42 U.S.C. 1981. The district court dismissed the case, explaining that plaintiff could not maintain a section 1981 claim because he was ultimately able to complete his purchase, and that Winn's alleged actions did not rise to the level of outrageousness required to state an IIED claim under controlling Florida law. After thorough review and having had the benefit of oral argument, the court agreed and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant appealed his sentence of 87-months imprisonment, imposed following his plea of guilty to one count of illegal reentry following deportation. On appeal, defendant claimed that the district court erred by enhancing his sentence based on its finding that his prior conviction for false imprisonment under Florida law qualified as a conviction for a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). The court held that it was error to find defendant's prior conviction under Florida Statutes 787.02 was a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because, like false imprisonment, a conviction for the other charges contained in defendant's information could be secured without the "physical force" necessary to commit a crime of violence. Therefore, the court vacated the sentence.

Defendant was convicted of producing child pornography and of attempting to entice a child to engage in unlawful sexual activity. The district court sentenced defendant to 320 months' imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently. After examining defendant's challenges related to authenticity and best evidence, motions to suppress, constitutional challenges to 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), sufficiency of the evidence, jury instructions, and sentencing, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Willie Keen, a former zoning official for Dixie County, Florida, appealed convictions arising from two different cases consolidated on appeal. In Case No. 09-16027, a jury convicted Keen of fraudulently obtaining low-income housing funds in violation of federal criminal law. In Case Nos. 09-16028, 10-10438, and 10-10439, a jury convicted Keen, together with former Dixie County Commissioners John Driggers and Alton Land, of federal bribery charges that stemmed from an undercover investigation of corruption in Dixie County. On appeal, Keen, Driggers, and Land challenged their convictions. The court confirmed all convictions after careful review of the record and the parties' briefs, and after having had the benefit of oral argument. However, because the court concluded that the district court erred in calculating Keen's sentence, the court remanded to the district court with a mandate to vacate the sentence and re-sentence him.

Petitioner, a Florida prisoner sentenced to death for the murder and sexual battery of the victim, appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contended that, during the sentencing phase of his trial, the lead prosecutor made several improper arguments that persuaded the jury to recommend a death sentence. The Supreme Court of Florida concluded that none of the prosecutor's arguments rose to the level of misconduct that would violate petitioner's constitutional right to due process. Because no decision of the United States Supreme Court clearly established otherwise, the court could not say that the Supreme Court of Florida unreasonably applied federal law. Moreover, even under a de novo review, none of the prosecutor's comments were improper. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner was convicted of capital felony murder that occurred during a robbery of the victim's home. The court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on petitioner's claims regarding (1) his motion for a change of venue; (2) his trial counsel's effectiveness in litigating the motion for a change of venue; (3) the prosecution's statements during the penalty phase; and (4) his trial counsel's effectiveness at the penalty phase of his trial.

This appeal by the union presented the question of whether a jury was entitled to find that the union had violated the National Labor Relations Act 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4)(ii)(B), by conducting a secondary boycott of Fidelity Interiors. On appeal, the union argued that the district court abused its discretion when it permitted the jury to consider, as part of the totality of the circumstances, evidence of lawful conduct by the union, and when it refused to instruct the jury that evidence of unlawful picketing at one site could not support a finding of unlawful picketing at another site. The union also argued that the jury wrongfully awarded damages based on speculative assumptions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of conduct of the union, whether lawful or not, and the jury instructions correctly stated the law. The court also held that the record supported the jury's award of damages. Accordingly, the court affirmed the denial of the motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.

Petitioner, a federal prisoner, appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. The district court granted him a certificate of appealability (COA) as to the following issue: "[W]hether 'actual innocence' applies to a career offender sentence that has been final for nine years after a plea agreement that waived an appeal." Because petitioner's arguments centered on the legal classification of the crime of possession of cannabis, his claim was one of legal, not factual, innocence. Thus, petitioner had not excused the procedural deficiencies facing his motion to vacate and the court affirmed the dismissal of the motion in light of McKay v. United States.