Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In this interlocutory appeal, the government appealed from a district court order granting defendant's motion to suppress a firearm discovered after he and three associates were briefly detained by law enforcement officers at night in a parking lot. The district court granted the motion to suppress the firearm, holding that the detention of defendant was unreasonable and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. The court reversed and remanded because under the peculiar facts of the case and the danger extant, it was reasonable for the officers to make a split-second decision to briefly detain all four individuals as they investigated possible violations of Florida's concealed-weapons laws.

Plaintiff, an Alabama state prisoner sentenced to death, appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleging that Alabama's method of executing inmates by lethal injection violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the separation of powers required by Article III of the Alabama Constitution. The court held that the district court committed reversible error in dismissing plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claim without any opportunity for factual development, including discovery between the parties. The court also held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's Equal Protection claim at this stage of the proceedings and remanded for further factual development. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions.

Defendant appealed his convictions and 37-month total sentence for illegal reentry after a felony and for illegal reentry after conviction of false representation. On appeal, defendant argued that: (1) he should not have received a 16-level enhancement based on his Florida conviction for resisting an officer with violence, because Florida's statute did not constitute a crime of violence; and (2) his 37-month sentence was unreasonable because the district court failed to grant him a variance based on sentencing disparities caused by the Middle District of Florida's lack of a fast-track program. The court held that the district court did not err in imposing the enhancement where a conviction under Florida Statute 843.01 constituted a crime of violence. Because defendant had a prior conviction for a crime of violence and because he did not enter into a written plea agreement - two requirements by the Attorney General for fast-track programs - defendant did not meet the Attorney General's requirements for a fast-track program. Therefore, he would not have been entitled to fast-track relief even if the Middle District of Florida were to have this kind of program. Accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to grant defendant a variance.

Defendants, all state social workers, placed a teenaged minor in an adoptive home and the teenager later sexually assaulted the young grandchild of the adoptive parents. The victim sued the state workers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of his federal substantive due process rights. Defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Because the preexisting law at the pertinent time did not clearly establish that the victim's federal rights would be violated by the state workers' acts, the court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for dismissal of the federal claims against defendants in their individual capacities.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his untimely 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition challenging his Florida second-degree murder conviction. This appeal centered around the "depraved mind" mens rea in Florida Statutes 782.04(2). Petitioner conceded that his section 2254 habeas petition was not timely filed but claimed that an actual innocence exception to the statute's time-bar existed and argued that he made a sufficient showing of actual innocence in order for his petition to proceed. The court concluded that petitioner failed to state a cognizable actual innocence claim under Schlup v. Delo. Even if petitioner's claim of actual innocence were cognizable, his claim still failed because his "new" evidence was largely cumulative of what the jury heard, and he had not made a sufficient showing that it was more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him of second-degree murder. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's time-barred section 2254 petition.

Plaintiffs brought suit individually and on behalf of James Christopher Allen's estate against defendants, including officers Cooks and Harkleroad, for excessive force, denial of medical care, violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., assault, battery, negligence, and wrongful death. Allen died shortly after the officers repeatedly used their Tasers in an attempt to subdue and arrest defendant, who died shortly thereafter while being transported to jail. Cooks and Harkleroad subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal after the district court's judgment. The court held that, given all the factors, the officers' conduct did not arise to the level of "obvious clarity" which would require all reasonable officers to inevitably conclude that the force used was unlawful. Accordingly, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. The court also held that no reasonable jury could find that the officers used their Tasers with the deliberate intent to do wrong. The court agreed, and plaintiffs concurred, with Harkleroad's claim that he could not be held liable under Georgia law for any negligence-based claim resulting from the performance of discretionary acts. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

This was an appeal of a judgment of civil contempt that arose from a child pornography investigation. John Doe was served with a subpoena duces tecum requiring him to appear before a grand jury and produce the unencrypted contents located on the hard drives of Doe's laptop computer and five external hard drives. Doe informed the U.S. Attorney that, when he appeared before the grand jury, he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to comply with the subpoena. The court concluded that, because Doe's act of production would have testimonial aspects to it, an order to compel him to produce the unencrypted contents of the drives would require immunity coextensive with the Fifth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. 6002. Immunity coextensive with the Fifth Amendment required both use and derivative-use immunity. The Government's offer of act-of-production immunity clearly could not provide the requisite protection because it would allow the Government to use evidence derived from the immunized testimony. Thus, because the immunity offered here was not coextensive with the Fifth Amendment, Doe could not be compelled to decrypt the drives. Therefore, the court held that Doe properly invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege and reversed the judgment of the district court.

Defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of attempted alien smuggling and one count of failing to obey an order by federal law enforcement to heave to their vessel. The district court applied an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2L1.1(b)(5)(A) because a firearm was discharged by law enforcement. Defendant appealed his sentence, contending that the district court committed procedural error by incorrectly calculating the advisory Guidelines range. The court concluded that defendant's actions induced law enforcement to discharge their firearms because law enforcement's response was a reasonable foreseeable result of defendant's conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed defendant's 84-month sentence.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendants, alleging that all defendants violated her free exercise rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq. Plaintiff also alleged that CSC violated her rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on all claims. The court held that plaintiff had not provided evidence that Dr. Chosewood, CDC's Director of Health and Safety, and Ms. Zerbe, the CDC project officer responsible for managing the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) contract, requested her removal from the EAP in retaliation of her free exercise rights. Because plaintiff failed to show that her constitutional right was violated, Dr. Chosewood and Ms. Zerbe were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also held that no reasonable juror could conclude that Dr. Chosewood and Ms. Zerbe's decision was based on plaintiff's religious objections to counseling clients in same-sex relationships, rather than the manner in which plaintiff handled a certain client's referral and their understanding that plaintiff would not alter her behavior in connection with future referrals. Because Dr. Chosewood and Ms. Zerbe did not violate plaintiff's statutory right under RFRA, they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court further held that plaintiff could not assert a Bivens action against CSC; because CSC did not burden plaintiff's religious rights by removing her from the EAP contract or by ultimately terminating her employment, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of CSC on her RFRA claim; and the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII claim against CSC. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiff sued the President of Valdosta State University, claiming that under the Due Process Clause, he was due notice of the charges, and a hearing to answer them, prior to his removal from campus. Plaintiff, a student, was removed on the ground that he presented a "clear and present danger" to the campus. Plaintiff joined the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia as a defendant, claiming against the Board a state-law breach of contract claim for damages. Plaintiff claimed that the student handbook and contracts for student housing established binding agreements between the Board and the university students and the Board breached these agreements by failing to afford plaintiff the due process prior to his removal from campus. The court held that the district court properly denied the President's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity where plaintiff had a constitutional right to process before he was removed from the university and plaintiff's constitutional rights were clearly established. The court held, however, that the district court erred in failing to dismiss plaintiff's breach of contract claim against the Board as barred by the Eleventh Amendment where Georgia had not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for breach of contract actions.