Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

This case concerned the fruits of a cooperative, multi-national criminal investigation directed at tracking a sprawling international child pornography ring. 14 members of the ring were charged with offenses related to child pornography and this appeal addressed seven of the defendants. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. After review of the record and having had the benefit of oral argument, the court vacated Ronald White's child exploitation enterprise (CEE) conviction under Count One; vacated the other six defendants' convictions for conspiracy under Count Two; and vacated all of defendants' convictions for statutory obstruction of justice under Count Forty. The court also vacated the restitution award against James Freeman and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other regards.

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment charging him with one count of illegal reentry by an alien who had been previously removed or deported. Defendant argued that the indictment must be dismissed because the Government was collaterally estopped from attempting to establish the essential element of alienage because a jury, in a previous federal criminal trial for illegal reentry, found against the Government on this indispensable element. Based on all of the evidence presented on the issue of defendant's alienage and considering that the evidence of the remaining three non-alienage elements was undisputed, the court concluded that "the jury's verdict of acquittal [in the 2009 trial] was based upon reasonable doubt about a single element of the crime." Accordingly, the court agreed that the Government was collaterally estopped from arguing that defendant was an alien, reversing and remanding with instructions to dismiss the indictment.

Defendant appealed from a final order of criminal forfeiture seized from a safe deposit box. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant lacked standing to challenge the validity of the preliminary order forfeiture (POF). Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over this claim. The court also held that the district court did not err in dismissing defendant's petition as untimely under 21 U.S.C. 853(n) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant relief under Rule 60(b)(1) based on excusable neglect. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part.

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiring to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and for aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. The court held that, because defendant could not have been convicted of an offense for which he was not indicated, the district court's jury charge did not constructively amend or broaden the indictment. The court also held that, although the district court abused its discretion by admitting defendant's 1988 conviction for selling marijuana, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence presented at trial. The court held that defendant's remaining claims lacked merit and affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff sued the Secretary and several elected officials, alleging that the officials' application of a Georgia statute that governed absentee voting, Ga. Code Ann. 21-2-381(a)(1)(D), denied him the right to have a ballot mailed to him at the jail and prevented him from voting while he was incarcerated in the fall of 2008. The court vacated the summary judgment entered by the district court and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiff's alleged injury was not fairly traceable to any actions of the officials where plaintiff would not have received a ballot at the jail regardless of the officials' application of the statute when he provided only his home address on his application for an absentee ballot.

Defendant was convicted of mail fraud and money laundering charges related to two separate fraudulent schemes: the River Shore Scheme and the GenSpec Scheme. On appeal, defendant challenged his convictions and sentences on various grounds. The court concluded that the proof presented at trial in connection with the River Shores mail fraud count materially varied from the allegations contained in the superseding indictment and this variance substantially prejudiced defendant. Therefore, the court reversed his conviction on this count. The court also reversed defendant's money laundering convictions because they were predicated on the River Shores mail fraud count. The court affirmed defendant's mail fraud convictions related to the GenSpec Scheme. Finally, the court held that defendant's other assertions of error lacked merit.

Appellants, members of the U.S. House of Representatives, along with the Florida House of Representatives, appealed from a district court order granting final summary judgment to appellees, the Florida Secretary of State and various intervening parties. At issue was whether a state constitutional provision, Amendment Six, establishing standards for congressional redistricting that was approved by the people by initiative was contrary to the Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court held that Florida voters' act of lawmaking according to the state's expressly enumerated lawmaking process was fully consistent with the commands of the Elections Clause, and consonant with the understanding given to the Elections Clause by the Supreme Court in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant and Smiley v. Holm. The court also held that the factors enumerated in Amendment Six have been for many years commonly considered by legislative bodies in congressional redistricting and long accepted by the courts as being lawful and consistent with the powers delegated to the state legislatures by the U.S. Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellants are the parents of G.J., a child with autism and brain injuries. At issue was whether the ALJ and the district court properly evaluated appellants' claims that the MCSD did not comply with certain provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., with respect to services it was to provide to G.J. The court held that the district court did not err in setting forth reasonable conditions for G.J.'s reevaluation and in determining that appellants were not entitled to either a private or publicly funded independent educational evaluation. The court also held that there was no basis for making a determination that any procedural failures with regard to the August 2008 and 2009 IEP meetings impacted the education received by G.J. to any substantive degree. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs, parents and the personal representative of the deceased's estate, sued defendant, a police officer, for use of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Florida's wrongful death statute. Defendant used lethal force against the deceased after the deceased failed to follow defendant's commands and attempted to flee in a vehicle that struck defendant in the process. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The court held that defendant was entitled to qualified immunity where the use of deadly force was reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case and there was no clearly established law at the time of the incident that would have given defendant fair notice that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner National Labor Relations Board (the Board or NLRB) sought enforcement of its order against Respondent Contemporary Cars, Inc. (Contemporary). In 2008, the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (the Union) filed a petition with the Board seeking certification as the representative of Mercedes-Benz service technicians employed at Contemporary. The Board held a hearing, determined the proposed bargaining unit was appropriate under two different theories, and directed that an election occur. Contemporary requested that the Board review the Regional Director’s decision regarding the bargaining unit. Despite only having two members, the Board summarily denied the request. Members of the bargaining unit voted in for representation by the Union, and the Regional Director certified the Union. To preserve its right to challenge the validity of the bargaining-unit determination in a court of appeals, Contemporary refused to bargain. The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board. Contemporary conceded the violation, and in 2009, the two-member Board issued an order finding Contemporary in violation of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). Contemporary filed a petition for review of the NLRB’s order with the federal district court. The NLRB cross-petitioned seeking enforcement. The circuit court granted Contemporary's motion to hold the case in abeyance pending the Supreme Court's decision in "New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB" (130 S. Ct. 2635 (2010)). In 2010, the NLRB issued an order setting aside its previous two-member decision to "take further action as appropriate." The original two members plus an obligatory third member issued a new order, again affirming the Regional Director's bargaining-unit decision. The NLRB subsequently filed a petition for enforcement of its order with the Eleventh Circuit. Upon review, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Contemporary's due process challenge raised on appeal of the 2010 NLRB order. Furthermore, Contemporary did not meet its burden of demonstrating the Board's determination lacked substantial evidentiary support. Therefore, the Court granted the NLRB's petition.