Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Starship, a purveyor of various novelty items including sexually explicit materials, appealed the judgment of the district court dismissing under Rule 12(b)(6) its federal constitutional claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants and refusing to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state constitutional claims. Starship's claims stemmed from the County's decision to uphold the Business Director's denial of its application for a business license to operate a retail bookstore. The court found no error in the district court's dismissal of Starship's 1983 claims because they were barred by res judicata and the district court's decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Starship's state law claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Starship Enterprises of Atlanta v. Coweta County, GA, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued a police officer for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The officer shot plaintiff seven times while plaintiff was in his car. The officer and the city police department subsequently appealed the district court's denial of the officer's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The court concluded that the officer was not entitled to qualified immunity where no reasonable police officer would have used deadly force against plaintiff and where clearly established law gave the officer fair notice that his actions violated the Fourth Amendment. Further, state agent immunity did not apply to the assault and battery claim. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Morton v. Kirkwood" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a grand jury investigation and the issuance of subpoenas duces tecum to a target and his wife, which required the production of records concerning their foreign financial accounts. The government conducted an investigation of, among other things, the Target and his wife's failure to disclose tax returns on foreign accounts and failure to file certain government forms for these alleged accounts. The Target and his wife refused to comply with the subpoenas by producing their records, asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court joined its sister circuits and concluded that the subpoenaed records fell within the Required Records Exception and affirmed the district court's grant of the government's motion to compel. View "In re: Grand Jury Proceedings, No. 4-10" on Justia Law

Four police officers appealed the district court's denial of their motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 unlawful search claim. Plaintiff alleged that the officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they conducted a warrantless entry into her home and searched it. The court concluded that the officers lacked even arguable probable cause or exigent circumstances justifying their entry into plaintiff's apartment without a warrant or her consent. Therefore, the court agreed with the district court's ultimate conclusion that the officers were not entitled to summary judgment, though not for the same reasons articulated by the district court. View "Feliciano v. Acosta, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the USCIS's denial of her Form I-360 self-petition for adjustment to permanent resident status. USCIS denied the petition on the grounds that it was contrary to the Cuban Refugee Adjustment Act of 1966 (CAA), 8 U.S.C. 1255. Petitioner claimed that USCIS's decision violated the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection under the law. Because petitioner's husband did not satisfy the fifth requirement under the plain reading of section 1 of the CAA, the alien must be admissible to the United States for permanent residence, petitioner could not self-petition under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994's, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902, amendments to the CAA. Further, the USCIS's distinction between non-Cuban aliens on the basis of a Cuban spouse's adjustment status did not violate the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Toro v. Sec. for the Dept. of Homeland Security, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed that his former employer discriminated against him on account of his age when it terminated his employment, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The employer argued that the reason for plaintiff's discharge was due to a reduction in force (RIF), not his age, 71-years-old. After thorough review of the record with benefit of oral argument, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, concluding that no reasonable fact finder could find that the employer's decision was "but-for" his age and plaintiff had not established that the project manager acted as a mere cat's paw for the assistant project manager's discriminatory animus. View "Sims, Jr. v. MVM, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged Florida's "Patient Self-Referral Act of 1992" (the Florida Act), Fla. Stat. 456.053, which prohibited Florida physicians from referring their patients for services to business entities in which the referring physicians have a financial interest. The court concluded that the conflict preemption doctrine did not apply, and the exemptions in federal law allowing physicians serving end-stage renal disease patients to engage in self-referral did not preempt Florida's more restrict law prohibiting such conduct. The court also concluded that the Florida Act did not discriminate against interstate commerce, nor did it impose a burden on interstate commerce that was clearly excessive when compared with the law's putative local benefits. Therefore, the Florida Act did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Further, plaintiffs' substantive due process claim failed to survive rational basis scrutiny, and an equal protection claim would fail as well. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Fresenius Medical Care Holding, et al v.Tucker, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal involved a county ordinance for permitting stevedores at the Port of Miami in Miami-Dade County. FTS filed suit against the County, which owns and operates the Port. FTS alleged that the County's Port Director did not follow the ordinance's requirements at all but instead protected incumbent stevedores and kept out new entrants and competition, like FTS, by rubber-stamping and automatically renewing permits for all existing stevedore permit holders at the Port and automatically denying permits to all new applicants in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The court held that the ordinance as applied violated the dormant Commerce Clause and the market-participant exception was not applicable. The court also held that the evidence provided a sufficient legal basis for the jury's damages award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Florida Transportation Service v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against her former employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., after she was terminated. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer because plaintiff did not present sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the termination - that plaintiff violated (or appeared to violate) the company's conduct policies - was pretextual. In this case, the corporate executive who terminated plaintiff later said that she was an exceptional employee who had done nothing wrong, had done everything right, and should not have been fired. The court held that such evidence, when combined with a prima facie case, created a jury question as to discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Kragor v. Takeda Pharmaceuticals America" on Justia Law

The Board challenged the district court's determination affirming the validity of a Department of Education regulation that required state and local agencies to reimburse parents and guardians for an independent educational evaluation (IEE) of their children with disabilities. The court held that the Secretary of Education did not exceed its authority in promulgating 34 C.F.R. 300.502, providing parents the right to a publicly financed IEE and therefore, the district court did not err in requiring the Board to reimburse plaintiffs for the IEE that they obtained for their child. View "Phillip C., et al v. Jefferson County Board of Education" on Justia Law