Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Mead was fired from her job as administrator of 15 assisted living facilities operated by IA and licensed by the Maine Department of Health and Human Services. She sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983,alleging that her termination without a hearing infringed her procedural due process rights. She also asserted state law claims.The district court dismissed the due process claims, explaining that IA was a nonstate actor and thus could not be held accountable under section 1983, and that the complaint failed to allege a constitutional violation by the DHHS employees. The First Circuit affirmed.

An FBI agent went online, undercover, to search for child pornography, using LimeWire, a commercially available peer-to-peer filesharing program. He used a special version developed by the FBI, known as EP2P, to assist child pornography investigations. Modifications permit agents to download a file from a single source, learn the general location of the source, and facilitate the identification of child pornography as such. The agent downloaded files and confirmed that they contained graphic depictions of young girls, served a subpoena on the ISP, traced the IP address to a residence owned by the defendant's father, executed a search warrant, and spoke to defendant, who took responsibility for seized computers and admitted to using LimeWire. He denied that he had ever searched for, or downloaded, child pornography. Forensic analysis revealed over 5,000 images and videos of child pornography on the desktop and nearly 2,000 on the laptop. Convicted of two counts of possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B), and one count of distribution, 2252(a)(2), defendant was sentenced to 97 months plus a life term of supervised release and payment of $10,000 to each of two victims who requested restitution. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of multiplicity and upholding evidentiary rulings.

The Belfast Project collected taped interviews of the recollections of members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Provisional Sinn Fein, the Ulster Volunteer Force, and other paramilitary and political organizations involved in the "Troubles" in Northern Ireland from 1969 forward. The Project had various confidentiality measures in place, but in 2011, the United States submitted an application to the district court ex parte and under seal pursuant to the US-UK Mutual Assistance Treaty and 18 U.S.C. 3512, seeking appointment of an Assistant U.S. Attorney to collect evidence and to take other action to effectuate a request from law enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom, concerning the 1972 murder and kidnapping of Jean McConville. The district court granted the government's application. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that there was no First Amendment basis for challenging the subpoenas. The fact that communications were made under a promise of confidentiality does not create a privilege.

An ATF agent obtained a warrant and searched Widi's apartment, which contained a marijuana growing system, ammunition, and firearms. He was convicted of possessing a firearm or ammunition as a prohibited felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and manufacturing marijuana, 21 U.S.C.841(a)(1) and sentenced to 108 months' imprisonment. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that Widi was not competent to stand trial. The court also rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, denial of a motion to suppress statements made after Miranda warnings, denial of severance, and jury instructions.

After the government disclosed new information regarding its confidential informant, Rigaud moved to suppress evidence recovered in 2006 during the execution of a search warrant and sought an evidentiary hearing to establish that there were material omissions from an affidavit submitted in support of the request for a search warrant that undermined the probable cause finding. The district court denied the motion. Rigaud then pleaded guilty to drug trafficking charges, reserving his right to appeal denial of his motion to suppress. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly found that disclosure that the informant was not searched or was searched inadequately would not have resulted in a negative finding on probable cause; there was ample corroboration to overcome her untrustworthiness.

The Southeastern Massachusetts Gang Task Force obtained warrants to arrest Roderiques, age 16, for drug trafficking and to search for cell phones and paperwork relating to cellular phone ownership at a house that Roderiques shared with Grupee and others. The officers discovered guns, drugs, and drug paraphernalia, as well as two cell phones, in Roderiques’s room. In Grupee’s room, they found a storage bin with Grupee’s personal papers, three pistols, and ammunition. A drug detection dog alerted toward a car parked in the driveway. The officers paused while they obtained warrants to search the house for firearms, drugs, and related materials and to search for the same in the car. In the rear seat they found a black gym bag with a bus ticket in Grupee’s name inside, a bag of cocaine, and a magazine of 9 millimeter ammunition. The second search of Grupee’s room uncovered more drugs and records of drug sales. Grupee entered a conditional plea to possession of firearms and ammunition as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). The First Circuit affirmed denial of a motion to suppress.

After defendant had sexually-explicit online communications with a detective, posing as a 14-year-old, the detective researched defendant’s criminal history, which included convictions for public lewdness and disorderly conduct, obtained a warrant, and searched defendant’s home. Finding child pornography on a computer, police obtained a second warrant and discovered 3,366 images of child pornography, 95 emails sent from the computer with child pornography attachments, and 54 emails received with child pornography attachments. A district judge denied defendant's motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his home computer. Defendant pled guilty to unlawful transportation of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(1) and was sentenced to 10 years in prison. The First Circuit affirmed denial of the motion, rejecting arguments that: the warrant allowed a search that was overbroad given the narrow scope of probable cause; the computer search unlawfully exceeded the broad scope of the warrant; and the plain-view and good-faith exceptions did not apply.

Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. 7, denies federal economic and other benefits to same-sex couples lawfully married in Massachusetts and to surviving spouses from those couples, by defining "marriage" as "only a legal union between one man and one woman." "Spouse" refers "only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." DOMA absolves states from recognizing same-sex marriages solemnized in other states; prevents same-sex married couples from filing joint federal tax returns, affecting tax burdens; prevents a surviving same-sex spouse from collecting Social Security survivor benefits; leaves federal employees unable to share health insurance and other benefits with same-sex spouses. DOMA may result in loss of federal funding of programs such as Medicaid and veterans cemeteries if states recognize same-sex marriages in determining income or allowing burials. The district court declared Section 3 unconstitutional. The First Circuit affirmed, but stayed injunctive relief, anticipating certiorari review. The court applied "a closer than usual review" based on discrepant impact among married couples and on the importance of state interests in regulating marriage and tested the rationales for DOMA, considering Supreme Court precedent limiting which rationales can be counted and the force of certain rationales.

The trooper saw a minivan with what appeared to be a glinting blue light, like those mounted behind the windshields of police cars. Because Maine law prohibits such lights on civilian vehicles, the trooper gave chase with his siren going. The driver continued on for 39 seconds, making unusual motions. The trooper saw a television screen attached to the windshield by a large blue suction cup and a blue placard on the rearview mirror. The driver was talking on a cell phone, and, asked about his furtive motions, said he had dropped the phone, picked it up, and called his wife; he claimed to have left his license and registration at home. He gave a false name, which did not match computerized records, and eventually admitted that he did not have a valid license. Arrested, he refused to be fingerprinted. The officer was applying for a search warrant when the driver admitted that he was wanted for kidnapping. A pistol, ammunition, and marijuana were found in the van. He entered a conditional plea of guilty to being a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and was sentenced to 36 months The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to denial of a motion to suppress and to the sentence.

FBI agents executed a search warrant at an apartment; the search was one of six that day involving an alleged domestic terrorism plot by "Los Macheteros," an organization dedicated Puerto Rican independence that has been involved in numerous prior violent acts. When reporters entered the apartment complex during the search, there was a confrontation, and agents used pepper spray and struck or pushed plaintiffs, who brought Fourth Amendment excessive force claims. After the First Circuit vacated summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, the district court again granted summary judgment for defendants. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court's discovery limitations were consistent with resolving qualified immunity questions at the earliest possible stage and it acted within its discretion to consider depositions and video clips. The court concluded that it was not clearly established that a "non-arrest" could be considered a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, so that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. Even if viewed as a seizure, the court found the force employed by defendants was reasonable in at the time of the events.