Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1982, Jimenez was convicted of the parolable offense of second degree murder for killing a police officer and simultaneously acquitted of murder in the first degree, conviction of which would have carried no possibility of parole. The Massachusetts Parole Board denied his parole applications in 1999, 2004, and 2009. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of due process and equal protection and infringements of guarantees under the Commonwealth's constitution. The defendants are the six members of the Board, named in their official capacities, each of whom voted to deny parole. The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim for constitutional violations, finding specific relief barred by the section 1983 prohibition of injunctions against judicial officers. The First Circuit affirmed. There is nothing shocking or arbitrary about the parole board’s discretion. A state may rationally take the position that a law enforcement officer’s constant exposure to violence calls for a more powerful deterrent to homicidal behavior than the general laws of homicide provide.

Puerto Rico has classified Coors as a large brewer under its beer tax schedule, taxed at a higher rate than small brewers, including local brewer Cervecería India. In 2006, Coors brought suit challenging this differential treatment under the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court originally dismissed the case on comity grounds, but the First Circuit reversed. While remand was pending in 2010, the Supreme Court decided Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., which expressly abrogated the First Circuit’s 2009 decision. The district court then dismissed on grounds of comity. The First Circuit affirmed. Puerto Rico’s Secretary of the Treasury did not consent to litigate in federal court and Puerto Rico courts provide an adequate state forum for adjudication of federal constitutional claims.

Defendant, convicted of first degree murder in Massachusetts, exhausted state appeals. No physical evidence linked him to the crime, but circumstantial evidence included his threats to kill the victim, testimony that the victim was last seen getting into a car with defendant, and defendant’s statements indicating guilt. The district court rejected his habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which was based on an argument that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court applied a beyond a reasonable doubt standard contrary to that articulated by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), in evaluating his claim that there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to support his conviction or incorrectly applied the correct standard. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.

Plaintiffs had a longstanding feud with neighbors, based on plaintiffs' "botanical menagerie" that served as a sanctuary for wild parrots. A marker tree spanned the boundary between the plaintiffs' and the neighbors' properties. Claiming that the tree threatened power lines, the neighbors obtained a permit to remove the tree from the Natural Resources Department. The Electric Power Authority temporarily shut off power to the lines and municipal employees removed all of the branches, so that the tree eventually died. Plaintiffs claim that the operation caused extensive damage to other plantings. Plaintiffs sued the municipality, the individual employees, and the neighbors under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming failure to provide pre-deprivation notice or opportunity to be heard, taking without just compensation, and intense pain and suffering. After a maze of cross-claims and counterclaims were filed, so that the electric authority became a party, the district court dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that, even if destruction of the vegetation was improper, plaintiffs did not state any constitutional cause of action.

After pleading guilty to stealing firearms and possessing stolen firearms, defendant received a sentence of 54 months' imprisonment, based, in part, on a finding that he qualified as a "prohibited person" who, because of his history of substance abuse, was barred from possessing firearms. The First Circuit affirmed. The court first held that defendant had waived an argument that an interview with the Pretrial Services Office during which defendant disclosed information about his drug use, involved a promise of confidentiality, and that inclusion of the information in the sentencing report violated his due process rights and FRCP 32. The court rejected a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, based on his attorney allowing him to disclose the information.

Petitioner, an Orthodox Jew, is serving a life sentence for murder without the possibility of parole, sought a transfer back to the prison in which he was previously held. Before the transfer, he regularly participated in Jewish religious activities, followed dietary restrictions, and met individually with a visiting rabbi. After the transfer to a prison in a less-populated area, the prison chaplain made efforts, largely fruitless, to provide Jewish services. Only one other practicing Jewish inmate was housed at the facility. The district court denied a preliminary injunction under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The First Circuit affirmed. Petitioner's disadvantages depend importantly on proximate actions and decisions not attributable to the government and are too attenuated from the transfer decision to be considered government imposed burdens under RLUIPA. He was not transferred for the purpose of restricting his religious opportunities or in retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.

Plaintiff began working for the police department in 1986. Although he was a member of NPP, one of Puerto Rico's two major political parties, he received promotions while NPP's main rival, PDP, dominated the executive branch. In 2008, he was promoted to the rank of Commander. His career path became rocky when his party, NPP, won the 2008 general election. New leadership eliminated unspecified duties, retrieved his official cellphone and departmental car, evicted him from his office, and reassigned him to mundane tasks that he viewed as beneath the dignity of his rank. He was not discharged nor stripped of rank, and he did not allege that his compensation was diminished. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, finding no plausible claim of political discrimination. Plaintiff did not allege deprivation of a constitutionally protected interest.

After a jury convicted defendant as a felon in possession of a firearm, the trial judge learned that a pocket-sized New Testament Bible was found in the jury deliberation room. The judge notified defense counsel, who immediately moved for a new trial, arguing violation of the Sixth Amendment rights to a trial before an impartial jury and to confront witnesses. The judge rejected a request to recall each juror for individual voir dire. The judge denied a second motion for a new trial, arguing that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing and rebuttal arguments. The First Circuit affirmed, first rejecting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant waived his Confrontation Clause argument. The district court’s decision to question only the foreman about whether the Bible influenced deliberations was within its discretion. Even if the prosecutor’s statements about defendant’s failure to explain himself were improper, they were not prejudicial in light of their brevity, the amount of evidence of guilt, and a curative instruction.

Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant appealed his conviction and sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The First Circuit affirmed, upholding denial of a motion to suppress evidence seized incident to a Terry stop, including a firearm. Defendant's actions provided reasonable suspicion for the stop and the officers acted reasonably throughout.A prior conviction for assault and battery with a dangerous weapon qualified as a predicate offense under ACCA.

Defendant was 16 years old at the time of the 1986 shooting deaths of two men, but after a hearing in juvenile court, he was transferred for adult criminal proceedings. His first conviction was vacated in 1992. He was convicted again in 1994, and sentenced to life imprisonment. The state supreme court affirmed the juvenile court's transfer decision, his conviction, and his life sentence. In 1999, he filed a motion for a new trial, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court rejected the motion and the supreme court affirmed. In 200 he filed a federal petition for habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition. The First Circuit affirmed, stating that it is barred from reviewing the state court decision because it rests on an independent and adequate state ground.