Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1981 defendant, a habitual sex offender, was sentenced to a term of perpetual imprisonment for rehabilitation, to last a minimum of 12 years. He was not released from prison until 2008. The district court dismissed his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. The defendants, high-level government officials, enjoyed immunity. Defendant's general claims of failure to supervise did not state a claim; there was no evidence that specific defendants were even aware of his continuing incarceration.

After attempting to stop defendant for driving with illegal tinted windows, police gave chase and stopped his truck. Inspecting the interior of the abandoned truck, police found two wrapped blocks of what was later found to be cocaine. The chemist who tested the blocks was not available for trial, due to mental illness, and the officers had not observed the testing. Testimony was supplied by another chemist. Defendant was convicted of possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine (21 U.S.C. 841). The First Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial, citing the Confrontation Clause. There were several questions about the reliability of the testing that the witness was unable to answer; the error was not harmless.

In 2002 defendant was convicted under the Massachusetts aggravated rape statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 265, 22(a). He exhausted state appeals. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the statute was void for vagueness as applied to the case, for failure to define "resulting in serious bodily injury." It was reasonable for the state court to conclude that the phrase was not a technical term and could be understood by non-lawyers.

A few hours after a domestic disturbance, Austin was spotted trying to get into his former girlfriend's apartment and given disorderly conduct and criminal trespass warnings. He was later spotted, visibly agitated, in a park, in violation of an ordinance closing the park over night. A civil citation issued. In response to a call from a payphone, indicating that a woman had been killed at the girlfriend's address, different officers went to the area and stopped defendant who matched Austin's general description and was walking on the street. A pat-frisk revealed a gun. It later came to light that the call was a hoax and that defendant was not involved with Austin. Defendant was convicted as a felon in possession, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the arrest was based on probable cause, following a valid "Terry" stop that was brief and appropriate to the circumstances.

Puerto Rico requires all motor vehicle owners to pay for compulsory, state-issued auto insurance when they purchase or renew their vehicle registrations, even if they have obtained equivalent private insurance, with limited exceptions P.R. Laws tit. 26, 8051. Privately-insured vehicle owners who pay twice for coverage are entitled to reimbursements of state payments. A lot of the money is not returned during the two-year period for refunds; no statute or regulation provides notice of how to obtain reimbursement and only some insurers provide their insureds with notice of how to obtain reimbursements. After the two-year period, the money is transferred into trust for five years before being transferred to the commonwealth treasury. Individuals entitled to reimbursement receive no notice. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting challenges to the law. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding that the law violates the notice requirements of the Due Process Clause and directing entry of a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to that effect. The court rejected substantive due process and takings claims and left claims under Puerto Rico trust law to the Puerto Rico courts.

Defendant, a film company, released a documentary, "The Price of Sugar," in 2007 that depicts treatment of Haitian laborers at sugar plantations in the Dominican Republic. The film mentions plaintiffs, senior executives of family plantations, by name. In a suit for defamation, the court entered summary judgment for defendant and denied a motion to compel production of discovery materials. The First Circuit affirmed in part. The plaintiffs are limited public figures in the entire United States, who used their access to the press to launch a PR blitz, thereby risking public scrutiny. Their conduct was beyond a reasonable reply to negative publicity. The court remanded for consideration of actual malice, based on communications between defendant and a fact-checker, hired at the suggestion of defense counsel.

DEA agents and local police went to a residence with a warrant to arrest a drug dealer, but no warrant to search. When the owner opened the door, they entered and spent 15-20 minutes questioning the owner's wife and looking for the drug dealer, who was not in the house. Agents seized a vehicle that had been used in a drug deal. The district court rejected Fourth Amendment claims, citing qualified immunity, and claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 1346(b), 2671-2680. The First Circuit affirmed. The agents' actions were not manifestly unreasonable.

After a gang fight, officers followed and stopped defendant by blocking his path. They did not recognize defendant or have reason to believe he was involved in gang activity. Based on his hand motions, as if he were protecting his abdomen, an officer placed a hand on defendant's waist. A struggle ensued, officers subdued defendant, and found a gun in his waistband. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition despite having a prior felony conviction (18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)) and possession of a firearm with an obliterated serial number (18 U.S.C. 922(k)). The First Circuit reversed, holding that the gun should have been suppressed. The initial detention of defendant constituted a seizure rather than a consensual encounter; the officers lacked an objectively reasonable, particularized basis for suspecting him of criminal activity. Regardless of the validity of the "pat frisk," the evidence was tainted.

Defendants, jointly tried and convicted of drug-related crimes, unsuccessfully petitioned for habeas corpus (18 U.S.C. 2255). The First Circuit affirmed with respect to one defendant and vacated with respect to the other. A partial courtroom closure during jury selection based on crowding likely violated the Sixth Amendment because there was not a substantial justification, but one defendant procedurally defaulted the claim and did not show cause to excuse the default. Defendant's counsel's failure to object to the closure did not amount to ineffective assistance. The other defendant is entitled to a new habeas hearing because the lower court did not address an allegation that his attorney was not aware of the closure nor present to object; defendant is entitled to appointed counsel in connection with a hearing on the issue. The fact that the clerk, not the judge, effectuated the courtroom closure, was not an impermissible delegation. The judge was responsible for the decision.

In 2010 defendant, then serving a sentence in Rhode Island state prison for parole and probation violations, was charged with a 2000 armed robbery and murder of a gas station manager (18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A); 924(j)(1) and 1951(a)). The governor refused to transfer defendant to federal custody because doing so would expose a Rhode Island citizen, to a potential death sentence on federal charges, in contravention of the state's longstanding rejection of capital punishment. Defendant agreed to plead guilty to state charges. Unable to obtain custody under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 18 U.S.C. App. 2, the federal prosecutor filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum. The district court granted the motion. The First Circuit issued a writ of prohibition, reasoning that the writ of habeas corpus should be treated as a request for custody under the IAD and that the governor has a right to refuse such transfer. To grant the federal government custody would be to allow it to circumvent the IAD.