Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

The buyer of a personal computer found child pornography on the hard drive and contacted authorities. The seller, a non-commissioned Naval officer, was ordered to return to his home, where police were questioning his pregnant wife. His house was searched and he was questioned at the house and at the station. He entered a guilty plea under 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(b) and 2258(8)(A), reserving the right to appeal denial of a motion to suppress. The First Circuit remanded. Given the influence of military authority, defendant was in custody when he was questioned at home without having received a Miranda warning. The situation at the house would have left any member of the armed services reasonably feeling that he lacked free choice to extricate himself, and sufficiently compelled to answer to authority. Authorities deliberately planned to subject defendant to unwarned questioning, so a warning issued after leaving the house may have been inadequate to cure the situation with respect to statements made at the station.

Defendant pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens into the U.S. (8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), (v)(I) and was sentenced to 12 months and one day of imprisonment, followed by three years supervised release. Shortly after defendant's release, her probation officer filed a motion requesting a written reprimand and warning because defendant had tested positive twice for cocaine use. The court never acted on the motion, but defendant entered a treatment program. After she left the treatment program, the probation officer filed another motion, which remained pending until defendant was arrested about four years later. The district court revoked her supervised release and sentenced her to time served and 26 months of additional supervised release. The First Circuit affirmed. The district court had relation-back jurisdiction under the Delayed Revocation Statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(i), even though the warrant on which defendant was arrested was not based on an oath or affirmation.

Officers executed a search warrant at defendant's residence and found a loaded firearm, defendant's identification, five bags of heroin, a bag of cocaine, $500 in cash, a razor blade, and empty baggies. In custody, he waived his Miranda rights and told the police that the gun belonged to him. Convicted as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), defendant was sentenced as an armed career criminal, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), to 226 months in prison. The First Circuit affirmed the conviction, but vacated the sentence. Because two of defendant's prior convictions were for serious drug offenses and drug-dealing is notoriously linked to violence, the court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of the felon-in-possession law. The prosecution's reference to defendant as a drug dealer was not improper, despite the fact that he was not charged with drug crimes. In sentencing, the court relied on two Massachusetts assault and battery convictions as predicate offenses without evidence that the felonies involved violence.

After discovery of previously-undisclosed evidence, plaintiff's murder conviction was vacated and he was released after more than 30 years in prison. His suit for damages, against the city and detectives, was dismissed. The First Circuit affirmed in part. Holding that the detectives were entitled to qualified immunity on one count, the court noted that in 1972 it was not clearly established that Brady's no-fault disclosure obligation applied to police officers as opposed to prosecutors. They were not entitled to immunity on a claim of deliberate deception in concealing evidence and allowing false testimony. Plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to state a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for municipal liability.

Until 2005, when the Puerto Rico Board of Medical Examiners promulgated a first-in-the-nation regulation that limited the practice of cosmetic medicine to particular classes of medical specialists, all licensed physicians in Puerto Rico could perform cosmetic surgery. The Board enforced the regulation against a physician who did not possess the required specialty board certification. The district court disposed of challenges on the ground that the defendants enjoyed various kinds of immunity and did not reach constitutional issues. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the suspension of plaintiff's license amounted to a substantive due process violation and was retaliation for past testimony. The Board afforded due process protections in its hearing process.

Recording companies sought statutory damages and injunctive relief under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 101, claiming willful infringement of copyrights of music recordings by using file-sharing software to download and distribute recordings without authorization. The jury found that the infringement was willful and awarded statutory damages of $22,500 for each infringed recording, an award within the statutory range of $750 to $150,000 per infringement. The judge reduced the damages by a factor of ten, reasoning that the award was excessive in violation of defendant's due process rights. The First Circuit affirmed the finding of liability, but reinstated the original damage award. The district court erred in considering the constitutional issue without first addressing defendant's motion for remittitur. The court noted a number of issues concerning application of the Copyright Act that "Congress may wish to examine."

The district court declined to enter judgment on on the pleadings, in favor of defendants, in a case under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The complaint alleged that defendants failed to provide medical services to an inmate, who had threatened suicide and engaged in self-destructive behavior, while in custody following a single-car accident.The inmate committed suicide 14 hours after release. The First Circuit reversed. The allegations went beyond the requirements of due process; there was no claim of state-created or augmented risk, and 14 hours at liberty is not reasonably compatible with any claim that normal sources of support were effectively blocked.

Petitioner, convicted of a 1984 Massachusetts murder, exhausted state appeals. After hearing new evidence that, according to a witness, another man had made self-incriminating about the murder, the district court denied habeas relief. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner did not establish prejudice.

Plaintiff was arrested for using his cell phone camera to film police officers arresting a man on the Boston Common. Charges included violation of the Massachusetts wiretap statute and two other state-law offenses, were subsequently dismissed. Plaintiff's suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violation of the First and Fourth Amendments, the district court denied the officers qualified immunity. The First Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff was exercising clearly-established First Amendment rights in filming the officers in a public place and his clearly-established Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest without probable cause.

In April 1999, a Massachusetts jury convicted petitioner of rape, kidnapping, assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, and carjacking. After unsuccessful attempts at post-trial relief in state court, he filed an unsuccessful petition for habeas corpus. The district court also denied a motion by which petitioner sought to subject evidence to DNA testing. The First Circuit affirmed. The court properly denied the discovery motion, given petitioner's speculative theories and baseless allegations. The court also rejected an argument that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254, pursuant to which the district court evaluated the petition, unconstitutionally restricts review to existing Supreme Court precedent.