Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 2000 the planning board approved a development and the developer began purchasing land. In 2002, the Department of Justice issued an opinion that the land could be sold without legislative action, although it was gained from the sea. Construction began; the developer invested $200 million. Because of protests, the legislature investigated and concluded that the developer lacked valid title. A 2007 Department of Justice opinion stated that the land belonged to the public domain. The governor suspended permits and froze construction. Pending a hearing, the developer filed a quiet title action. The Regulations and Permits Administration upheld suspension of construction. The Puerto Rico appeals court ordered the administration to hold an evidentiary hearing (which did not occur), but did not lift the stay on construction. The developer succeeded in its quiet title action; in 2008 construction resumed. The supreme court held that the developer's due process rights had been violated. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed. Although the plaintiff did state a procedural due process claim, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. The defendants were not on clear notice they they were required to hold a meaningful pre-deprivation hearing.

The inmate, convicted in 1978 of murder, gained a reputation as a "jail house lawyer" while serving his life sentence and acquired a number of "separations," a term used to indicate a conflict counseling against assignment of one inmate to the same institution as another inmate or staff member. Because of the separations, Pennsylvania began billeting him in other states' institutions pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact. In 2001 he was transferred to Maryland. A letter, written in connection with the transfer, noted that the inmate is not a discipline problem, but is a "nuisance" as a jailhouse lawyer. The district court rejected a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no evidence of a causal connection between the inmate's protected First Amendment activities and the transfer. The timing of the transfer and the use of the term "nuisance" did not establish retaliatory motive.

The defendant had sexually explicit online conversations with an officer posing as a 12-year old girl. Agents obtained a warrant to search his residence for evidence of violation of 18 U.S.C. 1470 (transfer of obscene material to a minor) and 18 U.S.C. 2422(b) (coercion or enticement of a minor), seized a computer system and cds, and found child pornography. Defendant was charged with transferring obscene material to a minor under age 16 (18 U.S.C. 1470) and possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B)). The district court granted a motion to supress, holding that the agents lacked probable cause to search for child pornography. The First Circuit reversed, based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. The agents had probable cause to search the digital media and, in searching for evidence of interaction with minors, had to thoroughly search the electronic files.

Police obtained warrants, believing that the suspect had beaten a victim with a nightstick, went to the apartment before dawn, broke down the door, and promptly removed the suspect. The suspect's 15-year-old sister claims she was pushed down, injured her knee, and was handcuffed. The parents claim to have had guns held to their heads; the mother was wearing only underpants. The suspect's girlfriend claims that officers threatened to take her baby. They were detained for 40-60 minutes. In a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, the court denied officers' motions for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The First Circuit reversed with respect to claims based on detention of the plaintiffs. Officers had an interest in protecting their own safety and in an unimpeded search; plaintiffs were cuffed only for the duration of the search. There was no clear constitutional violation. The court affirmed with respect to other claims. The sister's injuries were sufficient to support a Fourth Amendment claim; no reasonable officer would think it clearly necessary to point an assault weapon at a handcuffed 15-year-old girl with no history of violence. Similarly, it was not clearly reasonably necessary to point a gun at the head of a woman, not a suspect, and nearly naked. The court also declined claims of state-law official immunity.

After gang-member shooting victims were taken to the hospital, police officers watching the emergency room entrance, observed the defendant and another known gang member leaving. They followed and pulled over the speeding car. Believing the occupants to be acting "nervous" and to have a gun, the officers conducted a thorough search of the car and found a gun and crack cocaine hidden in an access panel. A second search, by an expert familiar with "hides," revealed ammunition. Defendant entered a conditional plea of guilty as a felon in possession (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The district court denied a motion to suppress and sentenced defendant to 188 months incarceration. The First Circuit affirmed. The officers had reasonable suspicion, the five-minute duration of the search before the gun was found was reasonable, and the scope of the search, including the easily accessible hidden compartment, was reasonable.

Pursuant to a permit issued by the Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council (CRMC), the developer built 26 of 79 planned homes and installed infrastructure between 1992 and 2007. The Rhode Island Historic Preservation and Heritage Commission (HPHC) became interested in the site and recommended withdrawal of the permit or requiring a complete archaeological data recovery project. In 2009, after informal negotiations, the developer notified the HPHC that it would resume construction absent some response from the agencies. The developer resumed construction and a stop-work order issued. CRMC hearings are ongoing. The district court dismissed the developer's takings claims as unripe, rejecting an argument that the state litigation requirement was excused; that argument was foreclosed by a binding First Circuit holding that Rhode Island's procedures were available and adequate. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the developer did not prove that state remedies were unavailable or inadequate.

The defendants, arrested in a reverse sting operation after they drove to a sham drug deal in a vehicle containing $100,000 in cash, were each convicted of a single drug conspiracy count. The First Circuit vacated and remanded. The court first acknowledged that, taking into account only unchallenged evidence, the record was sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was more than an innocent bystander to the transaction. However, tainted evidence was central to the prosecution's case and potentially disastrous to the defense. The court erred in allowing "overview" testimony by the lead officer, announcing the defendants' roles in the conspiracy, although the officer was not a witness to many of the events; the witness was no better suited than the jury to put the pieces together. The testimony also implicitly "vouched" for later testimony. The officer's testimony about the post-arrest interview statements of a third defendant, who offered to cooperate, violated the Confrontation Clause, even though the cooperating defendant was not directly quoted.

After a tip led them to a website containing the male defendant's phone number and pornographic pictures of the female defendant's eight-year-old daughter, the police obtained a warrant and searched the woman's home. They seized electronics containing pornographic images; the woman admitted to abuse of the girl. The district court denied a motion to suppress. The male defendant was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment; the mother was sentenced to 27 years. Each was ordered to pay $67,600 in restitution. The First Circuit vacated and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the motion. The defendants had an expectation of privacy on their password-protected website, which was searched without a warrant. It is not clear whether they shared the password with others and risked loss of privacy; whether the police search exceeded the tipster's private search; whether the tipster was assisted by authorities; whether the police expected to find something significant beyond pornography described by the tipster; whether the police had a reasonable belief that harm was imminent; or whether the evidence would have inevitably been discovered independently. The district court acted within its discretion in denying a "Franks" hearing, based on its finding that the tipster's affidavit established a link between the pornography and the female defendant's home.