Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed the district court's dismissal of their suit for failure to state a claim and denying their motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs, parents and/or legal guardians of seven children with disabilities, sought equitable relief preventing defendants from enforcing a prohibition on the use of aversive interventions. The court concluded that the State's prohibition of one possible method of reducing the consequences of a child's behavioral disability did not undermine the child's right to a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) or prevent administrators from enacting an individualized plan for the child's education. The court also concluded that New York's law represented a considered judgment by the State of New York regarding the education and safety of its children that was consistent with federal education policy and the United States Constitution.

Hecht sued UCB, a debt collector alleging violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by placing telephone calls without meaningful disclosure of the caller’s identity, 15 U.S.C. 1692d(6), and by failing to disclose in its initial communication that the debt collector was attempting to collect a debt and that any information obtained would be used for that purpose. The district court dismissed, finding that the suit was precluded under the doctrine of res judicata because Hecht alleged facts and violations already litigated, settled, and disposed of by a final judgment. The Second Circuit reversed. The prior judgment does not bar Hecht’s claims because she had a due process right to notice of that suit and the manner of providing notice, publication of the notice in a single issue of USA Today, was inadequate.

Fabrikant was arrested and arraigned on five counts of criminal animal cruelty, pursuant to New York Agriculture and Markets Law 353. All but two of her dogs were taken. The seized dogs were spayed or neutered and sent to live in foster homes pending conclusion of the criminal case. Fabrikant was ultimately acquitted but apparently never asked that her seized dogs be returned after the trial. She filed a pro se civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the New York SPCA, several of its employees, and some of the prospective adopters who originally alerted the SPCA about the dogs’ conditions. The complaint included federal claims for malicious prosecution and for violations of her rights to due process, the presumption of innocence, counsel, and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures and state-law claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Accordingly, although they acted under color of state law, the SPCA defendants were protected by qualified immunity and could not be held liable for the spaying, neutering, or fostering out of Fabrikant’s dogs. Officers had probable cause to search Fabrikant’s house and arrest her.

Grayton was found guilty of Murder in the Second Degree, N.Y. Penal Law 125.25(1), based on a 2001 shooting death, and was sentenced to 25 years to life imprisonment. He exhausted his state appeals and timely petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his exclusion from a Geraci hearing violated his constitutional right to presence at all material stages of the trial. Geraci hearings are held in New York state courts to determine whether a defendant has procured a witness’s unavailability by misconduct and has thus forfeited his Confrontation Clause rights in regards to that witness. The district court assumed, without deciding, that Grayton had a federal constitutional right to be present at the hearing, then determined that he had waived that right. The Second Circuit affirmed, first holding that there is a right to be present at a Geraci hearing. Grayton had at least minimal knowledge of the proceeding; if he objected to his exclusion, it was incumbent upon him to have made that known. It is not unreasonable to call failure to do so waiver.

A New York state court judge found Gibson, charged with criminal mischief, not competent to stand trial and filed a temporary order of observation, transferring Gibson to custody of the mental health commissioner for a period not to exceed 90 days, for treatment to restore capacity to stand trial. New York law distinguishes between temporary orders and final orders, which are intended to prepare the subject for release into the community. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law 730.40(1). While detained, he filed a federal complaint alleging civil rights violations and requesting to proceed in forma pauperis. While federal law generally permits a court to waive fees for those who cannot afford them, the 1995 Prison Litigation Reform Act generally prohibits a “prisoner” who has filed three or more frivolous actions in federal court from filing another lawsuit without paying required fees, 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The Act defines “prisoner” as “any person . . . detained in any facility who is accused of . . . violations of criminal law.” The district court concluded that Gibson was was a “prisoner” under the PLRA, and that, based on previous frivolous filings, he was barred from filing another complaint without first paying fees. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Irwin appealed the district court’s denial of his petition to vacate his convictions for assault in the first degree and witness intimidation in the third degree. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that he had caused serious physical injury, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the above witness intimidation count.

Plaintiffs, New York inmates with complicated histories of incarceration, claimed that their release dates were incorrectly calculated. Their due process claims (42 U.S.C. 1983) were dismissed on grounds that prison system officers and employees were entitled to qualified immunity. The Second Circuit affirmed. The state defendants could not necessarily “fairly be said to ‘know’” that due process required that the inmate be afforded certain credits and cited precedent, by its terms, does not instruct prison administrators as to the calculation of release dates when multiple sentences are at issue.One sentencing judge’s instructions may conflict with that of another.

Harrington is serving a statutorily mandated 15-year prison sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e), on his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court rejected his challenge to the sentence. The Second Circuit affirmed. Harrington’s vagueness challenge to the ACCA was barred because it was not presented to the district court. First degree unlawful restraint under Conn. Gen. Stat. 53a-95, is a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause, that together with two prior first-degree robbery convictions compelled imposition of the statutorily mandated minimum 15-year prison term.

Plaintiffs filed a class action on behalf of themselves and other New York State prisoners convicted of violent felonies, alleging that they were denied parole as a result of an “unwritten policy” to deny parole to violent felons, and that this unofficial policy violates the Due Process, Equal Protection Clause, and Ex Post Facto Clauses. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. To state a claim for violation of due process rights, plaintiffs would have to allege that they were denied parole based on an “inappropriate consideration of a protected classification or an irrational distinction.” They did not do so. Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices, and prisoners either in the aggregate or specified by offense are not a suspect class. The rational basis for a distinction in parole determinations is preventing early release of potentially violent inmates who may pose a greater danger to others. The Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to guidelines that do not create mandatory rules for release but are promulgated simply to guide the parole board in the exercise of its discretion.

McGarry claimed that while he was a pretrial detainee at the Vermont Chittenden Regional Correction Facility, facing charges related to a domestic dispute, prison officials compelled him to work in the prison laundry under threat of physical restraint and legal process. His pro se complaint alleged violation of his Thirteenth Amendment right to be free from involuntary servitude. The district court dismissed, reasoning that McGarry did not allege that his work in the laundry was “like the slavery that gave rise to the enactment of [the Thirteenth] Amendment.” The Second Circuit reversed. The complaint plausibly stated a claim; defendants did not establish entitlement to qualified immunity. Correctional institutions may require inmates to perform personal housekeeping chores such as cleaning the areas in or around their cells without violating the Thirteenth Amendment, but it is “clearly established” that requiring hard labor of pretrial detainees (persons not “duly convicted”) violates the Thirteenth Amendment. A pretrial detainee’s compelled work in a laundry for up to 14 hours a day for three days a week doing other inmates’ laundry cannot reasonably be construed as personally related housekeeping chores and officers of reasonable competence could not disagree.