Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Two protesters at the 2004 Republican National Convention at Madison Square Garden were arrested after they failed to comply with police instructions to move from an area where demonstrating was prohibited to one designated for protesting. They sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the policy violated the First Amendment and that their arrest violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Second Circuit affirmed. The restriction on speech was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction, and plaintiffs’ arrest was supported by probable cause.

In 1997, Malik Jones, an African-American male, was shot and killed by a member of the East Haven Police Department. Plaintiff Jones, mother of Malik Jones, filed suit against the town and officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the town’s custom, policy, or usage of deliberate indifference to the rights of black people caused the killing of her son in violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. At trial, the jury found in favor of the police officers, but found the town liable and awarded damages. The Second Circuit affirmed, finding that plaintiff’s evidence was legally insufficient to demonstrate a custom, policy, or usage of deliberate indifference which caused Jones’s death.

Wrobel was a longtime employee of Erie County's highway division. In 1999, a newly elected Republican county executive appointed defendants as Wrobel’s supervisors. Over the next 18 months Wrobel’s run-ins with them resulted in harassment of him and his transfer to a faraway workplace. His direct supervisor, Naylon, repeatedly referred to employees that predated his tenure as being part of the “old regime,” and to the office under his supervision as the “new regime.” Following his transfer, Wrobel made anonymous complaints to public officials and a confidential report to the FBI, for which he claims he was further persecuted. Wrobel’s complaint alleged retaliation in violation of his First Amendment rights. He alleged that he suffered discrimination because he was apolitical, and not politically aligned with the “new regime.” The district court dismissed hi 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Wrobel’s mistreatment was caused by any political activity or inactivity.

Defendant pleaded guilty to a two-count information that charged him with producing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), (b)(2), and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of imprisonment for 240 months and 120 months and 40 years of supervised release with numerous conditions. The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that his plea was defective because the district court did not advise him of the possibility of civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person at the end of his prison term under the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, 18 U.S.C. 4248(a) (2006).The court was not required by due process or Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to advise of the possibility of civil commitment.

A jury convicted defendant of conspiracy, (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)), and being a felon in possession of a firearm, (18 U.S.C. 922(g)). The district court upheld the firearm conviction, but vacated the RICO conviction and dismissed the conspiracy count from his indictment. The court stated that the attempt to prosecute conspiracy to violate the Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act, 18 U.S.C. 2341, failed for unconstitutional vagueness in New York Tax Law, 471, which delineated the parameters of a CCTA violation. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that a prior decision to certify questions regarding Section 471 to the state’s highest court did not indicate that that statute was unconstitutionally vague. The court rejected a claim that the CCTA was inapplicable to defendant given New York’s “forbearance policy,” under which the state refrained from collecting taxes on cigarette sales transacted on Native American reservations. The forbearance policy did not signal a choice not to enforce tax laws when enforcement would be possible, but represented a concession to the difficulty of state enforcement, complex jurisdictional issues surrounding reservation-based cigarette sales, and the politically combustible nature of bootlegging prosecutions. Congress enacted the CCTA to provide federal support to states struggling with those circumstances.

Zaleski was convicted of possessing machine guns, 18 U.S.C. 922(o), 924(a)(2); possessing a firearm with an obliterated serial number, 18 U.S.C. 922(k), 924(a)(1)(B); and possessing firearms, silencers, and destructive devices not registered to him, 26 U.S.C. 5841, 5861(d), and 5871. The district court imposed a 101-month sentence and ordered forfeiture of machine guns and pistols, a shotgun, homemade silencers, hand grenades, and improvised explosive devices, all unlawfully in his possession. Weapons Zaleski lawfully possessed remained in government custody while the government sought an order (All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651(a)), authorizing it to destroy them. Zaleski estimates the value of non-forfeited weapons at $100,000, including guns, 65,000 rounds of ammunition, body armor, grenades, a grenade launcher, explosive chemicals, and materials for pipe bombs. As a convicted felon, Zaleski was prohibited under 18 U.S.C. 922(g) from possessing the items; he sought to have the weapons transferred to a dealer for sale. The court determined that the government did not need the requested order, that the proposed sale arrangement would violate 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and that appraisal would be useless because the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars claims for damages. The Second Circuit vacated in part; 922(g) does not categorically prohibit the proposed sale arrangement.

In 1986, minority inmates commenced a class action, alleging racial discrimination in housing, job assignment, and discipline. The trial judge found a “pattern of racism” and, in 1993, issued a decision requiring that the percentage of minority inmates in “preferred” jobs, including jobs in the print shop, correspond to the percentage of minority inmates in the general prison population. In 1999, plaintiffs, inmates formerly employed in the print shop, filed complaints alleging racial discrimination by civilian supervisors and prison administrators. After four years of discovery, plaintiffs sought to file an amended class action complaint. In addition to claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, the complaint claimed violations of the earlier order, and the state Human Rights Law and constitution. Plaintiffs contended that the pattern-or-practice method of proof used in Title VII class actions could be employed against individual defendants. The court denied class certification and leave to amend and analyzed plaintiffs’ individual complaints under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework generally employed in assessing individual disparate treatment claims under Title VI and granted defendants summary judgment on individual claims. The Second Circuit affirmed; the pattern-or-practice framework is ill-suited to establish liability of individual defendants named in the proposed amended complaint.

Plaintiffs are non-immigrant aliens, authorized by the federal government to reside and work as pharmacists in the U.S. All reside in New York and are licensed pharmacists there pursuant to a statutory waiver to New York Education Law 6805(1)(6)’s requirement that only U.S. citizens or Legal Permanent Residents are eligible to obtain a pharmacist’s license in New York. The waiver provision was set to expire in 2009. The district court permanently enjoined the state from enforcing the law. The Second Circuit affirmed. A state statute that discriminates against aliens who have been lawfully admitted to reside and work in the United States should be viewed in the same light under the Equal Protection Clause as one which discriminates against aliens who enjoy the right to reside here permanently. Applying strict scrutiny and finding, as the state conceded, that there are no compelling reasons for the statute’s discrimination based on alienage, the court found the statute unconstitutional.

Rivas, serving an indeterminate life sentence in New York for the second-degree murder of his former girlfriend, sought habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court dismissed the petition as barred by the statute's one-year limitations period. On remand, the district court again dismissed, after hearing evidence of actual innocence. The Second Circuit reversed, finding that Rivas raised a credible and compelling claim of actual innocence, based on new information not presented to the jury that dramatically undermines the central forensic evidence linking him to the crime of which he was convicted. There was essentially unchallenged testimony from a respected forensic pathologist, that the victim was almost certainly killed at a time when he had an uncontested alibi, and not earlier. That evidence warrants an equitable exception to AEDPA’s limitation period, allowing the petitioner to have his otherwise time-barred claims heard by a federal court.

Freeman was convicted in New York of second-degree assault, second-degree vehicular assault, common law driving while intoxicated, and leaving the scene of an accident. He filed a petition for habeas corpus, arguing that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in identifying as harmless the erroneous admission of evidence obtained from a blood draw compelled pursuant to a warrant found invalid under state law. The Second Circuit affirmed denial. The challenged harmlessness determination regarding an error of state law was itself a decision of state law that cannot form the basis for federal habeas relief.