Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of receiving and possessing child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), 2252A(a)(5)(B), 2256(8)(A), and 2256(8)(C). The Second Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was violated because he was compelled as a parolee to make self-incriminating statements during a mandatory polygraph examination and a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

Hearing that Warren had called him an insulting name, Darnell notified his friends to leave the area, entered the store, followed by his brother, Darryl. Darryl grabbed Warren and said “I told you to stay out of this store.” Darryl’s gun fired. Darnell drew his gun and pointed it at another. Darryl fired four more shots into Warren. After Darryl pleaded guilty to second-degree intentional murder, Darnell was convicted of second-degree depraved-indifference murder and sentenced to 17-1/2 years to life in prison, the same sentence received by his brother. The appellate court affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to convict Darnell as an accomplice to depraved-indifference murder. Before the conviction became final, the New York supreme court reversed a depraved-indifference murder conviction based on accomplice liability where the attack on the victim was “quintessentially intentional.” State courts rejected a motion to vacate Darnell’s conviction. He filed a habeas corpus petition, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Second Circuit affirmed, noting that this was the fourth case to advance the “somewhat perverse argument” that petitioner should be released from custody because the evidence suggests he is more culpable than he was found to be.

Plaintiff, a state inmate proceeding pro se, was knocked unconscious and injured when a prison transport bus, in which he was riding with his wrists and ankles shackled, took a sharp turn. He claimed defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by transporting him on a bus without a seatbelt. The district court dismissed. The Second Circuit affirmed. Failure of prison officials to provide seatbelts to prison inmates does not, standing alone, violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments.

Defendant appealed his conviction based on two counts of bank robbery and sentence of life imprisonment. The court held that the three strikes statutory scheme under 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(1) was constitutional and did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers. Further, defendant's argument that prior convictions subjecting a defendant to life imprisonment under section 3559 must be found by a jury in a bifurcated jury trial was without merit. The court considered all of defendant's remaining arguments on appeal and found them to be without merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his conviction or correct his sentence on the principal grounds that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel and appellate counsel, and (2) from the denial of his motion for reconsideration. The court vacated so much of the July 2009 Order as summarily rejected petitioner's biased-investigator ineffective assistance of counsel claim and remanded to the district court for further proceedings on this claim, including such proceedings as could be necessary for the court to determine whether to appoint counsel to represent petitioner in connection with this claim. The court declined to address petitioner's remaining issues.

The government appealed from the district court's decision vacating defendant's conviction of one count of attempted enticement of a minor and grant of his motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. The government argued that the district court erred because the deviation between the text of the indictment and the jury charge neither affected the "core criminality" proven at trial nor modified an "essential element" of the crime, nor did it leave defendant open to be charged again for the same offense. The court agreed with the government's contentions and therefore reversed the district court's decision and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants were convicted on charges arising from an elaborate, years-long financial fraud. Defendant Gowing continued to take actions in furtherance of the conspiracy to defraud even after he was arrested and released awaiting trial for that same charge. On appeal, Gowing principally argued that the district court's application of 18 U.S.C. 3147 was error because he did not commit a separate or additional offense while on release, but only continued to commit the conspiracy. Because the statute did not make such a distinction, and because Gowing's other sentencing arguments were without merit, the court affirmed the convictions and sentences.

Defendant was convicted of transporting into his state of residence a firearm acquired in another state in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3). Defendant appealed on the ground that section 922(a)(3) violated his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The court held that, in light of the ample alternative means of acquiring firearms for self-defense purposes, section 922(a)(3) did not impose a substantial burden on the exercise of defendant's Second Amendment rights. Since section 922(a)(3) did not burden defendant's Second Amendment rights in a away so substantial as to justify heightened scrutiny, his facial challenge to the statute also must fail. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs, black and Hispanic registered voters in Albany County, sued the County and the Board of Elections (collectively, defendants) for enacting a redistricting plan for the Albany County Legislature (Local Law C) in response to the 2010 United States census that allegedly diluted black and Hispanic voting strength in violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, by failing to provide for five majority-minority districts (MMDs). The court concluded that plaintiffs' appeal was not moot, even though the challenged elections have not taken place. While the court identified legal error in the district court's determination that plaintiffs failed to make the majority-minority showing required to satisfy the first step of a vote dilution claim as identified in Thornburg v. Gingles, the court identified no error in the district court's determination that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success as the third majority bloc-voting step of the Gingles inquiry, or in the court's denial of preliminary injunctive relief on that ground.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appealed an order of the district court dismissing her 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for failure of timely service and a subsequent order denying her Rule 60(b) "motion to open." The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing plaintiff's action or in denying Rule 60(b) relief, despite her attempt to effect service with the aid of the U.S. Marshals Service. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.