Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the adoption by the district court of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to revoke his supervised release for violating a mandatory condition of supervision that he "shall not commit another federal, state, or local crime." Defendant principally disputed the district court's determination that, under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1, good cause existed to allow the government to introduce hearsay evidence during his Violation of Supervised Release (VOSR) hearing. The court held that defendant was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; the evidence presented at the VOSR hearing was sufficient to support the district court's finding that defendant committed felony assault under New York law; and the district court did not err in denying defendant's request to reopen the VOSR hearing.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court granted a certificate of appealability as to whether petitioner's representation was per se ineffective under the Sixth Amendment when, although he had a licensed attorney of record, a disbarred attorney acted as his de facto counsel. The court concluded that if the performance of the licensed attorney passed muster under Strickland v. Washington, the defendant's decision to rely upon other sources did not violate the Sixth Amendment. If the licensed attorney's performance did not pass muster under Strickland, the defendant's rights were protected. Accordingly, the per se ineffectiveness rule did not apply in this case and the court affirmed the judgment.

This appeal arose out of the suppression of defendant's station house confession to unlawful dealings in firearms. That confession followed an incriminating statement made in response to brief questioning at the apartment where defendant was arrested earlier that day. The confession followed Miranda warnings; the earlier incriminating statement did not. The district court suppressed the station house confession as the product of a deliberate, two-stage interrogation strategy barred by Missouri v. Seibert. Relying on the court's decision in United States v. Capers, the district court reasoned that the admissibility of defendant's station house confession turned on whether the decision to forego Miranda warnings at the apartment was "legally justifiable." Finding that it was not, the district court suppressed the station house confession. The court concluded that the district court's determination rested on a misapplication of Capers. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court sentencing him principally to a term of imprisonment of 228 months for committing drug offenses. At issue was whether the district court correctly determined, for the purpose of applying U.S.S.G. 2D1.1., the most closely analogous substance listed in the Drug Quantity Table of that Guideline to the controlled substance seized from defendant at the time of his arrest. Because the district court did not have the benefit of the court's opinions in United States v. Chowdhury and United States v. Figueroa, which were issued while this appeal was pending and which governed this case, the court remanded for resentencing.

Defendants appealed from separate judgments of conviction related to their activities in a narcotics trafficking ring. Defendants raised numerous issues on appeal. Having conducted an independent review of the record, the court found no error in the district court's thorough and considered analysis of defendants' various claims. To the extent defendants have raised claims that were not initially brought before the district court, the court held that they did not reveal error, much less plain error. These complex proceedings were conducted with care and fairness and therefore, the court affirmed the judgments.

Plaintiffs appealed from a grant of summary judgment dismissing their challenge to the legislative prayer practice at Town Board meetings in the Town of Greece, New York. Since 1999, the town has begun its Town Board meetings with a short prayer. The court held that the district court erred in rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the town's prayer practice affiliated the town with a single creed, Christianity, in violation of the Establishment Clause. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a follower of Islam, was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Otisville, New York (FCI Otisville). Plaintiff's religious beliefs required participation in congregational prayer five times a day but under the FCI Otisville policy, the prison chapel was available only once a day and no other space within the facility was made available to plaintiff and others in his faith. Plaintiff subsequently appealed from the district court's dismissal of his claims that defendants violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1, based on a finding that plaintiff had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies concerning his congregational prayer policy claim. Because the court found that plaintiff did indeed exhaust his administrative remedies, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

This appeal arose from defendant's conviction, after a guilty plea, on child pornography charges. Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court erred when it imposed a mandatory life sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3559(e) in the apparent absence of judicial record evidence regarding the age of the victim of his prior state offense. Accordingly, the court remanded solely for resentencing.

Defendant pleaded guilty to wire fraud and subsequently appealed her sentence of principally 78 months' imprisonment. Defendant argued that her sentence was procedurally defective and substantively unreasonable. Defendant argued that the district court procedurally erred by: (1) inadequately considering the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; and (2) neglecting to address several of her objections to the Presentence Investigation Report, allegedly in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(a)(3)(B). The court held that because defendant did not raise either procedural objection before the district court, the court's review was restricted to plain error. The court further concluded that neither alleged procedural defect amounted to plain error. Because the court also concluded that the sentence chosen by the district court was substantively reasonably, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs appeal from an order of the district court dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs argued that New York's Kosher Law Protection Act of 2004 (Kosher Act), N.Y. Agric. & Mkts. Law 201-a-201-d, violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment and was unconstitutionally vague. The court held that the Kosher Act did not violate the Establishment Clause because it neither advanced or impeded religion, had a secular purpose, and did not create an excessive entanglement between state and religion. The court further held that the Kosher Act did not violate the Free Exercise Clause because it was neutral, generally applicable, minimally burdensome, and had a rational basis. Finally, even under the strictest scrutiny, the inspection provision was not void for vagueness. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.