Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the district court's denial of his motion to compel post-conviction DNA testing of six items pursuant to the Innocence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. 3600 et seq. Defendant contended that the testing of these items would provide evidence exonerating him from his conviction for the murder of three persons in furtherance of a continuing enterprise. On appeal, defendant faulted the government for failing to take reasonable measures to preserve the items he sought to test and for lack of due diligence in searching for the items. The court held that defendant failed to show that "[t]he proposed DNA testing of specific evidence may produce new material evidence that would...raise a reasonable probability that [he] did not commit the offense." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant was convicted of conspiring to distribute heroin, aggravated theft, and making false statements on a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency. Defendant appealed his convictions for aggravated identity theft and false statements, the district court's pretrial denials of his motions to suppress statements made during a safety-valve proffer and for severance of Count One from Counts Four and Six of the indictment, and his 110 month sentence. The court held that (1) defendant's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence; (2) the court's pretrial decisions on defendant's motions were not erroneous; and (3) defendant's sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. Concluding that defendant's claims on appeal have no merit, the court affirmed both his convictions and sentence.

Plaintiffs appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment, dismissing their complaint, which alleged that an elementary school student's First Amendment rights were violated when he was suspended for six days after expressing a wish for violence to the school and teachers. The litigation arose out of a crayon drawing by B.C., a ten-year-old fifth-grader, in response to an in-class assignment. The drawing depicted an astronaut and expressed a desire to "[b]low up the school with the teachers in it." The court concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable that the astronaut drawing could create a substantial disruption at the school and defendants' resulting decision to suspend B.C. was constitutional. The court also held that there was no merit to plaintiffs' argument that B.C.'s punishment was excessive in light of the court's deference to school authorities. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and (b)(2). On appeal, defendant contended that the district court miscalculated his applicable sentencing range under the Guidelines range by including a two-point criminal history enhancement for his commission of his offense while on a term of supervised release. The court held that a term of supervised release did not terminate upon a defendant-alien's deportation for purposes of calculating a defendant's applicable sentencing range under U.S.S.G. 4A1.1(d). The court further held that the district court did not erroneously take into account unproven relevant conduct in fashioning its sentence, nor was the district court's sentence substantively unreasonable in light of defendant's personal circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiff, an African-American and former Syracuse police officer, was suspended with pay pending investigation of an incident involving a fifteen-year-old girl whom he took to a hotel knowing she was a runaway. He was eventually suspended without pay and terminated. Plaintiff claimed that defendants, the City and certain police officers, discriminated against him by treating him more severely than white officers who committed acts of an equal or more serious nature. Because plaintiff's subsequent guilty plea to the charge of Endangering the Welfare of a Child resulted in his automatic termination under New York Public Officers Law 30(1)(e), he could not prove an "adverse employee action" for any of the measures taken by his employer after his guilty plea. Further, as a matter of law, plaintiff's suspension without pay pending the investigation did not, in these circumstances, amount to an adverse employment action, and plaintiff had no constitutionally recognized cause of action for deprivation of "professional courtesy" that police sometimes extended to their fellow officers.

Plaintiff, a prison inmate, appealed from the judgment of the district court dismissing his complaint against defendants after granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's individual claims for damages arising from defendants' refusal to give plaintiff antiviral treatment for his Hepatitis C. Because the district court did not adequately explain why it granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for damages, the court vacated the judgment and remanded to the district court to address more fully defendants' motion. Because the district court misinterpreted the parties' settlement agreement with respect to the recovery of reasonable costs, the court vacated that part of the its order denying plaintiff's application for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses and remanded the issue to the district court to determine in its discretion whether to grant plaintiff's application for such costs.

National Grid challenged the constitutional and statutory authority of the District, a New York public benefit corporation, to assess it for benefits that its property along the Hudson River received from a dam and reservoir that the District operated. National Grid argued that the District's assessment and apportionment scheme was federally preempted by the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 803(f), 821, and that even if the assessment authority existed, all assessments made prior to 2010 violated National Grid's protection rights under the U.S. Constitution and constituted impermissible takings under the U.S. and New York State constitutions. Because the FPA did not preempt the District's authority under New York state law to assess National Grid as it did here, the court affirmed the district court's judgment as to federal preemption. The court further found that National Grid had abandoned its appeal of the district court's dismissal of the DEC from this action, and in any event, that the district court's dismissal of the DEC was proper. However, because the court concluded that abstention was not warranted as to National Grid's remaining constitutional claims, the court remanded those claims to the district court for resolution, expressing no view on their merits.

This appeal concerned a First Amendment challenge to a New York rule requiring attorneys to identify themselves as certified specialists to make a prescribed disclosure statement. At issue was whether Rule 7.4 of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct, N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22 section 1200.53(c)(1), which required a prescribed disclaimer statement to be made by attorneys who stated that they were certified as a specialist in a particular area of law either violated plaintiff's freedom of speech or was unconstitutionally vague. Because enforcement of two components of the required disclaimer statement would violate the First Amendment and because the absence of standards guiding administrators of Rule 7.4 rendered it unconstitutionally vague as applied to plaintiff, the court reversed with directions to enter judgment for plaintiff.

Plaintiffs appealed a decision and order of the district court granting the motions to dismiss filed by defendants, LCB and AmEx. Plaintiffs, all Israeli residents, were allegedly injured or their family members killed or injured, by rockets fired by Hizballah, a Lebanese terrorist organization, into northern Israel in July and August 2006. Plaintiffs asserted that Israeli law governed their negligence claim while AmEx maintained that New York law governed. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' negligence claim against AmEx, evaluating the claim under New York state law. Because the court concluded that New York law would apply even if a conflict between the laws of the relevant jurisdiction existed because New York had the greatest interest in the litigation, and that plaintiffs did not have a viable claim against AmEx under New York law, the judgment of the district court insofar as it was in favor of AmEx was affirmed.

Defendant appealed from a judgment entered in the district court on a plea of possession of a firearm by a felon. After defendant's arrest, defendant inculpated himself when he was questioned by police before he received Miranda warnings and again later, after he was warned. Defendant contended that the subsequent confession must be suppressed because it was obtained through a two-part interrogation technique outlawed as a violation of the Fifth Amendment in Missouri v. Seibert. The court concluded that the subsequent confession was given voluntarily and without coercion, and was not elicited by the proscribed two-step technique. The court also concluded that the confession did not offend the Sixth Amendment because defendant's right to counsel had not yet attached, particularly with regard to the federal offense for which he was prosecuted. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.