Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of two counts of rape in the first degree. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel on account of his trial counsel's failure to object, under New York law, to venue in Ontario County, New York, for one of the alleged rapes, which appeared to have occurred in Monroe County, New York. The court held that trial counsel's failure to object to venue resulted in defendant receiving ineffective assistance of counsel and that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court denying habeas relief and remanded.

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of the district court denying her petition to vacate an arbitration decision that rejected her claims, which asserted principally that defendant, her former employer, discriminated against her on the basis of gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal plaintiff principally contended that the arbitrators' decision should be vacated in light of the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 (Fair Pay Act), Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. The court reviewed the district court's conclusions of law de novo and found plaintiff's contentions to be without merit. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Appellant Spies petitioned for a rehearing on the court's decision in United States v. Nadirashvili where the court vacated appellant Solomonyan's sentence because the district court used the incorrect standard, preponderance of the evidence, in applying two offense level enhancements under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for the involvement of: (i) 200 or more firearms, under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(1)(E); and (ii) a destructive device, under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(b)(3)(A). The court found that the district court used the incorrect standard in applying the enhancements of appellants Spies and Kharabadze. Therefore, the court vacated their sentences and remanded for resentencing.

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the district court following his plea of guilty to a violation of the conditions of his supervised release. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court exceeded its authority by imposing a post-revocation term of supervised release that extended beyond the end-date of the originally imposed term of supervision. Therefore, defendant argued that his sentence was impermissible under Johnson v. United States. The court joined a number of other circuits in rejecting the approach urged by defendant where the court failed to see how the decision could be read to impose the limitation which defendant sought. In the alternative, defendant argued that the term of supervised release was a substantively unreasonable sentence. The court held that because this was not an exceptional case where the trial court's decision could not be located within the range of permissible decisions, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a 59-month term of supervised release. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Defendants, moved the district court to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Mathew Trainor, a Fulton County Assistant District Attorney, was absolutely immune from plaintiff's claims. The court affirmed the district court to the extent it found Trainor absolutely immune from plaintiff's claim that Trainor violated her constitutional rights by making false statements in support of a material witness order. The court vacated and remanded the rest of the order and judgment because absolute immunity did not immunize prosecutors from liability for making defamatory statements to the press, accessing a person's voicemail without consent, or persuading a party to a conversation to record its contents; and, the district court should consider in the first instance whether Trainor was absolutely immune for continuing to withhold/preserve evidence - plaintiff's cell phone.

Defendant, former Majority Leader of the New York State Senate, appealed his conviction for honest services mail fraud, arising from defendant's failure to disclose conflicts of interest related to his receipt of substantial payments from individuals seeking to do business with the State. While defendant's appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Skilling, and held that 18 U.S.C. 346, the honest services statute, criminalized only fraudulent schemes effectuated through bribes or kickbacks and did not criminalize mere failures to disclose conflicts of interest. At issue was whether defendant could be retried under the standard announced in Skilling on certain counts. Although the court held that Skilling required the court to vacate the convictions on Counts Four and Eight, because the court's review of the record convinced it that the government adduced sufficient evidence under the Skilling standard, double jeopardy did not bar retrial on those two counts. The court also held that double jeopardy did not bar retrial on Count Three because, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence, the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude a retrial on a charge that resulted in a hung jury. Accordingly, the court vacated the counts of conviction and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff, a New York state prisoner who practiced Rastafarianism, sued New York Department of Corrections officials, among others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging inter alia that these two defendants infringed his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by touching his dreadlocks without his consent. Following trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff but awarded him only $1.00 in actual damages. Plaintiff appealed from the part of an amended judgment awarding him $1.50 in attorney's fees and ordering defendants to pay $1.40 of the fee award. Plaintiff contended that the district court erred in concluding that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(d)(2), capped the maximum possible fee award in this case at 150 percent of the $1.00 monetary judgment. The court agreed with the district court and held that Section 1997e(d)(2) limited the possible award of attorney's fees in this case to 150 percent of the monetary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the amended judgment.

Plaintiff, an inmate in Great Meadow Correctional Facility, originally filed suit pro se against three Great Meadow employees, alleging pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, that he was improperly denied access to medically-prescribed therapeutic diets, resulting in violations of his Eighth Amendment right to due process. After plaintiff's in forma pauperis status was revoked, plaintiff paid the filing fee so that he could proceed with his case. Subsequently, the district court, relying on a Report & Recommendation prepared by a magistrate, granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff, now represented by counsel, appealed the revocation of his in forma pauperis status, as well as the decision of the district court to grant summary judgment to one of the defendants. The court held that, based on the court's recent opinion in Mills v. Fischer, that any action against a prosecutor for initiating a prosecution or for presenting the prosecution's case that was dismissed sua sponte on the ground of absolute prosecutorial immunity was deemed "frivolous" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court held that the remainder of plaintiff's arguments on appeal were without merit. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Appellants sued New York City and the State, along with a number of city and state officials, challenging a tax scheme that exempted New York City residents from a tax levied on parking services rendered in Manhattan. Appellees subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that comity barred the federal courts from hearing appellants' challenge to the state law. The district court granted the motion and the court affirmed, holding that because New York state courts have the ability to implement a remedy that the federal courts could not, Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc. counseled in favor of dismissing the complaint pursuant to comity.

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on her claims of sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq, and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law 290-301. The district court granted summary judgment after determining that plaintiff had offered "sham evidence" in opposition to defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court held that the district court did not err in concluding that, in light of plaintiff's inconsistent and contradictory testimony, there was no genuine issue of fact to be decided by a jury. Accordingly, the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants.