Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the SPCA and others, seeking damages as a result of a search of her property and her arrest based on allegations of equine abuse. The district court applied claim splitting principles to dismiss plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action because she filed a suit for tort damages based on the same facts in state court. Applying the Supreme Court's Colorado River abstention standard, the court concluded, however, that the district court's decision to dismiss the federal claim because of a similar pending state court litigation was erroneous. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's declaratory judgment claim because Brillhart/Wilton abstention could not apply when plaintiff sought damages in addition to declaratory relief. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Kanciper v. Suffolk County SPCA" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Midland, a debt collector, for damages after Midland called him between 22 and 28 times over the course of 2011 when none of the calls were intended for plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiff contended that neither of two putative offers of judgment extended by Midland could have rendered his action moot because neither offer complied with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. The court held that an offer need not comply with Rule 68 in order to render a case moot under Article III. Consequently, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiff's refusal to settle the case in return for Midland's offer, notwithstanding plaintiff's acknowledgement that he could win no more, was sufficient ground to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Doyle v. Midland Credit Management, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendant, the officer who arrested her, alleging false arrest and malicious prosecution. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's denial of his motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that the record established uncontroverted facts that, taken together, provided probable cause for the arrest and prosecution of plaintiff. Therefore, defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions for the district court to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment. View "Stansbury v. Wertman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., alleging that two federal law enforcement officers caused the tortious intentional infliction of emotional distress when they maliciously and falsely testified before a federal grand jury about his involvement in a drug conspiracy. Although the court disagreed with the district court about the need to evaluate the possible ambiguity of section 2674, the court affirmed the district court's conclusion that, in FTCA suits, the United States could assert common law defenses available to private individuals under relevant state law. The court also concluded that, were Connecticut courts to consider the matter, they would find statements made under oath by federal grand jury witnesses to be privileged. View "Vidro v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for threatening to assault or murder three Seventh Circuit judges with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with them in the performance of their duties or to retaliate against them on account of their performance of official duties. On a blog post, defendant declared that the judges deserved to die for their recent decision in a Second Amendment case. The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence was sufficient, that the jury was properly instructed regarding a "true threat," and that defendant was not prejudiced by any error. The court found defendant's remaining arguments to be without merit. View "United States v. Turner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., alleging that defendants' denial of his leave request from prison for the treatment of his post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) violated his constitutional rights. The district court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment and defendants appealed. The court concluded that, even assuming, arguendo, that on plaintiff's version of the facts, a reasonable jury could find a violation of his Fourteenth or Eighth Amendment rights, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because no reasonable jury could conclude, on the record here, that it would have been objectively unreasonable for a public official in the position of these defendants to believe that he or she was acting in a manner consistent with plaintiff's rights to equal protection and to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Spavone v. N. Y. State Dep't of Corr. Servs." on Justia Law

Defendant sought a hearing under United States v. Monsanto to recover restrained monies to fund his counsel of choice in a civil action. The court held that a defendant seeking a Monsanto or Monsanto-like hearing must demonstrate, beyond the bare recitation of the claim, that he or she had insufficient alternative assets to fund counsel of choice. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion because the district court gave defendant ample opportunity to demonstrate that he had insufficient unrestrained assets to fund his defense with counsel of choice in his parallel criminal case - which he failed to do. View "United States v. Bonventre" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's denial of his motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) and dismissal of his civil rights complaint. At issue was the interpretation of the three strikes provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). The court concluded that neither the dismissal of plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition seeking to vacate his conviction in the Jones v. Herbert case nor the dismissal of his appeals related to that petition constituted strikes under the PLRA. Because this holding negated three of plaintiff's five alleged strikes, the district court erred in denying plaintiff IFP status under the three strikes provision. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and ordered the court to permit plaintiff to proceed with his complaint in forma pauperis. View "Jones v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants, alleging, inter alia, the denial of visitation rights, telephone usage, and access to a law library, and deprivation of proper temperature control, ventilation, and various amenities. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's dismissal of his complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1). The district court dismissed plaintiff's action with prejudice on the basis of his initial pleading, denying him leave to file an amended complaint alleging that he in fact sent his letter to the Warden complaining of prison conditions. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment of the district court to the extent that it dismissed the claims against the Warden in his individual capacity with prejudice and without leave to file an amended complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed in all other respects. View "Grullon v. City of New Haven" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's suit against Sheraton, alleging state law claims and invoking subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). The district court dismissed plaintiff's first and second complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Sheraton subsequently moved for "just costs" including attorney's fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1919 and the district court granted the motion, concluding that plaintiff's second complaint was engineered to re-assert diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that section 1919 did not authorize an award of attorney's fees and that, although such fees could be awarded on a non-statutory basis for bad faith in the conduct of litigation, fees were not warranted under the circumstances of this case. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded with directions to delete the award of attorney's fees. View "Castillo Grand, LLC v. Sheraton Operating Corp." on Justia Law