Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

In 1993 Vasquez was sentenced to 262 months for heroin offenses. In 1996, he was sentenced to 14 months, to run consecutively, for possession of a prohibited object. His projected release date is October, 2012. The Second Chance Act, which applies, increases a federal prisoner’s eligibility for pre-release placement in a halfway house from 6 to 12 months, and requires the Bureau of Prisons to make individual determinations that ensure that placement is of sufficient duration to provide the greatest likelihood of success and to provide incentives for participation in skills development programs. Vasquez’s team recommended a 151-180 day placement in a Residential Re-entry Center. Vasquez had not regularly participated in educational programs during his incarceration. He filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that the BOP failed to comply with the reentry initiative and improperly added a factor to trick inmates into thinking that they have been considered for incentives that were never properly implemented. The district court rejected the petition. Vasquez was not merely challenging construction of the Second Chance Act or implementation of the reentry initiative; exhaustion of administrative remedies was required. There was no abuse of discretion in how the factors were balanced with goals of the Act.

Cardona was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) & 846; conspiring to possess with intent to distribute less than 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) & 846; possession with intent to distribute over 100 kilograms of marijuana, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(B); and possession with intent to distribute over 100 grams of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C). He was sentenced to 480 months and eventually was referred to the special management unit, which limits contact with other prisoners and access to personal property. An inmate is allowed to reintegrate, by demonstrating potential for positive interaction. Between his sentencing and SMU referral, Cardona filed multiple lawsuits challenging his conviction and conditions of confinement. He believes that SMU referral was punishment for the litigation, although the notice referred to narcotics-related infractions. He filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 224. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, stating that the SMU did not affect the fact or duration of incarceration. The Third Circuit affirmed, agreeing that Cardona must file a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents to seek redress.

Rolan was convicted in 1984 of murder and possession of an instrument of crime for a 1983 shooting death involving a drug sale. He obtained habeas corpus relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. After a retrial, the jury convicted Rolan of murder again. After exhausting appeals, he again sought habeas corpus. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct that was based on closing argument statements about the reliability of an alibi witness. The court properly allowed reading of a transcript of testimony by a witness, who died before retrial.

In 1993 Simon and others burglarized a house; the occupant arrived during the burglary and was shot dead. Simon was tried for felony murder, first degree robbery, and third degree burglary. Simon repeatedly moved to dismiss his appointed defender, Ayala. Ayala moved to withdraw claiming that Simon was hostile and was planning to claim ineffective assistance of counsel. The court declined. Ayala did not give an opening statement, call witnesses, or object to closure of the courtroom during closing arguments and jury instructions. Simon was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. His direct appeals were unsuccessful. Another participant, who testified against Simon, had his sentence reduced for his assistance. Virgin Islands court rejected a petition for habeas corpus and, on appeal, Simon's attorney filed an Anders motion to withdraw. The motion was granted and the petition was ultimately denied. The Third Circuit vacated, first rejecting a challenge to its jurisdiction. The Appellate Division did not err in applying Anders procedures to assess motions filed by court-appointed counsel to withdraw on post-conviction appeal, but erred in finding the Anders brief sufficient on its face. There were nonfrivolous issues that should be reviewed on the merits.

After police conducted a controlled buy, through a confidential informant, defendant was convicted of cocaine distribution and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); using and carrying a firearm during a drug-trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1); and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a challenge to sufficiency of the evidence and an argument that the district court violated defendant's constitutional rights and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43 by questioning prospective jurors on the record, at sidebar outside his presence. The court properly denied his motion to disclose the identity of the confidential informant and properly imposed an upward variance.

Plaintiffs, involved in the adult media industry, challenged the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 2257 and 2257A, criminal laws imposing record-keeping, labeling, and inspection requirements on producers of sexually explicit depictions. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit vacated in part. With respect to an as-applied challenge, the district court properly held that the statutes are content-neutral and that intermediate scrutiny applies, but plaintiffs should have an opportunity to conduct discovery and develop the record regarding whether they are narrowly tailored. With respect to a facial challenge, the court stated that certain statutory definitions are not readily susceptible to limiting constructions.

Defendants were convicted of a series of carjackings, an attempted robbery, and the murder of a security guard. One was sentenced to life imprisonment and consecutive prison terms totaling 70 years on federal counts, and to life imprisonment and a consecutive prison term of 15 years on Virgin Islands counts, with local sentences to run consecutively to the federal sentences. Three others were sentenced to life imprisonment on federal counts, and to life imprisonment and a consecutive 15-year prison term on Virgin Islands counts, with local sentences to run consecutively to federal sentences. Each was fined $50,000. The First Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors, prosecutorial misconduct, faulty jury instructions, insufficiency of the evidence, and double jeopardy. After examining 18 U.S.C. 924 (c) and (j) the court stated that Congress clearly intended to impose cumulative punishment when a killing occurs in connection with a predicate offense, including crimes of violence and drug trafficking. A "Title III" recorded conversation (18 U.S.C. 2510) admitted at trial was not testimonial, and not subject to Confrontation Clause scrutiny.

In 1977 defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree murder. He was released in 1992, and, still on parole, was accused of inappropriately touching his six-year-old daughter. He was convicted; the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections recommended that his sentence include participation in a sex offender treatment program. He has been repeatedly denied parole based on refusal to participate. He claims that the program requirement that he admit committing the sex crime for which he was convicted would amount to self-incrimination and would have compromised his then-pending appeal. His petition for habeas corpus was denied by the district court. The Third Circuit affirmed, declining to address whether petitioner had exhausted state remedies. Even assuming that refusal to participate was the sole reason for denying parole, the actions of the Board did not amount to “compulsion” within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. The purpose of the program is not simply to gather information and an inmate has no right to parole. Penalties that merely alter the degree of comfort or freedom that an inmate is afforded do not amount to compulsion under the Fifth Amend

Serving a life sentence for murder, petitioner exhausted state appeals. The federal district court denied habeas relief. The Third Circuit affirmed. The petition was not timely under 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling or equitable tolling. Allegedly "new," exculpatory evidence of witness tampering and the identity of the "actual shooter" was known to petitioner in 1994. Petitioner did not establish his diligence or extraordinarily burdensome circumstances and the evidence did not establish actual innocence.

During the 1981 New Jersey gubernatorial election, the Democratic National Committee and others sued the Republican National Committee, and others, alleging that defendants targeted minority voters for intimidation, in violation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1971, 1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. RNC allegedly mailed sample ballots to individuals in precincts with a high percentage of minority registered voters and included individuals whose postcards were returned as undeliverable on a list of voters to challenge at the polls and enlisted off-duty officers to intimidate voters by standing at minority precinct polling places, wearing “National Ballot Security Task Force” armbands. Some allegedly wore visible firearms. In 1982, RNC and DNC entered into a consent decree, national in scope, limiting RNC's participation in voter fraud prevention without advance court approval. The decree was modified in 1987 and was the subject of enforcement actions in 2000, 2004, and 2008. The district court denied, in part, a motion to modify or vacate the decree, but made modifications. The Third Circuit affirmed, stating that if RNC does not hope to engage in conduct that would violate the decree, it is puzzling that it would pursue vacatur so vigorously. despite significant modifications.