Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of third degree murder after a third trial concerning a 1996 shooting death. He unsuccessfully appealed and sought relief under Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act, then sought federal habeas corpus review under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that petitioner's Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court admitted prior testimony from an unavailable government witness, even though petitioner did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness with newly-discovered impeachment evidence. Petitioner had a full opportunity for cross-examination at his second trial. The court also rejected claims based on the judge questioning a juror in camera, without petitioner present.

After receiving a tip from a reliable source that individuals in a white Toyota Camry were carrying firearms, police officers initiated a traffic stop. A firearm was discovered on the driver, who unsuccessfully moved to suppress the firearm as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure. The Third Circuit vacated the conviction and sentence. The requisite reasonable suspicion of criminal activity was not established by the presence of illegal tints on the vehicle's windows or by the tip that firearms were in the possession of the individuals in the vehicle. The informant gave brief information, not including whether the firearm was legal or illegal.

In 2006, Long filed an suit against city and state police and forensic chemists, claiming conspiracy to obtain a murder conviction against him by presenting false evidence and preventing him from obtaining DNA testing that would prove his innocence (42 U.S.C. 1983). After screening (28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2); 1915A), the district court found that the claims were barred unless he could demonstrate that his conviction was invalid. Dismissal was entered on the docket August 21, 2006, so that he had until September 4 to file a Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration. On September 25, he filed the motion with a letter explaining that he had not received the filings until September 22, because of a transfer from one prison to another. The district court treated the motion as timely, but rejected it on the merits. The order was entered on the docket October 6. On October 31, Long signed a notice of appeal that was timely from the denial of reconsideration, but untimely from the dismissal order. The Third Circuit affirmed without deciding the delay issue, finding that it had jurisdiction based on the denial of reconsideration.

An inmate in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections brought a civil rights action in 2000 claiming that two prison facilities unlawfully denied his request to accommodate his particular religious group, a subgroup of Sunni Muslims. Several claims were dismissed, and, following a trial, the district court ruled in favor of individual defendants on a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim that policies and practices violated the inmate's right to practice his religion as guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments and a claim under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The Third Circuit affirmed. RLUIPA does not permit individual-capacity suits and defendants had qualified immunity with respect to the 1983 claims. Plaintiff did not have a clearly established right to separate religious services in accordance with the Habashi sect when Sunni Islamic services were already available.

Plaintiff led a demonstration at the entrance to the Liberty Bell Center at Independence National Park, sharing the sidewalk with tourists, carriage operators, and Komen Foundation walk participants. A ranger told plaintiff to vacate the sidewalk because it was not a designated First Amendment area; he issued an oral permit to continue on the opposite side. Plaintiff refused. Two hours later, the ranger escorted him off the sidewalk. Plaintiff was convicted of violating a permit, 36 C.F.R. 1.6(g)(2), and interfering with agency functions, 36 C.F.R. 2.32. The Third Circuit found insufficient evidence of violating a permit, and vacated conviction for interfering with agency functions as invalid under the First Amendment. Plaintiff sued the Park Service, the Department of the Interior, and the rangers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, finding the rangers entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff’s First Amendment rights were not clearly established at the time, and he could not show that the rangers acted without probable cause when arresting him. Plaintiff was not similarly situated to other groups that were allowed to stay. Claims for declaratory relief were moot; the Park Service has revised regulations to designate the sidewalk as a First Amendment area, and now exempts small groups from permit requirements. The Third Circuit affirmed

Petitioner was convicted in 1990 of murder and arson after his 20-year-old mentally ill daughter died in a fire at a religious retreat. His attorney argued that the deceased set the fire as a suicidal act. He was sentenced to life without possibility of parole. On remand for an evidentiary hearing on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the court received substantial evidence about developments in the field of fire science that provided reason to question the reliability of the arson investigation. The court nonetheless affirmed the convictions and sentence. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied an appeal. The district court denied a petition for habeas corpus without an evidentiary hearing. The Third Circuit remanded for discovery. Petitioner was diligent in state court to develop his claims that newly developed scientific evidence establishes that the expert testimony at his trial was fundamentally unreliable, in violation of due process, and that he is actually innocent. He has alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that discovery is essential to the development of his federal claims.

The Pennsylvania Steel Products Procurement Act,73 Pa. Cons. Stat. 1881-1887, prohibits the use of temporary bridges made out of foreignsteel on public works projects. The district court rejected a claim that the law was preempted by the Buy America Act, 23 U.S.C. 313, and that it violated the Commerce Clause, Contract Clause, and Equal Protection Clause. The Third Circuit affirmed. The federal Act contemplates more restrictive state laws. The state law was authorized by Congress, is rational, and did not, at its enactment, impair plaintiff's existing contracts.

The District, which operates six elementary schools and two very highly-rated high schools set goals for redistricting, including: equalizing enrollment of the high schools and middle schools; operating elementary schools at or under capacity; not increasing the number of buses required; giving 2010 graduates the choice to either follow the redistricting plan or stay at the high school of their previous year; and basing decisions on current and expected future needs, not on past practices. The district court concluded that the plan required strict scrutiny because race was a factor in the formation of the plan, but concluded that the plan is constitutional because it does not use race impermissibly. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that strict scrutiny did not apply, simply because decision-makers discussed race. The plan neither classifies on the basis of race nor has a discriminatory purpose. The plan met the rational basis test.

To revitalize the Conshohocken waterfront, the Redevelopment Authority of Montgomery County filed a declaration of condemnation of plaintiffs' property in 1996, which had the effect of transferring title to the property, which housed a successful steel processing business. A state court invalidated the taking and awarded attorneys' fees and expenses. Because the Authority held title to the property throughout the state court action, plaintiffs filed a claim in federal court, seeking just compensation. The district court rejected the claim, because they had never asked the Authority whether it would give them “just compensation.” The state court determined that plaintiffs had obtained all the relief to which they were entitled. The district court dismissed their case, holding that plaintiffs should have brought their federal claims as part of their second action in state court. The Third Circuit reversed. Because title passed, this was a per se taking and the claim was not time-barred. Rejecting a claim of issue preclusion, the court stated that the parties never actually litigated the federal constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code.

Petitioner, was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of first-degree murder, reckless endangerment, and possession of an instrument of crime, for a drive-by shooting. The court rejected his evidence of misidentification and alibi. He exhausted state court remedies. The district court granted a habeas petition. The Third Circuit reversed. The district court erred in granting an evidentiary hearing, which was essentially a new trial. The purpose of the Antitterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. 2254 is to channel prisoners' claims first to the state courts. Defendant did not establish that his attorney's failure to develop his alibi prejudiced his trial; the prosecution had physical evidence and eyewitness testimony.