Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

More than 20 years ago, Cox was convicted in Philadelphia of first-degree murder and related charges. In 2000, he sought a federal writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed in 2004, finding that all but one of Cox’s claims were procedurally defaulted due to counsel’s failure to pursue them in initial post-conviction state court proceedings and that the preserved claim lacked merit. The Third Circuit affirmed. In 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, announcing an exception to longstanding precedent: under certain circumstances, for purposes of habeas review, post-conviction counsel’s failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims could excuse a procedural default of those claims. Within three months, Cox moved under FRCP Rule 60(b)(6), for relief from the 2004 order. The district court denied the motion, finding that the intervening change in law, “without more,” did not provide cause for relief. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded. For relief to be granted under Rule 60(b)(6), “more” than the important change of law is required: what must be shown are “extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.” What those extraordinary circumstances could be in the context of Martinez was neither offered to the district court by the parties nor discussed by the court. View "Cox v. Horn" on Justia Law

Cruz was arrested for assaulting, resisting, or impeding Social Security Administration employees and two counts of threatening a federal law enforcement officer. The district court granted a judgment of acquittal on Count I, and a jury returned guilty verdicts on Count II and Count III. After the court received the pre-sentence investigation report, the prosecution successfully moved for a determination of competency. A Federal Bureau of Prisons forensic psychologist concluded that Cruz was mentally incompetent and suffered from schizophrenic disorder, bipolar type. After a hearing, the court concluded that Cruz was incompetent and found that he could not proceed with sentencing. A second report concurred with the diagnosis, noted Cruz’s ongoing refusal to take anti-psychotic medication recommended by BOP personnel, concluded that without medication Cruz would remain incompetent, and stated that “there is a substantial probability that [his] competency can be restored with a period of” forced medication. The prosecution obtained an order authorizing the BOP to medicate Cruz against his will. The Third Circuit affirmed, citing the Supreme Court decision, United States v. Sell (2003), and reasoning that the government can have a sufficiently important interest in forcibly medicating a defendant to restore his mental competency and render him fit to proceed with sentencing. View "United States v. Cruz" on Justia Law

Political groups challenged the constitutionality (42 U.S.C. 1983) of two provisions of Pennsylvania’s election code that regulate ballot access. Sections 2911(b) and 2872.2(a), require that candidates seeking to be included on the general election ballot (other than Republicans and Democrats) submit nomination papers with a specified number of signatures. Section 2937 allows private actors to object to such nomination papers and have them nullified, and permits a Pennsylvania court, as that court deems “just,” to impose administrative and litigation costs on a candidate if that candidate’s papers are rejected. The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the aspiring political parties established that their injury-in-fact can fairly be traced to the actions of the Commonwealth officials and that the injuries are redressable. View "Constitution Party of PA v. Aichele" on Justia Law

In 1993, Branch entered a Newark building, inhabited by drug dealers and addicts, just before Mosley was fatally shot. When the police arrested Branch the next day, he had the gun that shot Mosley. Branch testified that he went to the building to retrieve $50 that he had paid for fake cocaine. He encountered a lookout, and, though he claims to have been unarmed, insisted on going inside. Inside, Branch saw several people and asked who had supplied the fake cocaine. Lee produced a gun and told Branch to get out. Branch claims that in the ensuing scramble, Lee’s gun discharged, that Lee dropped her gun, and that he grabbed it and ran out. Branch called two witnesses who confirmed his account. The state called several witnesses who indicated that Branch went to the building to rob its occupants and killed Mosley. All of the witnesses had long criminal records. The arresting officer testified that Branch ran, fought him, and tried to pull a weapon. Despite apparent reservations, the jury convicted Branch. After state appellate proceedings and two remands, the trial court sentenced Branch to life for aggravated manslaughter. The appellate court affirmed. After unsuccessful state post-conviction proceedings, Branch unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit vacated, stating that it could not find any justification for trial counsel’s failure to call two potential witnesses; if they had testified consistently with their pretrial written statements, there is a reasonable probability that the evidence would not have favored the prosecution. The state courts’ conclusions were unreasonable applications of federal law, so the district court was required to hold a hearing to ascertain reasons for not calling the potential witnesses. View "Branch v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Powell, a former Pennsylvania state inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections violated his Fourteenth Amendment right not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law when it revoked its decision to release him to a community correctional center. The DOC conceded that the revocation was based on an improper calculation of Powell’s sentence. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Pennsylvania inmates do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the expectation of release to a community correctional center. View "Powell v. Weiss" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Borough of Shickshinny approved placement of a religious-themed sign on municipal property near the home of Tearpock-Martini . Shickshinny employees installed the sign, which reads: “Bible Baptist Church Welcomes You!” and has a directional arrow with “1 BLOCK” written on it, and depicts a gold cross and a white Bible. Tearpock-Martini installed, on her property directly in front of the church sign, a sign that read: “This Church Sign Violates My Rights As A Taxpayer & Property Owner. Residential Neighborhoods Are Not Zoned For Advertisement Signs!” Shickshinny warned Tearpock-Martini that she could be charged if she did not remove her sign. In 2012, Tearpock-Martini filed a civil rights action, alleging violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed the challenge as be time-barred. The Third Circuit vacated, finding that the constitutional challenge to a still-existing monument erected on municipal property is not time-barred, but that claims that the refusal of Shickshinny to allow Martini to erect her own sign violated her rights to free speech and equal protection of the law are barred by Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations. View "Tearpock-Martini v. Borough of Shickshinny" on Justia Law

Reyes was convicted of Hobbs Act robbery of a grocery store, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a)1; using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. 924(c); and being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1)t. He appealed only his Hobbs Act conviction. The Third Circuit affirmed. After unsuccessfully petitioning the Supreme Court for certiorari, Reyes filed a pro se habeas petition, 28 U.S.C. 2255. The district court appointed counsel and conducted an evidentiary hearing. Before the court ruled, Reyes sought to amend his petition, to add claims under the Supreme Court’s 2013 Alleyne decision. In Alleyne, the Court clarified that, under the Sixth Amendment, “‘any facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed’ are elements of the crime” and must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. The district Court denied Reyes’ petition and his request to amend. While appeal was pending, the Third Circuit decided United States v. Winkelman, finding that the new rule of criminal procedure announced by the Supreme Court in Alleyne does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. View "United States v. Reyes" on Justia Law

Erdely was investigating online distribution of child pornography when he discovered a computer on a peer-to-peer network sharing 77 files that he suspected contained child pornography. With information available to anyone, he found the Internet protocol address (IP address) through which it connected to the internet. Searching publicly available records, Erdely determined that the IP Address was registered to a Comcast subscriber and obtained a court order. Comcast gave Erdely the Neighbor’s name and Pittsburgh address. Erdely executed a warrant. None of the Neighbor’s computers contained child pornography or the file-sharing software; his wireless router was not password-protected. Erdely deduced that the computer sharing child pornography was connecting without the Neighbor’s knowledge. With the Neighbor’s permission, Erdely connected a computer to the router for remote access. Later, while working in Harrisburg, Erdely learned that the computer was again sharing child pornography on the Neighbor’s IP address. Erdely determined the mooching computer’s IP address and MAC address, which belonged to an Apple wireless card. Erdely had not discovered any Apple wireless devices in the Neighbor’s home, so he decided to use a “MoocherHunter” mobile tracking software tool, which can be used by anyone with a directional antenna. Not knowing which residence the signal was coming from, Erdely proceeded without a warrant. From the sidewalk the MoocherHunter’s readings were strongest when aimed at Stanley’s apartment. Erdely obtained a warrant for Stanley’s home. When officers arrived, Stanley fled, but returned and confessed that he had connected to the Neighbor’s router to download child pornography. Erdely seized Stanley’s Apple laptop and recovered 144 images and video files depicting child pornography. Stanley was charged with possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a). The district court denied a motion to suppress. The Third Circuit affirmed. Use of the MoocherHunter was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. View "United States v. Stanley" on Justia Law

Sara sued the City of Newark and Police Officer Borrero, alleging that Borrero, who had an extensive disciplinary history and who was off-duty at the time, stopped Sara for alleged unsafe driving. Borrero then entered her car and attacked Sara, threatened a bystander who tried to intervene, charged Sara with attacking an officer, and held her without counsel for 12 hours. A jury found that Borrero and the city were liable and awarded $2,700,000 in compensatory damages. The district court remitted Sara’s award to $750,000 and informed her of her right to either accept the remitted award or reject it and proceed to a second jury trial, limited to the quantum of her compensatory damages. A second jury was convened and awarded $4,000,000 in compensatory damages. Instead of addressing the city’s new motion for remittitur, the court entered a final order, vacating the second jury’s verdict and the earlier order of remittitur, and reinstating the first jury’s verdict. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions that the district court should resolve the city’s motion for remittitur of the second jury’s verdict, but stating that it saw little merit to any of the arguments on appeal. View "Lesende v. Borrero" on Justia Law

Responding to a dispatch, Pennsylvania State Trooper Carroll and another trooper proceeded to the Carman home to search for a man who had stolen two loaded handguns and a car with New Jersey plates. Arriving at the Carman residence, the troopers bypassed the front door and went directly to the back of the house and onto a deck adjoining the kitchen. On the deck, a scuffle ensued between Carroll and Andrew Carman. In a suit under 42 U.S.C.1983, the Carmans challenged Carroll’s warrantless entry onto their’ property. Carroll argued that he did not violate the Carmans’ Fourth Amendment rights because he entered into their curtilage, the area immediately surrounding their home, while executing a legitimate “knock and talk” encounter. The district court denied the Carmans’ judgment as a matter of law on their unlawful entry claims; a jury found that Carroll acted reasonably. The Third Circuit reversed in part. Because Carroll proceeded directly through the back of the property and did not begin his visit at the front door, the “knock and talk” exception to the warrant requirement dd not apply. The court affirmed the jury verdict regarding the unlawful seizure claim; there was sufficient support for the jury’s finding that Carroll acted reasonably. View "Carman v. Carroll" on Justia Law