Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Detectives Riley and Cunningham conducted a 10-week undercover investigation of Mitchell. On five separate occasions, an informant made controlled purchases of crack cocaine from Mitchell and officers covertly tailed Mitchell to establish his residence. They followed him to various residences, including his mother’s home and a home owned by his wife and ultimately applied for a search warrant for his wife’s residence. Detectives executed the search warrant and recovered 4.5 ounces of cocaine; drug packing paraphernalia, including three plastic bags with a white powdery residue and small plastic bags commonly used for packaging crack cocaine; approximately $6,415 in cash; and, underneath the mattress, a loaded firearm. Mitchell was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1) and 924 (a)(2); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(c); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(2). The district court denied a motion to suppress, holding that the detectives acted in good faith in relying on the warrant. Mitchell was convicted and the Third Circuit affirmed. View "United States v. Mitchell" on Justia Law

In 1985 the bodies of an eight-year-old boy and his seven-year-old sister were found in the basement of a New Jersey apartment building, in which Halsey, then age 24, lived with their mother. The children had been sexually assaulted and mutilated. The killer was ultimately determined to be their next-door neighbor, Hall, who had a record for attempted sexual assault. Hall asked the police whether he would be locked up, but was not considered a suspect at the time. Halsey had an arrest record, but no history of incarceration. Halsey had a sixth-grade education and was “Mildly Mentally Retarded.” Halsey, who had previously worked at the apartment building, was at his new job at another location when he learned about the murders. He returned home and was taken to the police station, where he was isolated in an interview room, accused of the murders, told he had failed a polygraph examination (he had actually passed), and confronted with false evidence. After being interrogated for several days, in a state of great fear, he signed a document purporting to be his confession, with details that investigators must have inserted because Halsey could not have known them. He was convicted, and sentenced to life. He was released 22 years later, after it was clear that he had not committed the offenses. Halsey filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. An officer who fabricates evidence to obtain a conviction violates the defendant’s constitutional right to due process. Without the false confession, there would not have been direct evidence linking Halsey to the crimes so that the prosecutor would not have had cause to prosecute Halsey. View "Halsey v. Pfeiffer" on Justia Law

After receiving a tip in 2005, the DEA began monitoring calls between a confidential informant and Velazquez, tracked co-defendants, recovered nine kilograms of cocaine, and arrested the two co-defendants. An arrest warrant issued for Velazquez in August 2005. The DEA declared Velazquez a fugitive and turned his apprehension over to the U.S. Marshals, which entered Velazquez’s information in the Warrant Information Network. An assistant U.S. attorney sent a copy of the warrant to Velazquez’s counsel, who stipulated that he received it. Neither that attorney nor Velazquez appeared at the arraignment. From November 2005 until November 2010, authorities checked the National Crime Information Center eight times to see if any agency had encountered Velazquez. A DEA agent checked with the U.S. Attorney’s Office annually to make sure the office was still willing to prosecute, ensured that the warrant was still active in the NCIC, and contacted the Marshals Service to ask if they had new information. He put Velazquez on the “Most Wanted” section of the Philadelphia DEA website, but not on the Los Angeles site, where authorities believed Velazquez was living. No law enforcement agency visited addresses identified in 2005 or returned to the home of Velazquez’s brother; no one contacted his parents, his attorney or the Los Angeles agent; and no one searched commercial or other governmental databases. Velazquez was apprehended in 2011, in California on an unrelated narcotics charge. The district court denied his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. The Sixth Circuit reversed, applying the four-factor test from two Supreme Court decisions. View "United States v. Velazquez" on Justia Law

Pennsylvania troopers responded to a domestic disturbance involving someone “under the influence … waving a loaded firearm … dragging his daughter.” The daughter’s friend relayed information the daughter was sending by text message. The dispatcher advised that the father was believed to be White, who previously had resisted arrest. Arriving at the home, the troopers saw two individuals behind a mud room screen door. Guns drawn, the troopers ordered them out. White emerged and walked unsteadily, leading the troopers to conclude he was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. As instructed, White went down on the ground, was handcuffed, and subjected to a pat down search. White did not have any weapon. White’s adult daughter, Samantha, emerged. Given her size and apparent victim status, the troopers decided not to handcuff Samantha. A trooper opened the door and seized two guns from the floor just inside the mud room. He walked through the home with Samantha, finding no other person but observing gun cases and a burnt marijuana cigarette, none of which he seized. An officer advised White of his Miranda rights. White stated he was a gun collector, owned firearms, had been carrying guns because he believed people were trying to kill him, and had shot at animals earlier that day. Weeks later, after obtaining a warrant based on the seized firearms, police seized 91 firearms. Indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), White unsuccessfully moved to suppress all firearms and inculpatory statements. The Sixth Circuit remanded for further proceedings regarding reasonable suspicion and exigent circumstances. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

In 1986 when the United States sought an injunction under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), 42 U.S.C. 1997, and entered into a Consent Decree, under which the Virgin Islands would attempt to remedy the conditions at Golden Grove Correctional Facility with respect to unreasonable fire safety risks, physical violence by other inmates or staff, adequate sanitation, and medical care. The district court entered several additional orders when conditions at Golden Grove failed to improve according to plan. In 2011, the Virgin Islands sought to terminate prospective relief under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 18 U.S.C. 3626(b), (e). The court concluded that all but one of the orders entered after the 1986 Consent Decree constituted prospective relief under the PLRA and did not include the findings required under the statute. The court ordered a hearing to determine whether “prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current and ongoing violation of a federal right at Golden Grove … and, if so, to ensure that the prospective relief is narrowly tailored to that violation in the manner required by the PLRA.” Gillette, a prisoner at Golden Grove, was denied leave to intervene. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that the United States adequately represents Gillette’s interests and that others will be prejudiced if intervention is permitted. View "United States v. Territory of VI" on Justia Law

Thomas was in custody pending trial for shoplifting and failing to pay fines. He was assigned to a small unit with an upper level open to the lower level, housing minimum and medium security detainees. The facility has four or five fights reported every day; 20-30 are estimated to be unreported. Thomas had a reputation as a bully, known for stealing food. One day Thomas found about 12 angry inmates outside of his upper level cell. A verbal dispute ensued. Officer Martinez was with the crowd; Officer Wilde was on the lower level. Martinez said something about locking everybody down. The inmates laughed, but did not disperse. Inmate Santiago yelled, “come down here and take stuff from me.” Thomas began to walk to the lower level. Within seconds after he arrived, Santiago struck Thomas. Martinez restrained Santiago, but another inmate struck Thomas. Martinez was immediately next to Thomas yelled for everyone to lock down. The inmates complied. Three to four minutes had passed between the beginning of the argument on the upper level and the violence on the lower level. Inmates stated that the officers could and should have stopped the argument. Thomas suffered a concussion and loss of sight in one eye. Thomas sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, The district court granted the county summary judgment. The Third Circuit vacated, finding genuine issues of material fact concerning deliberate indifference to the need for pre-service training in conflict de-escalation and intervention and whether the lack of such training had a causal relationship to Thomas’s injuries.View "Thomas v. Cumberland Cnty." on Justia Law

Cooper was convicted of rape in Oklahoma in 1999 and paroled in 2006, before enactment of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250; 42 U.S.C. 16901. He complied with sex offender registration laws in effect at the time. After enactment of SORNA, Cooper moved to Delaware in 2011. He did not register in Delaware, nor did he inform authorities of his new address. He was convicted of failing to comply with SORNA sex offender registration requirements. On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of the provision of SORNA in which Congress delegated to the Attorney General the authority to determine the applicability of registration requirements to pre-SORNA sex offenders. The Third Circuit affirmed his conviction, stating that it found “delegation of this important decision curious at best,” but not an unconstitutional abdication. View "United States v. Cooper" on Justia Law

New Jersey enacted the 2002 Off-Track and Account Wagering Act, N.J. Stat. 5:5-127, providing for establishment of 15 off-track wagering (OTW) facilities. The Act authorized a license for the N.J. Sports and Exposition Authority, conditioned upon NJSEA entering into a participation agreement with other entities that held horse racing permits in 2000 (ACRA and Freehold). NJSEA, ACRA, and Freehold entered into an agreement, allocating permit rights. By 2011, only four facilities had opened. NJSEA had leased control of its tracks to the New Jersey Thoroughbred Horsemen’s Association (NJTHA) and another. The 2011 Forfeiture Amendment provided that permit holders would forfeit rights to any OTW not licensed by 2012, unless they demonstrated “making progress” toward establishing an OTW; forfeited rights would be available to other “horsemen’s organizations” without compensation to the permit holder. NJTHA qualified for forfeited rights. The 2012 Deposit Amendment extended the forfeiture date and allowed a permit holder to make a $1 million deposit for each OTW facility not licensed by December 31, 2011, retaining the “making progress” exception. The Pilot Program Act allowed installation of electronic wagering terminals in some bars and restaurants, by lessees or purchasers of NJSEA-owned racetracks, who could exchange unused OTW licenses to install electronic terminals. NJTHA secured such a license. ACRA and Freehold submitted challenged the constitutionality of the amendments under the Contracts, Takings, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses. The Commission determined that both ACRA and Freehold had made progress toward establishing their unlicensed OTW facilities and absolved them of the obligation to submit deposits. The district court dismissed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1988 on Younger abstention grounds. Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided Sprint Communications v. Jacobs, (2013), clarifying the Younger abstention doctrine. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that the action does not fit within the framework for abstention. View "Acra Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki" on Justia Law

The Winkelman brothers, have a “long and protracted litigation history” involving challenges to the constitutionality of their sentences, which they brought while in custody, and which were filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255. The Sixth Circuit denied certificates of appealability. The current motion, to reinstate their direct appeals, argued that their sentences are unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s 2013 holding, Alleyne v. U.S. that “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum [sentence] is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury” and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Third Circuit denied the motion, which it characterized as “successive.” A successive section 2255 motion is authorized only if it is based on “newly discovered evidence,” or on “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” The Supreme Court may have announced a new rule of law in Alleyne, but note that “a new rule is not ‘made retroactive to cases on collateral review’ unless the Supreme Court holds it to be retroactive.” View "United States v. Winkelman" on Justia Law

Galarza, a U.S. citizen, was working at a construction site. The contractor sold cocaine to an undercover detective, Correa, who arrested the contractor, Galarza, and other employees for conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Galarza had a wallet, containing his Pennsylvania driver’s license, his Social Security Card, a debit card, and his health insurance card. The complaint listed Galarza’s place of birth as Perth, N.J. and contained his Social Security Number and date of birth. Correa called ICE and provided Galarza’s information. Galarza claims that, by making the call, Correa indicated that she suspected Galarza had given false identification information. Galarza was detained and went through booking; officials took his wallet and its contents. ICE Agent Szalczyk, acting on information relayed by Correa, filed an immigration detainer that described Galarza as a suspected “alien” and citizen of the Dominican Republic. The detainer was not accompanied by a warrant, an affidavit of probable cause, or a removal order. A surety company posted bail, but Galarza was told that he would not be released. Galarza had not been interviewed by ICE nor provided with a copy of the detainer. Three days after his arrest, a counselor told Galarza about the detainer. Galarza protested and urged the counselor to retrieve his wallet. The counselor refused. Galarza later met with ICE officers. The detainer was removed and Galarza was released about three days after his arrest. Galarza was acquitted and filed complaints under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 346(b). The district court dismissed the complaint against Lehigh County, holding that it could not be held responsible for Galarza’s detention because it was compelled to follow the detainer. The Third Circuit vacated. Immigration detainers do not compel a state or local law enforcement agency to detain suspected aliens subject to removal.View "Galarza v. Szalczyk" on Justia Law