Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Quinn, charged with aiding and abetting Johnson in an armed bank robbery, claimed that when he drove Johnson to the bank, he did not know that Johnson intended to rob a bank teller at gunpoint. Johnson, who was awaiting sentencing, refused to testify. The district court refused Quinn’s request to immunize Johnson so he could testify. His statement to police that Quinn was not aware of the planned robbery was excluded as hearsay. Quinn was convicted and sentence to 147 months. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of prosecutorial misconduct by postponing sentencing to induce Johnson not to testify. Quinn also argued that the court erred by not exercising its authority to immunize Johnson’s testimony. Rejecting that claim, the court stated that courts lack that authority, as immunity is a statutory creation reserved to the Executive Branch. If the accused can show a due process violation, a court has authority to vacate a conviction. View "United States v. Quinn" on Justia Law

Ball, an inmate in the Restricted Housing Unit at the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming deliberate indifference to her medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Ball, pro se, asked to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Third Circuit determined that she is not eligible for IFP status and denied her motion for appointment of counsel, citing the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 110 Stat. 1321 Ball had accrued three “strikes” under the PLRA and was not in imminent danger of serious physical injury. View "Ball v. Famiglio" on Justia Law

Washington’s friend, Taylor, worked at Dollar Express in 2000. Taylor observed that manager Ritterson routinely arrived at 5:00 a.m. and would smoke a cigarette on the loading dock with the door open before starting work and that the store contained a safe, but no guards, cameras, or other security measures. Washington, Johnson, Waddy and Taylor met at Waddy’s home to plan the robbery. Johnson carried the gun; Washington drove the group to the store. Washington and Taylor remained in the car while Waddy and Johnson entered, carrying tools to open the safe, and confronted Ritterson and another employee. Johnson shot them. Washington heard the shots, ran into the store, and helped remove $750 from the safe. Waddy filled a bag with items to sell. When the others returned to the car, Taylor did not take any money. After learning that police had designated him a person of interest, Taylor surrendered and agreed to testify in exchange for a sentence of 55 to 110 years. Waddy also gave a statement. Johnson, Waddy, and Washington were tried together. Washington was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and criminal conspiracy for his participation as the driver. After exhausting state remedies, Washington obtained a conditional federal writ of habeas corpus, based on his argument that introduction of a jointly-tried nontestifying coconspirator’s confession violated his Confrontation Clause; the redacted confession replaced Washington’s name with “someone I know” or “the driver.” The Third Circuit affirmed; no reasonable reading of Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence would permit introduction of the redacted confession. View "Washington v. Sec'y PA Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Philadelphia officers were patrolling an area where drug deals are common. They spotted a Jeep with Davis and Blackshear inside; the engine was running. Davis and Blackshear reached toward each other with “body motions [that] were consistent with the exchanging of narcotics in a narcotics transaction.” Seeing the officers, Davis and Blackshear had “expressions of shock,” and tossed something into the backseat. They exited the Jeep and quickly walked away without closing a door. The officers stopped the men and patted them down for weapons, but found wads of cash in their pockets. An officer saw a handgun through the open door. They arrested Davis and Blackshear, returned to the Jeep, and spotted a shopping bag in the backseat. It was open and contained a white substance. A drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs. The officers obtained a warrant and recovered 10 cell phones and shopping bags with 740 grams of cocaine distributed among smaller Ziploc bags. As evidence that Davis recognized the cocaine in the Jeep, the government proved that he had two prior cocaine convictions. The Third Circuit vacated Davis’s conviction for possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), noting that the government never proved that the cocaine from his past was similar in appearance, quantity, or form. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Keep A Breast Foundation educates young women about breast cancer and believes that negative body image inhibits awareness. To “start a conversation about that taboo in a lighthearted way” and break down inhibitions keeping young women from performing self-examinations, the Foundation began its “I [heart] Boobies!” initiative, which included selling bracelets emblazoned with that motto, KEEP A BREAST” and “check yourself!” The School District banned the bracelets. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against the ban. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Supreme Court precedent does not sustain the ban. Under those decisions plainly lewd speech, which offends for the same reasons obscenity offends, may be categorically restricted regardless of whether it comments on political or social issues; speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd but that a reasonable observer could interpret as lewd may be categorically restricted if it cannot plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues; and speech that does not rise to the level of plainly lewd and that could plausibly be interpreted as commenting on such issues may not be categorically restricted. The bracelets are not plainly lewd and comment on a social issue. The District did not show that the bracelets threatened to substantially disrupt school. View "B.H. v. Easton Area Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Individuals who wish to carry a handgun in public for self-defense must obtain a license under New Jersey’s Handgun Permit Law, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4. Police evaluate applications based on criminal history, age and mental health requirements, familiarity with safe handling and use of handguns, and “a justifiable need to carry a handgun.” The meaning of “justifiable need” is: [T]he urgent necessity for self-protection, as evidenced by specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant’s life that cannot be avoided by means other than by issuance of a permit to carry a handgun. If the officer determines that the applicant has met all the requirements, the application is approved and sent to a judge, who “shall issue the permit to the applicant if, but only if, it is satisfied that the applicant is a person of good character and meets the statutory criteria. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of arguments that the Second Amendment secures a right to carry arms in public for self-defense; that the “justifiable need” standard was an unconstitutional prior restraint; and that the standard fails any level of means-end scrutiny. View "Muller v. Maenza" on Justia Law

In 1999, Shotts was charged with a string of burglaries. Following his arrest, Shotts offered to assist in an investigation into corruption at the county prison and the District Attorney helped secure Shotts’ release on bail. Once released, Shotts engaged in another crime spree and was charged with burglary, theft, criminal mischief, criminal conspiracy, receiving stolen property, passing bad checks, criminal trespass, aggravated assault, simple assault, reckless endangerment of another person, driving under the influence of alcohol, and with three probation violations. Because Shotts had made confessions, his attorney pursued a plea deal, but did not request discovery of police records. The Commonwealth offered a plea deal with a sentence of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. The judge commented that the sentence seemed high, given Shotts’ assistance with the corruption investigation. Shotts rejected the deal and entered a general guilty plea, confirming that his lawyer had explained the maximum sentences. Despite evidence of Shotts’ cooperation and his earlier statement, the judge sentenced Shotts to 30½ to 133 years. Following state collateral review, during which Shotts had five different lawyers, he filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming that his first attorney rendered ineffective assistance. The district court dismissed the claim as procedurally defaulted. The Third Circuit affirmed on the merits, but stated that the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s determination that Shotts’ claim was defaulted because he failed to raise it when first represented by new counsel was “an exorbitant application of an otherwise independent and adequate state rule” that cannot bar federal review. View "Shotts v. Wetzel" on Justia Law

The district court permanently enjoined enforcement of two Hazleton ordinances that attempt to prohibit employment of unauthorized aliens and preclude them from renting housing within the city. The Third Circuit affirmed in 2010. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded for reconsideration in light of Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, S. Ct. 1968 (2011). The Court later decided Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.2492 (2012). Both address the extent to which federal immigration law preempts state laws pertaining to the treatment of unauthorized aliens. On remand, the Third Circuit again concluded that both the employment and housing provisions of the Hazleton ordinances are preempted by federal immigration law. The employment provisions in the ordinance are distinguishable from the Arizona law upheld in Whiting. The lack of minimal procedural protections in Hazleton’s ordinance conflicts with express congressional objective of minimizing undue burdens on, and harassment of, employers. The rental registration scheme serves no discernible purpose other than to register the immigration status of a subset of the city’s population. The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Whiting and Arizona does not undermine a conclusion that both the employment and housing provisions are preempted. View "Lozano v. City of Hazleton" on Justia Law

Conestoga and individuals who own 100 percent of the voting shares of Conestoga and who practice the Mennonite religion, alleged that regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services, which require group health plans and health insurance issuers to provide coverage for contraceptives, violated the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000bb (RFRA) and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The Mennonite Church teaches that taking of life, including anything that terminates a fertilized embryo, is intrinsic evil and a sin against God to which they are held accountable. Plaintiffs specifically object to two “morning after” drugs that must be provided under the mandate that may cause the demise of an already conceived, unattached embryo. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that a for-profit, secular corporation cannot to engage in religious exercise under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. Nor do the owners have viable claims; the law does not impose any requirements on them. Compliance and penalties are placed squarely on Conestoga. View "Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs." on Justia Law

On March 2, 2011, Graves was indicted for attempted possession of 500 grams or more of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(ii) and 21 U.S.C. 846. He was arraigned on March 31. The district court ordered a psychiatric examination and mental competency evaluation, 18 U.S.C. 4241(b). That evaluation was pending on June 3, 2011, three days before Graves’s trial was scheduled to begin, so the case was continued. On June 22, the Bureau of Prisons completed the report, concluding that Graves was competent to stand trial. The report was received on July 7. On September 21, 2011, the court ruled that Graves was competent to stand trial and appointed defense counsel, who moved for a continuance. The court set Graves’s trial date for February 27, 2012. Weeks after seeking the continuance, Graves moved to dismiss the indictment, claiming that more than 70 days of inexcusable delay had passed since the filing of the indictment, in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161, the Sixth Amendment, and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion. Graves was convicted and sentenced to 120 months in prison. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding no speedy trial violation. View "United States v. Graves" on Justia Law