Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

Judge Kendall contends that the Daily News and Blackburn defamed him while reporting on his decision to grant bail to Castillo, who subsequently murdered a child; his decision to use house arrest for Williams, who was subsequently involved in a police standoff; and his decision to retire. After a jury verdict awarded $240,000, the trial court awarded the defendants judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Virgin Island Supreme court affirmed after denying Kendall’s motion for recusal based on its previous contempt proceedings against him. The Third Circuit affirmed without reaching the issue of recusal. Judge Kendall could not establish actual malice as necessary in a public-figure libel action. View "Kendall v. Daily News Publ'g Co." on Justia Law

Gilliam was fatally shot outside a Pittsburgh bar in 1997. Grant was convicted on the testimony of one witness, who based his identification on clothing. The witness was apparently granted leniency with respect to a parole violation in exchange for testimony; the criminal history of the witness was not disclosed to or discovered by the defense. Others, who had been present and who stated that Grant was not the shooter, were not called as witnesses. There was no physical evidence tying Grant to the crime. The state court denied Grant’s petition for an evidentiary hearing on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed, holding for the first time that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should generally be raised in the first instance in post-conviction proceedings. Grant then filed an unsuccessful pro se petition under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9541. The federal district court denied his habeas petition. The Third Circuit remanded, directing the court to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus on the ineffective assistance claim.View "Grant v. Lockett" on Justia Law

Denny, an inmate at the Fairton, New Jersey, Federal Correctional Institution, was punished with 60 days of disciplinary segregation and forfeiture of 40 days of good time credit after a “shank” was found in a vent between the cell he shared with another inmate and another cell. The Disciplinary Hearing Officer found that Denny possessed weapons in violation of a prison regulation. Denny sought a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. 2241 arguing that prison officials violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The district court sua sponte dismissed the petition. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting the affirmative responsibility, of which the inmates were on notice, that they were to keep their “area” free from contraband. The mere discovery of contraband in a shared cell constitutes “some evidence” that each prisoner in that cell possessed the contraband. View "Denny v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Interstate requested approval for nine outdoor advertising signs along U.S. Interstate-295, a major transportation corridor. The township then adopted an ordinance prohibiting billboards. The district court dismissed a constitutional challenge. The Third Circuit affirmed. A reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that there was an insufficient basis for the township’s conclusion that its billboard ban would directly advance its stated goal of improving the aesthetics of the community. The fact that Interstate will not be able to reach the distinct audience of travelers that it desires to target does not mean that adequate alternative means of communication do not exist. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that complete billboard bans may be the only reasonable means by which a legislature can advance its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. View "Interstate Outdoor Advertising, L.P. v. Zoning Bd., Twp of Mount Laurel" on Justia Law

Opponents sought to enjoin enforcement of N.J. STAT. ANN. 2 2C:58-2(a)(7) and 2C:58-3(i), the One Gun Law, as preempted by 15 U.S.C. 5001(g)(ii), which provides that no state shall prohibit sale (other than to minors) of traditional B-B, paint ball, or pellet-firing air guns that expel a projectile through the force of air pressure. The One Gun Law prohibits the purchase or sale of more than one handgun per person per month, including B-B and air guns. They also claimed that implementation of the Law violates the Due Process Clause because exemptions for certain groups, such as collectors of handguns and competitive shooters are essentially illusory. In order to purchase more than one handgun per month under an exemption, the applicant must list, on a state-provided application form, the particular handguns, by serial number, that she wishes to purchase, so that a collector must convince the seller to take a gun off the market while the application is processed. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Law is not so onerous as to be a de facto prohibition. Even if objectors have a property interest, they did not demonstrate a deprivation of that interest. View "Ass'n NJ Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Governor of NJ" on Justia Law

In 1996 mother reported to police that, during a visit to her father’s apartment, their 12-year-old (Linda) alleged that father made sexual advances. Mother obtained an order of protection after he twice failed to appear. The county agency classified father as an “indicated” child abuse perpetrator on Pennsylvania’s child abuse registry. Father was charged with indecent exposure and endangering a child’s welfare. He pled guilty to harassment; the remaining charges were dismissed. In subsequent years, Linda denied the incident. Mother and father resumed living together and were allowed, by the agency, to have related children in their home. After mother obtained custody of their grandchild, the agency removed all children from the home, based on father’s listing. By the time father attempted to appeal in 2007, the agency had destroyed its 1996 records. The listing was expunged in 2010. The district court rejected claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that the agency’s position with respect to the listing did not “shock the conscience” and that there was no showing of a deliberate decision to deprive the plaintiff of due process nor evidence that the agency employs a policy or has a custom of conducting desultory investigations. View "Mulholland v. Cnty. of Berks" on Justia Law

First Korean Church alleged that the township violated its First Amendment right to religious freedom, its Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and its rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 by preventing First Korean from using its property as a church and seminary. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the township. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "First Korean Church of NY, Inc. v. Cheltenham Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd." on Justia Law

The school district hired Connelly as a teacher. Connelly had nine years of teaching experience, all in Maryland. Because Connelly acquired his teaching experience outside Pennsylvania, the district credited him with only one year. Other new teachers with like experience acquired within Pennsylvania (but not in the district) received at least partial credit for each year they had taught. Connelly’s initial annual salary was $38,023, which was substantially less than the $49,476 Connelly alleged he would have received with full credit for his experience. Connelly‘s initial salary determination continued to adversely affect his pay. In 2011 Connelly filed suit, asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983: that failure to fully credit his out-of-state teaching experience violated his right to interstate travel under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and denied him equal protection of the law. The district court dismissed, holding that the classification alleged is based on location of teaching experience, not residency. The Third Circuit affirmed, applying rational basis review. A school district may rationally place a premium on teachers who have more experience working within the Pennsylvania school system in order to achieve the legitimate goal of an efficient and effective public education system. View "Connelly v. Steel Valley Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Johnson was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without any physical evidence or eyewitness testimony tying him to the crime. The testimony of Robles, Johnson’s friend, that Johnson had confessed guilt to him, was pivotal. Johnson filed multiple petitions under Pennsylvania’s Post-Conviction Relief Act, unsuccessfully claiming violations of Brady v. Maryland. He then unsuccessfully sought federal habeas relief. The Third Circuit reversed, noting that it was not until discovery in Johnson’s federal habeas case that previously undisclosed evidence was uncovered, showing that, at the time Robles testified, he was under investigation for his role in a shooting, an assault, and multiple shots-fired incidents. Robles, who was never charged with any crimes despite repeated dealings with police in investigations involving guns and drugs, supplied police with information concerning an unrelated crime when his own involvement in an assault came under investigation. The jury never heard the impeachment evidence because when Johnson sought discovery of information concerning any criminal activity of Robles, charged or uncharged, the District Attorney who prosecuted Johnson represented to the state court that it had no information or police reports naming Robles as a suspect. View "Johnson v. Folino" on Justia Law

Jenkins was convicted of drug-related offenses. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review. Jenkins timely filed a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act, which the trial court denied. He timely filed notice of appeal, but the superior court granted his attorney’s motion to withdraw and affirmed denial of his petition on November 10, 2009. On December 2, 2009, Jenkins filed a pro se pleading with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court entitled, “Motion to File Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, and for the Appointment of Counsel.” The Pennsylvania Supreme Court notified the Superior Court that Jenkins had filed a petition for allowance of appeal, but, on December 16, issued notice, stating that his pleading failed to comply with certain Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure unrelated to timing. Jenkins perfected his pleading on December 29, but, on April 27, 2010, the Supreme Court denied his pleading without opinion. On May 7, 2010, Jenkins filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court, sua sponte, raised the issue of timeliness and ultimately dismissed as untimely. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that Jenkins is eligible for statutory tolling of AEDPA’s limitation period. View "Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands" on Justia Law