Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries

PG sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of 25 Pa. Stat. 3060(d), a portion of the Pennsylvania Election Code mandating that all persons, except election officers, clerks, machine inspectors, overseers, watchers, persons in the course of voting, persons lawfully giving assistance to voters, and peace and police officers, when permitted by the provisions of this act, must remain at least ten (10) feet distant from the polling place during the progress of the voting. PG claimed that the statute infringed on its First Amendment “right to access and gather news at polling places” and that selective enforcement violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Third Circuit affirmed. There is no protected First Amendment right of access to a polling place for news-gathering purposes and there was no evidence of “invidious intent” or intentional discrimination. View "PG Publ'g Co. v. Aichele" on Justia Law

In 1987, Waterfront purchased 5.3 acres in Philadelphia’s Central Riverfront District, zoned G-2 industrial. In exchange for rezoning to C-4 commercial, for a mixed-use, high-rise project, Waterfront agreed to restrictive covenants. When financing became possible in 2005, Waterfront obtained a permit for demolishing existing structures and constructing a 28-story apartment tower and entered into a financing agreement with a construction start date of February 2006. Waterfront had to postpone construction. In March 2006, the city extended to the site a zoning overlay with a height restriction of 65 feet and a width restriction of 70 feet. Waterfront alleged mistake; that the area councilman admitted that inclusion of the site was a mistake; and that Mayor Street stated that he would not have signed it had he known that the height restriction applied to the site. Waterfront unsuccessfully sought repeal, but never applied for a permit under the ordinance and did not seek a variance. Waterfront filed suit. In 2010 the city rescinded application of the height restriction. The district court held that the rescission mooted federal constitutional claims, denied Waterfront’s motion to amend to attack the width restriction, and granted the city summary judgment on all other claims. The Third Circuit affirmed. View "CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Huff pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and 500 grams or more of powder cocaine (21 U.S.C. 846). The district court sentenced her to 12 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Because Huff had spent more than a year in prison awaiting trial, supervised release began in July 2008. In August 2010, the probation office informed the court that Huff had violated conditions of supervised release. Huff waived a hearing and agreed to home detention for three months. In April 2011, the probation office filed a second report after Huff was charged with driving under the influence, endangering the welfare of children, improper vehicle child restraint, public drunkenness, and failure to stop at a red light and stated that Huff had been non-compliant with other terms of supervision. The court sentenced her to 10 months’ incarceration with no subsequent supervised release. Huff filed notice of appeal in December 2011, but was released from custody in August 2012. The Third Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot. A litigant who is unconditionally released from custody must show that she will suffer collateral consequences from the supervised release revocation to present a live case or controversy. View "United States v. Huff" on Justia Law

Daughter, born in June 2004, suffered medical problems that stunted her growth. In October 2005, Mother took Daughter to Dr. Lindblad, who diagnosed failure to thrive. She was treated inpatient for six days and gained 50 grams per day, a gain normal for a child of Daughter’s age and condition. After returning to Mother’s care, Daughter gained only four grams per day. Lindblad again prescribed inpatient treatment and, in April 2006, concluded that Daughter’s condition was psychosocial; he feared that Daughter was neglected and noted concern about Munchausen by proxy. He spoke to a child welfare caseworker, who was already investigating the situation. A judge ordered Daughter removed to her father’s home, with Mother to have only supervised visitation. Caseworkers thought it unnecessary to hold the hearing that Pennsylvania law would require were Daughter taken into state custody. Mother received no explanation of how to arrange for a hearing. After Daughter was removed, discrepancies in her recorded weights were discovered. Mother’s habeas petition, filed 40 days after removal, was rejected. Mother and father later agreed to share custody. The district court rejected Mother’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for trial on procedural due process claims. View "B. S. v. Somerset Cnty." on Justia Law

Nicole, age 15, sent a text message to a friend stating that she planned to commit suicide by ingesting ibuprofen pills. The friend called 911 and soon Officer Marshall of the Wright Township Police Department arrived at the residence, with two other officers and emergency medical personnel. When questioned by her parents, Nicole admitted that she had planned to commit suicide, but said that she had changed her mind and had not ingested any pills. Officer Marshall stated that Nicole had to go to the hospital. Her parents disagreed, but Marshall informed them that he would charge them with assisted manslaughter if something happened to Nicole because they did not send Nicole to the hospital. They relented. They initially refused to accompany her, stating that they felt unable to travel because they had taken prescription medication earlier that evening. Mrs. James eventually agreed to go to the hospital with her daughter, but later brought suit (42 U.S.C. 1983). The district court dismissed claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, but did not grant Marshall qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed. Mrs. James was not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. View "James v. City of Wilkes Barre " on Justia Law

Delaware State Police obtained search warrants for Pavulak’s email account and workplace after receiving information that he was viewing child pornography on his workplace computers. Evidence was seized, he was convicted of possessing, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(5)(B), and attempting to produce child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and (e), attempting to entice a minor, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b), and committing crimes related to his status as a sex offender, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court sentenced him to life imprisonment on the attempted-production conviction and to 120 months’ imprisonment on the remaining counts. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that the evidence should have been suppressed. The warrants were supported by an affidavit that pointed to Pavulak‘s prior child-molestation convictions and labeled the images, which had been reported by informants, simply as child pornography. No further details concerning the images content appeared in the affidavit, which was, therefore, insufficient to establish probable cause for child pornography, but the officers reasonably relied on the warrants in good faith. View "Unted Smith v. Pavulak" on Justia Law

Giles was a prisoner in the Delaware penal system. Campbell worked at the Sussex Correctional Institution. Giles brought excessive force and deliberate indifference claims, 42 U.S.C. 1983, against officers, including Campbell, based on a confrontation during Giles’s transfer to Sussex and against others regarding his medical treatment after the incident. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of several defendants, including Campbell, on the basis of qualified immunity, held a bench trial, and entered judgment in favor of remaining defendants. The Third Circuit remanded the summary judgment. On remand, the Delaware Department of Justice, which had represented defendants, notified the court that Campbell had died in July 2006. Giles moved to substitute the administratrix of Campbell’s estate as a defendant. Neither the suggestion of death nor the motion to substitute was served on the estate. The district court denied the motion to substitute, holding that Giles’s claim was not pending under Delaware law and was extinguished. Giles proceeded to trial and the jury found in favor of the remaining defendants. The Third Circuit vacated denial of the motion to substitute, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the estate. View "Giles v. Campbell" on Justia Law

In 1989, Copenhefer was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, attempted robbery, attempted theft by extortion, and terroristic threats. As to the murder conviction, the jury found two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstances, making a death sentence mandatory. The court imposed the death sentence and consecutive sentences totaling 20 to 40 years on remaining counts. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. A trial court denied a petition under Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act; the Supreme Court again affirmed. In 1999, Copenhefer filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court granted habeas relief from the death sentence on the ground that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that it was required to find that Copenhefer’s lack of a prior criminal record constituted a mitigating circumstance. The Third Circuit reversed, reinstating the original sentence. The court rejected additional claims that counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to challenge the Commonwealth’s theory that the victim lingered before dying and that the Commonwealth exercised peremptory strikes to remove female jurors. View "Copenhefer v. Horn" on Justia Law

Bistrian, an inmate at the Federal Detention Center in Philadelphia, filed 108-page complaint with 114 pages of exhibits, alleging that, while he was awaiting sentencing on wire-fraud charges, prison investigators used him to intercept notes being passed among other inmates, and then failed to protect him after they flubbed the operation and the inmates discovered his involvement. When the target inmates threatened to retaliate, Bistrian contends he repeatedly requested help, but no preventive measures were taken. Later, one of the inmates against whom Bistrian had cooperated, along with others, beat him while they were together in a locked recreation pen. A few months later, an inmate wielding a razor-blade type weapon attacked Bistrian in the recreation pen. Bistrian also claimed that certain of the 447 days he spent in segregation violated his substantive due process, procedural due process, and free speech rights. After the district court ruled on motions, six counts survived against 28 defendants. The Third Circuit affirmed in part. Counts that survived include: deliberate indifference to medical needs; substantive due process violations by failure to protect and by punitive detention; procedural due process; and retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. View "Bistrian v. Levi" on Justia Law

Garrus was convicted of voluntary manslaughter in 2001. At sentencing, the judge increased his sentence beyond the statutory maximum based on 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. 9714, the “three strikes” law. To do so, the judge made a finding that Garrus had previously been convicted of burglarizing an occupied building, when, in fact, he had only pled guilty to, and been convicted of, second degree burglary (which, under Pennsylvania law, necessarily requires that the burglarized building was unoccupied). In a habeas petition, Garrus argued that this judicial fact-finding violated the Supreme Court's 2000 holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, requiring that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court denied the petition on the basis that the highest state court determination upholding the sentence was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Third Circuit reversed. The state court determination upholding Garrus‟s sentence was objectively unreasonable. View "Garrus v. Johnson" on Justia Law