Justia Constitutional Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in U.S. 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
Wolfe v. Clarke
This matter was previously before the Fourth Circuit on appeal. Petitioner Justin Michael Wolfe, a Virginia prisoner, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death by the Commonwealth in 2002. By its decision in 2009, the Court remanded for further proceedings. Specifically, "Wolfe I" instructed the district court to determine whether Petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and other discovery; to decide in the first instance whether, under "Schlup v. Delo," (513 U.S. 298 (1995)), Petitioner had made a sufficient showing of actual innocence to clear any procedural bars to his constitutional claims; and to assess Petitioner claim, among others, that the prosecution had contravened his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, as recognized in "Brady v. Maryland," (373 U.S. 83 (1963)), by suppressing favorable and material evidence. On remand, the district court heeded the Fourth Circuit's "Wolfe I" mandate, authorized appropriate discovery and conducted an evidentiary hearing, and ruled in Petitioner's favor on the Schlup issue and his Brady and two additional claims. The court vacated Petitioner's capital murder and other convictions, and ordered the Commonwealth to either retry him within 120 days or release him unconditionally from custody. The judgment was stayed pending this appeal by the Commonwealth, which was initiated on its behalf by Respondent Harold Clarke, Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections. The Commonwealth challenged the remand proceedings from start to finish, contending that the district court erred in its procedural and substantive rulings. Because the Fourth Circuit concluded that the court's award of habeas corpus relief on Petitioner's Brady claim was not made in error, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment.
United States v. Davis
A jury convicted Defendant Earl Whittley Davis of various federal offenses arising from a course of conduct that included the armed robbery and murder during that robbery of an armored car employee, Jason Schwindler, as well as a subsequent carjacking. On appeal, Defendant challenged the use of DNA evidence against him at trial, and also argued that the district court erred in excluding expert testimony proffered by Defendant in an attempt to undermine an eyewitness identification of him. Upon review of the matter, the Fourth Circuit found no error and affirmed the judgment of the district court.
Wilson v. Flaherty
Five years after Eric Wilson fully served his sentence for a Virginia state rape conviction, he filed a habeas corpus petition to challenge his conviction. To satisfy the statute's jurisdictional requirement that he be "in custody" at the time he filed his petition, Wilson alleged that the sex offender registration requirements of Virginia and Texas law impose sufficiently substantial restraints on his liberty so as to amount to custody. The district court dismissed Wilson’s petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because he had fully served the sentence for his rape conviction, he was no longer "in custody," as required by statute. Upon review of the matter, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court and affirmed its decision.
United States v. Chappell
On October 6, 2009, Defendant-Appellant Douglas Chappell was stopped for speeding by a U.S. Park Police Officer. In an attempt to avoid a speeding ticket, Defendant falsely told the officer that he was a Fairfax County Deputy Sheriff. In fact, Defendant had not been employed by the Fairfax County Sheriff's Office for approximately one year. The officer asked Defendant for his law enforcement credentials, and Defendant replied that he had left them at home. He then produced his Virginia driver's license, pointing out that the license photo depicted him in uniform. In order to verify Defendant's employment, the officer called the Fairfax County Sheriff's Office, which requested an employee identification number. When asked for his employee identification number, Defendant made one up. He subsequently admitted his lie and was arrested for impersonating a police officer. Defendant appealed his subsequent conviction, and on appeal, asked the Fourth Circuit to hold the statute under which he was charged as facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit declined the invitation and affirmed the judgment of the district court.
United States v. Dinkins
In this appeal, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the convictions of three defendants who were tried together on charges relating to the murder of certain government witnesses, the murder of a coconspirator, and numerous other narcotics and firearms-related offenses arising from the defendants' involvement in a drug-trafficking organization in Baltimore. Among the several issues presented, the Court considered: (1) the district court's decision to empanel an "anonymous jury," in which biographical information about prospective jurors was withheld from the parties and their counsel; and (2) the admissibility of hearsay statements of a murdered government witness under the "forfeiture-by-wrongdoing" exception to the hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. Upon review of the trial court record, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in maintaining juror anonymity, and that the challenged hearsay statements were admissible based on the defendants' conduct leading to the witness' death. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court on these and all other issues presented.
United States v. Smoot
Following a jury trial in Maryland, Petitioner Charles Lee Smoot was convicted and sentenced to prison for being a felon in possession of a firearm. On appeal, Petitioner contended that his possession of the firearm was legally justified, or, in the alternative, that he was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the jury was misinstructed on an essential element of the offense. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Petitioner's challenges to his conviction, and another to his sentence, and affirmed.
Barahona v. Holder, Jr.
Petitioner Jose Barahona, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned the Fourth Circuit for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (the "BIA") which affirmed his ineligibility for a "special rule" cancellation of removal under section 203 of the Nicaraguan and Central American Relief Act of 1997 (the "NACARA"). Petitioner contended that the BIA erred by deeming him ineligible for NACARA relief because he had provided material support to a terrorist organization in the early 1980s by allowing anti-government Salvadoran guerrillas of the so-called "FMLN" (the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Libercion Nacional) the use of the kitchen of his Salvadoran home. Upon review, the Court rejected Petitioner's contentions and denied his petition for review.
United States v. Gomez
Defendant-Appellant Mirna Del Carmen Gomez, a citizen of El Salvador, pled guilty to unlawful reentry of a deported alien after an aggravated felony conviction. Although she agreed with the statement of facts submitted by the government in support of her guilty plea, Defendant objected to the government's assertion that her prior conviction for child abuse under Maryland law amounted to a crime of violence for purposes of the U.S.S.G. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) sentencing enhancement. According to Defendant, because the relevant portion of the statute did not contain a division between forceful and nonforceful conduct, the district court could not use the modified categorical approach to determine that her prior child abuse conviction was a crime of violence. The district court employed the modified categorical approach to determine that Defendant's child abuse conviction constituted a crime of violence and added sixteen levels to her base offense level. Thereafter, the district court calculated her Guidelines range to be forty-one to fifty-one months, but made a downward variance and sentenced her to twenty-four months' imprisonment. Because the Fourth Circuit found that the district court's application of the modified categorical approach to the indivisible provision at issue was in error, it vacated Defendant's sentence and remanded for resentencing.
United States v. Brehm
Defendant-Appellant Sean Theodore Brehm, a citizen of South Africa, pled guilty to a federal charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury, on condition that he be allowed to challenge through appeal the jurisdictional basis of the indictment underlying his conviction. The grand jury accused Defendant of stabbing a British subject, "J.O.," during an altercation at Kandahar Airfield, while both men were employed with private contractors supporting the NATO war effort in Afghanistan. On appeal, Defendant argued that the indictment's reliance on the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act was misplaced, in that the statute (which Defendant admitted was valid on its face) could not be applied to him in a manner consistent with the Constitution. Defendant also asserted that the government failed to establish a sufficient nexus between him and the United States to support the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, pointing out that, prior to his arrival in Virginia as an accused, neither he nor his victim had ever set foot in this country. Upon review, the Fourth Circuit rejected Defendant's challenges to his conviction and affirmed the district court's judgment.
US v. Mubdi
Defendant-Appellant Mantel Mubdi entered a conditional guilty plea to drug and firearm charges, reserving the right to challenge the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during a traffic stop. The district court sentenced him to 300 months' imprisonment. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because the officers who stopped his car lacked probable cause to execute the stop. Alternatively, Defendant argued that the officers unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop to conduct an open-air canine sniff of his car. Finding no error, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.